著者
横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)
参考文献数
56

In his “Demonstratives”, David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.
著者
島村 修平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
24

It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.
著者
林 晃紀
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.55-75, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)

When we read Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, we often feel baffled because it is difficult to draw out a systematic theory from the text. Given this exegetical problem, it is often said that Wittgenstein never intends to propound any theory; rather his aim of philosophy is therapeutic.     The problem of rule-following has been most often argued among the topics in the Investigations. Most of approaches to the problem, however, are not therapeutic but constructive. The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of rule-following from a perspective of therapeutic philosophy.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_79-1_94, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
32

Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, pace Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other.
著者
佐金 武
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
12

The central thesis to presentism is that only the present exists; what is past no longer exists and future does not exist yet. One problem with this position is how to explicate the asymmetry of time. In ordinary talk, we say that the past is fixed whereas the future is still open. How can we cash out such metaphors? The answer, however, will not automatically follow from presentism itself because past and future are said to be ontologically on par, both being nonexistent. In this essay, I first introduce a theory of presentism, which I call Tensed-Property Presentism, and show how it can explicate the asymmetry of time.
著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.1-17, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
2

The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.
著者
野中 哲士
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.2, pp.21-40, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)
参考文献数
31

I present an approach to the problems of perception that explicitly considers the material basis of the perceptual information picked up by active agents. Taking into account the reservoir of information external to the perceiver makes it possible to study activity before sensory signals have been aroused by stimuli, an activity that orients the organs of perception and explores for the external information. Drawing on J. J. Gibsonʼs ecological approach and the recent discussions on reservoir computing, I illustrate how the consideration of the material basis of potentially informative patterns could fundamentally change the traditional theories on perception.
著者
鈴木 生郎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
21

The paradox of coincidence, a paradox about the relation between a material object and its stuff, has been paid a great attention to in recent metaphysics. In this paper, I compare two influential approaches to this paradox; sortalism and fourdimensional worm theory, and defend sortalism. I give the following two arguments. (1) Worm theory, like sortalism, must introduce sortal concepts to resolve the paradox. So both approaches owe the (almost) same theoretical burden to explain how sortal concepts work. (2) Worm theory, unlike sortalism, introduces sortal concepts in a very problematic way.
著者
石田 正人
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_29-1_44, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
23
被引用文献数
1 1

This paper focuses on C. S. Peirce's philosophy of logic and mathematics pertinent to the so-called model-theoretic tradition in formal logic. While it is common to trace the development of model-theoretic logic back to Peirce, closer textual study tends to reveal that there is a gap between the work of Peirce and what was later achieved by, among others, Löwenheim and Skolem. As Peirce's nonstandard model of the theory of reals suggests, however, Peirce does belong to the model-theoretic tradition at least in a broad sense. This paper thus makes efforts to better situate Peirce in the model-theoretic movement by considering Cantor's influence on Peirce, which most probably motivated Peirce to develop his nonstandard model of the reals. The paper also endeavors to shed light on Peirce's highly original ideas regarding the logic of mathematics seen in this particular context.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015

In <i>Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge</i> (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Ueharas distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.
著者
島村 修平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012

It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.
著者
小川 芳範
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.1, pp.1-13, 2002

In this paper, I consider a philosophical interpretation of Hilbert's program put forward by Paul Bernays. The paper consists, roughly, of two parts. In the first part, I briefly describe Bernays's polemic against "immanence philosophy" over the question concerning the epistemological status of theoretical sciences and its relation to the foundational controversy in mathematics in the 1920s. In the second part, I briefly discuss the theory of cognition contained in the transcendental philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries and his twentieth century evangelist, Leonard<BR>Nelson, and consider Bernays's view against the background of this intellectual tradition. I conclude the paper by arguing for the importance of attending to Friesian influence in order to achieve a deeper understanding of Bernays's (and Hilbert's) philosophy of mathematics.
著者
太田 紘史 谷辺 哲史
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.2, pp.3-26, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
63

There is an emerging experimental trend in bioethics and neuroethics. We briefly review several topics in this trend and discuss how the existing and future studies can have normative implications related to bioethical/neuroethical issues. Particularly, we consider three major ways to draw such implications; (1) contributing to conceptual analysis and philosophical (counter-)evidence, (2) figuring out the unreliability of moral thinking and thereby providing a debunking argument, and (3) estimating the feasibility of ethical norms and policies.
著者
石原 孝二
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.17-32, 2014

Throughout the history of modern psychiatry, descriptive methods and operational definitions have featured prominently in endeavors to objectively refer to and classify mental disorders. An alternative to these descriptive approaches is the argument based on the concepts of "natural kinds" and "dysfunction" such as Wakefieldʼs "harmful dysfunction" model. However, none of these approaches seem promising for understanding the nature of mental disorders. This paper proposes that we abandon the prevalent tendency to objectively classify mental disorders, revert to the original meaning of psychiatry (Psychiaterie), a term coined by J. C. Reil, as a method of therapy, and reexamine the concept of mental disorder.
著者
野村 尚新
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.1-16, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
20
被引用文献数
2

Does Pegasus fly? We believe most of you would answer “yes”without thinking it actually exists in this world. On the other hand,W. V. Quine argued that if we let some existential formula be true,we have to commit the existence of the object which is essential to let the formula be true. So that it can be said that there is a gap between Quine’s ontological argument and ontology in our daily life. Our goal in this paper is to fill the gap and expand Quine’s argument by relying on Meinongian philosophy, especially G. Priest’s neo-Meinongianism called Noneism, which admits different types of existence.
著者
小草 泰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_29-1_49, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
16
被引用文献数
2

Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.
著者
将積 茂
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.59-72, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
20

In his paper "What is dialectic?" K. Popper tried to point out many limitations in the modern dialectic, from the angle of method of trial and error. His criticism on dialectic is very radical and suggestive. This paper intends to make some of his arguments clear, and set forth dialectician's explanations of them.
著者
山田 友幸
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.2, pp.1-16, 2013-12-20 (Released:2014-06-28)
参考文献数
10

John Searleʼs discussion of the gaps in rational action raises serious problems for the commonsense view that an explanation of an agentʼs action in terms of her reason for doing what she did is a species of causal explanation. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the problems Searle's discussion raises and examine the relation between the experienced gaps and the neurobiological processes in the brain.