著者

加藤 泰史 高木 駿 馬場 智一 小島 毅 納富 信留 建石 真公子 芝崎 厚士 後藤 玲子 杉本 俊介 田坂 さつき 柳橋 晃

出版者

椙山女学園大学

雑誌

学術変革領域研究(A)

巻号頁・発行日

2023-04-01

---

本総括班は、「領域運営調整会議」「ジェンダー学会議」「評価会議」を主導的に開催することで、本領域研究を適切に遂行できる環境と条件を整えると同時に、Web上にHPを作成して研究成果を各計画研究班で共有できるように工夫したりその都度社会に向けて発信したりできるようにする。その際に、各計画研究代表者の役割を明確にし、特に特任助教や特任研究員等の採用といった若手支援を適切に遂行できるように促す。また、年度毎の論文集の企画や『講座 尊厳』、さらに社会へのアウトリーチ等の企画にも責任を持つ。

著者

田坂 さつき

出版者

立正大学大学院文学研究科

雑誌

立正大学大学院紀要 = Bulletin of the Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, Rissho University (ISSN:09112960)

巻号頁・発行日

no.31, pp.79-98, 2015

著者

田坂 さつき

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.22-32, 1998-03-23

---

In the last argument of the first part in the Theaetetus(184b4-187a8), Socrates tries to refute the first definition of knowledge that it is perception. In the argument he distinguishes between perception and consideration and argues that being(ουσια) belongs to consideration, but not to perception, and therefore that the definition is false, for whatever being does not belong to a being cannot be knowledge. According to the orthodox interpretation, Plato distinguishes between making judgement and having sense experience, and argues that in order to make any judgement one must grasp being, for every judgement has a propositional construction, which requires being as one of its constituents. But in sense experience, for example, in sight we see a colour of an object, but do not see a proposition that an object is coloured in such and such a way. So sense experience does not yield judgement. Hence it is not knowledge. But I cannot accept this interpretation, because it cannot explain why the arguments of the second part restrict kinds of judgement to identity. According to it, the conclusion of the last argument of the first part concludes that perception is not knowledge, but judgement can be knowledge. It follows that any kind of judgement can be a candidate for knowledge. But the argument of the second part deals only with identity judgements. So the orthodox interpretation cannot explain why they restrict kinds of judgement to identity ones. In my view, Plato does not distinguish between making judgement and having sense experience, but between considering basic comprehension in language about our experience and having sense experience. When Theaetetus agress that colour can be percieved through eyes and sound through ears(184c1-185a3), he considers that colour is one thing, sound is another, and that there are 'both things'(αμφοτερω)at once(cf. 185a4-10). Now Socrates analyzes the contents of Theaetetus' consideration in this way: (1) Theaetetus previously considers that there are both(sc. a colour and a sound) (185a8-10). (2) He considers that each of them is distinct from the other and the same as itself(185a11-b1). (3) He considers that both together are two, and each of them is one (185b2-3). (4) He can investigate whether they both are alike each other or unlike (185b4-6). Plato uses the expression 'being(εστον)' in (1), but not in (2)(3)(4) by ellipsis. Plato pays attention to (1). (1) is an assumption for Theaetetus' consideration of 'both things'. So the being(εστον) in (1) means an existential assumption, which is necessary to thinking or saying in language. Theaetetus' consideration of 'both things' is also expressed as the consideration that each is and each is not(cf. 185c5-6, c9). To avoid any jump of logic, the consideration that, for example, colour is colour, and colour is not sound. This is an identifying judgement. So the consideration of 'both things, is composed of four contents((1)〜(4)), namely an existential assumption ((1)), and two comparisons with each other((2), (4)) and calculation of number((3)). We can say, therefore, Plato uses 'being' in two senses, that is, the sense of existence and the sense of identity, in this passage, when we consider the basic comprehension about our experience. But the identifying judgement includes the existential assumption ((1)). Thus, if we don't consider 'both things' as comprehended above, we cannot intend to observe and describe each of them and say that an object is perceived to be in such and such a way. Therefore our experience, for example, perceiving, observing, saying, describing, etc., is based on this sort of comprehension in our mind. Therefore, according to my interpretation, it is reasonable to restrict kind of judgement to identity alone, in the argument of the second part. For it has shown that the last argument of the first part itself has already done so. It has the merit of being able to find out the logical connection between the two arguments without difficulty. Hence we must conclude that in the last argument of part 1 Plato dintinguishes between having experience and considering basic comprehension about our language

著者

納富 信留 栗原 裕次 佐野 好則 荻原 理 大芝 芳弘 田中 伸司 高橋 雅人 土橋 茂樹 田坂 さつき 近藤 智彦

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2008

---

古代ギリシアにおける「正義」概念を明らかにし、現代社会の諸問題に応える目的で、プラトン『国家』(ポリテイア)を共同で検討した。その研究成果は、将来まとめて欧文研究書として海外で出版することを目標に、国際学会や研究会で報告され、欧文論文として海外の雑誌・論文集に発表されている。2010年夏に慶應義塾大学で開催された国際プラトン学会大会(プラトン『国家』がテーマ)では、メンバーが運営と研究の中核として、内外の専門家と共同で研究を推進した。

著者

伊勢 俊彦 田坂 さつき

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.72, pp.7-8, 2021-04-01 (Released:2021-05-20)

著者

田坂 さつき 島薗 進 一ノ瀬 正樹 石井 哲也 香川 知晶 土井 健司 安藤 泰至 松原 洋子 柳原 良江 鈴木 晶子 横山 広美

出版者

立正大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2019-04-01

---

本研究は、日本学術会議第24期連携会員哲学委員会「いのちと心を考える」分科会委員のうち9名が参画し、同分科会委員長田坂さつきを研究代表者とする。本研究には、政府が主催する会議などの委員を歴任した宗教学者島薗進、倫理学者香川知晶に加えて、医学・医療領域の提言のまとめ役でもあり、ゲノム編集による生物医学研究の黎明期から先導的に発言してきた石井哲也も参画している。医学・医療領域におけるゲノム編集に関する提言に対して、哲学・倫理の観点からゲノム編集の倫理規範の構築を目指す提言を作成し、ゲノム編集の法規制の根拠となる倫理的論拠を構築することを目指す。

著者

田坂 さつき

出版者

湘南工科大学

雑誌

湘南工科大学紀要 = Memoirs of Shonan Institute of Technology (ISSN:09192549)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.103-115, 2003-03-18

---

In the first part of Theaetetus (151d7.187a8), Theaetetus tries to define knowledge as perception. In the first half of this part (151d7.160d4), Plato explains the interrelation between this definition and the two theses, which are 'Man is the measure of all things', and 'All things really are in a process of becoming as the result of movement and change'. And Plato argues that these two are based on the thesis 'Nothing is one thing just by itself'. In the second half of the first part, Plato provides 9 arguments against the definition and two theses severally, so the definition is refuted. This paper attempts to clarify the structure of the 9 arguments, in addition to identifying the Plato's aim in refuting the definition. In my view of this paper, Plato argues that knowledge cannot be based on the thesis 'Nothing is one thing just by itself', because our use of language is in direct conflict with this thesis.In the first part of Theaetetus (151d7.187a8), Theaetetus tries to define knowledge as perception. In the first half of this part (151d7.160d4), Plato explains the interrelation between this definition and the two theses, which are 'Man is the measure of all things', and 'All things really are in a process of becoming as the result of movement and change'. And Plato argues that these two are based on the thesis 'Nothing is one thing just by itself'. In the second half of the first part, Plato provides 9 arguments against the definition and two theses severally, so the definition is refuted. This paper attempts to clarify the structure of the 9 arguments, in addition to identifying the Plato's aim in refuting the definition. In my view of this paper, Plato argues that knowledge cannot be based on the thesis 'Nothing is one thing just by itself', because our use of language is in direct conflict with this thesis.

著者

田坂 さつき

出版者

湘南工科大学

雑誌

湘南工科大学紀要 = Memoirs of Shonan Institute of Technology (ISSN:09192549)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.95-105, 2004-03-18

---

The problem of how it is possible for anyone to have false beliefs is introduced in the second part of the Theaetetus. The discussion on the false belief is divided into five sections. In this paper only the last section is discussed. Plato makes the last attempt to solve the problem with the Aviary Model here, but again he turns to be unsuccessful as well as in the previous four sections. The major task of this paper is to discuss what Plato's problem of the false belief is, and how this problem relates to the main topic `What is knowledge? '. Plato explains that man has a false belief when he recognizes an object with an expression which should not apply to the thing.The problem of how it is possible for anyone to have false beliefs is introduced in the second part of the Theaetetus. The discussion on the false belief is divided into five sections. In this paper only the last section is discussed. Plato makes the last attempt to solve the problem with the Aviary Model here, but again he turns to be unsuccessful as well as in the previous four sections. The major task of this paper is to discuss what Plato's problem of the false belief is, and how this problem relates to the main topic `What is knowledge? '. Plato explains that man has a false belief when he recognizes an object with an expression which should not apply to the thing.