著者

鳥飼 将雅

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.98-116, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

20

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Although the political processes in specific regions of Russia have attracted much scholarly attention since the collapse of the USSR, the number of case studies involving the North-Caucasian ethnic republics has been quite limited. Consequently, a rather shallow and stereotypical understanding emphasizing only limited aspects of the politics in these republics has been represented in the academic discussion. Building on information from local news-sources and interviews in Dagestan, this study highlights three overlooked but important aspects: (1) the consociational nature and instability between the regional and municipal governments in Dagestan politics, (2) the uniqueness of electoral mobilization in Dagestan, and (3) the struggle to consolidate the power vertical following Ramazan Abdulatipov’s appointment as the governor.The consociational nature of Dagestan politics, particularly in the 1990s, has been discussed by several specialists. While this uniqueness was guaranteed by the legal and constitutional framework of Dagestan, the Kremlin’s initiative to force regional governments to revise regional laws to comply with federal laws removed these constraints. However, by scrutinizing the composition of the regional assembly, this study shows that the balance of power among ethnic groups has been maintained informally in contemporary Dagestan. Moreover, an analysis of municipal level elites reveals the independence of diverse actors in Dagestan’s politics, which has resulted in an unstable regime.This study also highlights the difficulty of aligning our understanding of electoral mobilization in Dagestan with the general conception of political machines in the non-Russian ethnic republics. Although, as the literature on Russian electoral politics points out, turnout and support for incumbent candidates and parties in federal-level elections are extremely high in Dagestan, mayoral elections have proved highly competitive, implying that electoral mobilization in Dagestan is not controlled by the regional government but rather by clan groups whose activities are rampant at the municipal level. This finding demonstrates the need to modify the prevailing concept of Russian political machines, which has been based mainly on case studies of ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, to explain Dagastanʼs uniqueness.Finally, governors recently sent from the center have begun to establish the power vertical in Dagestan in order to enforce stable rule by the federal government. The fourth governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, was the first outsider governor in Dagestan since WWII. His close relationship with the Kremlin enabled him to neutralize several local clans that were firmly rooted in specific municipalities, although this attempt was left incomplete. His successor, Vladimir Vas’liev, had had no ties whatsoever to Dagestan prior to his inauguration as governor. Given his efforts to thoroughly transform Dagestan’s politics, there is an urgent need to observe whether this transformation, with support from the Kremlin, will succeed.Whereas the main focus is on the contemporary political process in Dagestan, the implications of this case study offer a deeper understanding of Russian federalism during Putin’s presidency. Study findings also show the importance of case studies focused on specific regions, even in centralized Russia, in order to expand our understanding of federalism and electoral politics in Russia.

著者

加藤 有子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.35-53, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

48

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In the interwar period, after the end of the partition, Polish literature was finally freed from national themes, and writers could focus more on language. Moreover, languages of the newly independent nations became national languages of their respective countries. Based on the understanding that artistic and social interest in languages increased during this period, this paper explores the concept of a new language in the futurist manifests (1921) and the novel I Burn Paris (1928), both written by Bruno Jasieński. My aim is to present I Burn Paris—regarded as a communist ideological novel—as a work featuring issues related to language, and to show Jasieński’s consequent longing for a new universal language.First, I discuss the recreation of the traditional Polish messianism (i.e., the suffering Poland would be reborn to save the world) by Jasieński, in one of his futurist manifests: “To the Polish Nation. Manifest of Immediate Futurization of Life” (1921). Jasieński rewrote the messianism as a socialist one, according to which the new Poland would reform the old capitalist Europe. This idea of a new world recurs in I Burn Paris as the concept of a new common language.Second, based on archival research, I show I Burn Paris was simultaneously translated into many languages and went through many printings, through that its different versions circulated. This research also shows the role of the international communist network in circulating literary works. Thanks to the network, East European writers writing in minor languages could join the modernist movement centered in big cities in Western Europe or in Russia. This was true also for the writers writing in Yiddish, a diaspora language. Considering these two diasporic networks, I propose to reconsider the West-Eurocentric map of 20th century modernism.Third, I present an unknown version of I Burn Paris with an alternative ending to the standard Polish version. My archival research shows that this version was circulated in Russian by 1934, when the socialist realist version revised by Jasieński was issued. The alternative ending is set two years after the ending of the standard version and mentions that the global revolution has already been accomplished. The novel’s reception by the Polish community in the USSR suggests that the ending was added to the Russian version to protect Jasieński from the expected criticism for the initial ideologically weak ending and the lack of depiction of class struggles. Further, I suggest that Jasieński wrote the alternative ending because it involves a longing for a new common language, which was his ultimate concern in his 1921 futurism manifest to the 1930 article written in Moscow. Jasieński believed that a new world should have a new common language, understandable by everyone and which, in turn, would create a new society.The repeated rewriting hints at Jasieński’s opportunism, but in fact, it was a result of his view on artistic creation. “Every movement ends with its manifest.” He viewed a novel as a performative “manifest,” which he had to ceaselessly overcome to create new one.

著者

生熊 源一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.72-89, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

参考文献数

30

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This paper discusses the problem of characters in Moscow Conceptualism, a unique school of Soviet underground art in the 1970s and 1980s. With their tendency for narrative, artists called Conceptualists invented an original style of creating a character who plays a role as an imaginary author of works made by Conceptualists. In other words, there were some occasions on which Conceptualists thought of their own works as products of a character whom they themselves worked out. They called this figure of the author “An Artist-Character.” As art-critic Boris Groys pointed out by giving an example of characters made by Conceptualist Ilya Kabakov, this invention had a relationship with the problem of self-image in Moscow Conceptualism. How then has this strategy of the characters been developed in texts and works by Conceptualists? There were lively discussions about the concept of “An Artist-Character” among Conceptualists. Therefore, the first half of this paper analyzes various descriptions of it. It was found that a range of meanings attached to this figure had been expanded as follows. In the beginning, “An Artist-Character” meant a relatively simple figure of the fictitious author; however, late examples show us a broader and more abstract conception. In the late 80s, Conceptualists such as Kabakov and Andrey Monastyrsky, started to express the function of detachment from themselves by this term. At the same time, a range in application of this effect also expanded; there appeared such new types of characters as “A Viewer-Character” and “A Critic-Character.” This expanded concept of “characterness” does not end within the bounds of the initial position of “An Artist-Character” as an imaginary author. The second half of the paper seeks to find the expanded function of characters in their activities. Works of the Conceptualists of each generation (Viktor Pivovarov, Monastyrsky and the “Collective Actions” group, Vadim Zakharov) were investigated from the viewpoint of the characters’ theme. What is common to their works is that characters’ images are not standardized by means of reduction, distance, emptiness, and so on. Another aspect of these characters is linked to observation: they can, of course, play a role as outside observers, but the focus is now on the art of being seen and written about, observed and described, which means that the role of characters could be related to the problem of archiving. What matters is that the “Collective Actions” group and Zakharov are known for their archival activity. Zakharov even invented a character called “A Pastor,” which was also the name of a journal he had published from 1992 to 2001. As shown by the figure of the pastor as archivist, the observation of characters has a relationship with documentation in Moscow Conceptualism. In this way, through the figure of characters, the problem of archiving can also be understood as a strategy of images. Therefore, it can be said that the invention of characters in Moscow Conceptualism was the soil for developing the technique of self-description in this community.

著者

門間 卓也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.103-118, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

43

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The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was constructed as a Nazi-puppet state, which spanned across a large part of what is now Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Because of its close relationship to the Nazi Party, Ustasha—a notorious Croatian political organization—attained power over NDH. Core members of the group emulated the fascist movements during WWI and WWII in Europe and forged ahead with a similar totalitarian policy in NDH, revising previous systems of governance.The highest aim of these reforms was the achievement of national unity, implanting the ‘Ustasha spirit’ throughout the nation. Considering the nationalistic character of the Ustasha movement, it seems reasonable to suppose that ideological discourses on nationalization were consistent inside the regime. However, previous studies have argued that the relationship between Ustasha and Tias Mortigjija—the chief editor of the major weekly newspaper Spremnost from May 1943 to the end of 1944—became tense due to disagreements regarding the editorial policy. Considering the variable nature of Croatian nationalism at that time, which was caused by increasing communist resistance and tangled relations with the Axis powers, the specific course of action of nationalization under the NDH regime must be investigated.This article analyses how Spremnost carried on propaganda work about Croatian nationalism during the period when Mortigjija was the chief director. Regarding the ideology of the Ustasha movement, it must be noticed that the leadership coped with the mobilization of the youth from the outset of NDH, training them as ‘elites’ who would conduct state affairs in the future. Ustasha thus implemented various educational policy measures to establish elitism in the mind of the younger generation (founding the Ustasha Youth, ‘purifying’ the school and the university and so on). As a result of this fascistic attempt, Zagreb University students were encouraged to develop their own political consciousness and became radicalized to adopt a resolution in April 1944 that asserted their loyalty to the Ustasha movement. Despite the discordance with the regime, Mortigjija seemed to sympathize with the appearance of the ‘elite’. The propaganda of Spremnost thus began to feature content associated with the Zagreb University students’ resolution and the student journal Plug, which was published in 1944.Initially, Ustasha defined the image of the Croatian state as one that belonged to the ‘West’, including it in the cultural circle of Europe, and one that had a vital role as a bulwark against the ‘East’. However, through the political rhetoric of Spremnost and Plug, this image was transformed, arguing that the Croatian state was a guardian of the Balkan States and emphasizing the cultural legacy of the ‘West’. On the other hand, the image of Croats was modified to reflect changing religious policies. The leadership reinterpreted Orthodoxy as a traditional faith in Croatia and instituted the Croatian Orthodox Church in June 1942 to assimilate Serbs to NDH.Following this ‘political tolerance’, an article of Spremnost advocated that Croats must possess three types of faith: Catholic, Islam and Orthodoxy. Moreover, it was highlighted and reiterated that the integrated nationalism of Croats was a Balkan-oriented one. In conclusion, the ideological discourse on nationalization in NDH was obviously altered to include religious pluralism during WWII in response to the international environment and to internal conflicts. ‘Balkan’ thus became a symbol of the nation.

著者

溝端 佐登史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.1-2, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

著者

土山 實男

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.141-145, 2007-12-31 (Released:2022-04-20)

著者

長谷川 雄之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.69-88, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

37

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To deal effectively with global security issues and the changing security environment, how to build and develop effective national security policies has been an important issue today. In this context, the function of the National Security Council (NSC) has been focused on, though there are some other decision making bodies, because of its ability that would solve the hard political decisions from cross-departmental perspective. According to the prior researches (Vendil-Pallin 2001, Hyodo 2004; 2009; 2012, White 2008), under the Putin regime (May 2000–) the Russian Security Council has enlarged its function and started to play the more important role of decision-making process in contrast to the Yeltsin era. This trend is going to continue into the Tandem (under the Medvedev administration from 2008–2012) and the Second Putin government (May 2012–). At the same time (May 2000–), to build “vertical power”, President Putin has started several federal reforms, such as series of legislative amendments which changed the formation of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, the creation of “federal districts”, and the appointments of plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in a federal district. Remarkably every representative was mainly a person from the “Power Ministry” or “Saint-Petersburg” and also holds the status of Russian Security Council membership. Previous works are not enough to examine the enlarged function of the Russian Security Council in the political reforms of the Putin era. This study looks into the role of Russian Security Council in Putin’s centralization like building “vertical power” and aims to provide a viewpoint for present state analysis on the Russian politics. As with every NSC in the world, the Russian Security Council is also an advanced secret organ. Thus, this study points out the personnel policies for the members of the Security Council and representatives in every federal district by analyzing public information such as legal documents (Presidential Decree and Federal Law). Reflected on the legislation of the new federal law on Security on December 28 2010, President Medvedev signed a presidential decree on the revised Regulation of the Russian Security Council. The new Regulation not only tightened its control power to the other state organs, but systematized local meetings held in every federal district, in which the secretary of the Security Council, presidential represent who covers the district, and federal and regional officials participate. In the meeting, the secretary of the Russian Security Council N.P. Patrushev, who assisted Putin for many years from when they worked together at the control division of the Presidential office, plays an important role in “realizing” the state program at the regional level. This paper concludes that the main mission of the Russian Security Council 
includes not only planning the national security policies or military affairs, but coordinating (or controlling) the relationship between federal government and regional leadership.

著者

上野 俊彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.1, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

被引用文献数

1

著者

沼野 充義

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.3-16, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

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In this paper I discuss the question of “oneness” and “plurality” and their interactions in contemporary Russian literature and cinema in which Russian national identity is represented in various ways. At the outset of our discussion, I pay attention to the controversy between Solzhenitsyn and Siniavskii in the first half of the 1980’s. While Solzhenitsyn attacked his contemporary liberal Russian dissidents, including Siniavskii, as “pluralists”, the latter ironically criticized Solzhenitsyn as “the founder of new edinomyslie.” The contrast between the two positions can be understood as the conflict between oneness-oriented nationalism and pluralistic liberalism that would continue to be one of the most important undercurrents in contemporary Russian culture. With this controversy in mind as a prehistory, we will then discuss the following works:(1) Solzhenitsyn’s Two Hundred Years Together (2001–2002)(2) Nikita Mikhalkov’s Film 12 (2007)(3) Denis Gutsko’s novel Russkogovoriashchii (2005) and Eduard Bagirov’s novel Gastarbaiter (2007)Two Hundred Years Together is a historical study in two volume devoted to the complex relationship between Russians and Jews through the last two hundred years. 12 is a remake of Sidney Lumet’s famous 12 Angry Men (1957), but it is entirely adapted to the contemporary Russian situation in which the Russian, according the film director, should play the role of the strong protective father-in-law toward other minor nationalities. While the Russianness is not challenged in the above-mentioned two cases and both Solzhenitsyn and Mikhalkov seem to take their Russian national identity for granted, the younger writers, such as Gutsko and Bagirov have completely different starting points: their background and experience do not allow them to speak of Russia in terms of its “oneness.” Gutsko’s autobiographical hero is a Russian, but speaks Russian with a Georgian accent as he was born and raised in Tbilisi, and he experiences absurd difficulties in getting a new Russian passport after repatriating to his mother’s native town Rostov-na-Donu. Bagirov was born in Turkmenistan between an Azerbaijani father and a Russian mother, and his autobiographical hero comes to Moscow to try his fortune in this enormous city abundant with a lot of opportunities open to non-Russian newcomers as well as venomous prejudices and even hatred toward them on the side of Russian inhabitants. In the case of these new writers, we see that in the present “postmodern” situation the classical dichotomy between Russian/ non-Russian is being deconstructed and a search is beginning for a new Russian identity based on fluidity and plurality of identities.

著者

小山 洋司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.88-102, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

26

被引用文献数

1

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Slovenia is the richest country in Central and Eastern Europe. The country joined the European Union in May 2004. Having satisfied the Maastricht criteria earlier than any other new EU member states, the country joined the Euro-zone in January 2007 and then served as the EU Presidency successfully in the first half of 2008. In that sense, Slovenia was the best performer among the post-socialist countries. During the period 2005–2008 the country accomplished a high economic growth. Since the capital market in this country had only a short history, companies depended mainly on debt financing. Many banks were competing with each other for market share. Slovenian banks borrowed a huge amount of funds on international wholesale financial markets and provided companies with cheap loans. In addition to core business activities, companies actively invested in non-core business activities, creating a real estate boom. Due to the Lehman shock, international financial markets suddenly became tight. Slovenian banks became unable to borrow funds from the wholesale markets. Domestic banks, in turn, were obliged to decrease credits to companies and households. Moreover, in the early 2009 external demands, especially demands on the EU markets decreased remarkably, and correspondingly exports decreased. Consequently, the domestic productions decreased. The GDP growth rate recorded –7.8 percent in 2009. Thanks to some increase in exports to the Euro-zone, the economy picked up only in the second quarter of 2010. In 2011, however, affected by the credit uncertainty in the Euro-zone, the Slovenian economy fell into a double-dip depression and further a serious crisis. Many companies went bankrupt, and the banking sector came to have a huge amount of non-performing loans. The type of the Slovenian crisis is different from that of Greece or Cyprus. First, Slovenia had a relatively sound budget until 2008. The country has not aimed to be a tourism country like Greece and Cyprus. Instead, the country had competitive manufacturing industries and her trade and current account deficits were small until recently. Second, the second wave of privatization started in 2006 mainly based on the MBO method, and Slovenian banks financed the MBO. Unfortunately, this move coincided with the Lehman shock. Third, the proportion of foreign-owned banks in the banking sector was small. Domestic capitals account for about 60 percent of the banking sector, but the state has control over major banks. In other Central and East European countries foreign-owned banks have been predominant, and therefore their parent banks have managed to support subsidiaries. In the case of Slovenia, in contrast, the government had to inject capitals to the banks repeatedly to protect the banking system, having negative influence on the state budget. In 2013 the credit uncertainty over Cyprus gave rise to concerns about Slovenia. Outside specialists think that there is no way other than asking the Troika (the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF) for help, but the government is struggling hard to overcome the crisis by itself without relying on rescue by the Troika. This paper examines why this country fell into such a serious economic crisis.

著者

香川 敏幸

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.111-114, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

上垣 彰

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.98-100, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

5

著者

櫻間 瑛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.34-49, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

55

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Contemporary Russia is considered one of the most multiethnic countries in the world. Consequently, questions such as “how to recognize ethnicity?” can give rise to serious problems. The Russian census is the focus of this discussion. When the first All-Russian Census was conducted in 2002, a number of groups demanded that their ethnicity be recognized. The second All-Russian Census was conducted in October 2010. Similar to the previous one, although on a smaller scale, this census process caused a controversy regarding the recognition of ethnicity. The governments of ethnic republics, especially Tatarstan, widely appealed for the integration of the nations. The director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow, V. Tishkov, emphasized the respect toward self-definition. Moreover, he insisted that a double-ethnic affiliation like “tatar-bashkir” should be recognized as an answer to the census. In this way, he attempted to adhere to every person’s opinion. However, in recent years, Tishkov has been actively arguing the importance of the unification of the “Russian nation [Rossiiskii narod]”. Contrary to Tishkov’s ideas, ethnic intellectuals such as Tatar historian D. Iskhakov have attempted to prove the validity of the unification of the nation. He insists that the integration and formation of the Tatar nation was completed on the basis of high culture, which was developed in the context of the standardization of Tatar language, rising rates of literacy, and activization of transmigration from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. He regarded each group’s movement for independence from the Tatar nation as a process of the nation’s breakdown and a result of the Soviet legacy. In reviewing these ideas, we can see that they both, at first, denied the Soviet ethnic policy. Tishkov criticized it by stating that the Soviet ethnic policy created a fixed ethnic framework and the hierarchies in it. Iskhakov considered the Soviet ethnic policy to be a way for the central government to suppress the ethnic minorities. Later, they actively publicized the European ethnic idea. At the same time, when we consider what they say, we find that the Soviet ethnic idea is reflected in their way of thinking. Iskhakov’s idea is, in principle, based on a fixed understanding of ethnicity. This tendency resembles the Soviet understanding. On the other hand, Tishkov often refers to the 1926 census as the ideal one. Moreover his emphasis on the “Russian nation” brings to mind the idea of a “Soviet people [sovetskii narod]”. When we pay attention to the reactions from ordinary people, we also find the Soviet ethnic policy being reflected. When they are asked about their ethnic affiliation, most of them refer to the name of an ethnic group that was written in the internal passports during the Soviet era. In Russia today, the understanding of the nations is contradictory. Most intellectuals have attempted to overcome the Soviet idea of nations and introduce European thinking. However, on the other hand, we see a continuation of Soviet ideas on the basis of their arguments.

著者

大串 敦 杉浦 史和 平田 武 渡邊 日日

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.1-33, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

田中 良英

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.38, pp.72-88, 2009 (Released:2011-10-14)

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In order to understand concretely how the Russian Imperial government used the nobility in state service in the 18th century, it is necessary to investigate the actual conditions in the army, because many noblemen were firstly recruited into the army and trained there as state servants. Once temporarily established under the reign of Peter I only for the coronation ceremony of his Empress Catherine on 8 May, 1724, the Cavalry Guards (Kavalergardy) were reformed as a permanent military unit by Catherine I at the end of 1725. This corps has two noteworthy features. Firstly, unlike the other two existing guard regiments that included soldiers and officers who were recruited from the common people, it was composed exclusively of both Russian and foreign noblemen, most of whom started state service as common soldiers or dragoons and attained the status of company officers on the basis of their continuous work and abilities. Being appointed to the Cavalry Guards was rather beneficial for these military functionaries, because they were frequently and quickly promoted to a higher rank either while in office or at the transfer to different posts despite not being expected to actually fight on the battlefield. After leaving the Cavalry Guards, some of the members became core commanders of the two guard regiments newly founded under Anna Ioannovna in 1730, and others reached the top four ranks in the Russian army or the administrative system. Along with these high-ranking officials, many of the ex-cavalrymen were promoted to offices leading regiments, battalions, or local governments, acquiring grades equal to field officers. Judging from such social origins and career patterns of the staff, the Cavalry Guards can be seen one of the important resources for the Imperial government to gather and organize the talented and experienced noblemen distributed across the vast Empire, thereby utilizing their abilities not only in military but also in civil organs. Furthermore, this unit played a social role in absorbing and posting serviceable foreign families into Russia. The second important point is that the Cavalry Guards were mainly used in the Westernized court and state ceremonies, which were employed by the Russian rulers, especially after the Petrine reform, to propagate their unrivalled authority both in- and outside Russia. For example, at the coronation of Empress Catherine in the Moscow Kremlin, the cavalrymen in white wigs, hats with gold lace and white ribbons, green woollen coats, and red woollen vests guarded both the front and the rear end of the procession of the Empress and her husband when they paraded from the court to the ceremonial cathedral. Contributing greatly to the glorification of the rituals and monarchical power, such colourful costumes attracted considerable attention from contemporaries, above all, the foreign diplomats, one of whom noted their resemblance to the uniforms of the French musketeers (mousquetaire). Additionally, soon after Anna’s arrival at the outskirts of Moscow and at a relatively early stage of her coronation, the Cavalry Guards were granted a special audience with her, which symbolically suggested the respectful treatment of the rulers. Such favour could also have strengthened the connections between the imperial power and the elite, thereby supporting the rapid development of the 18th-century Russian Empire.

著者

堀江 典生

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.13-25, 2010 (Released:2012-06-20)

参考文献数

36

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This paper examines how Russia has addressed a series of migration issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To follow the history of Russia’s migration issues, we examine legislative and institutional changes, and the academic trends of Chinese migration issues in Russia, and analyze the labor market structure where Central Asian migrant workers are embedded. Finally we examine how to define the problems faced by foreign workers in the labor market in a migration study of Russia. The problems faced by the former Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union included how each country would manage the newly established borders and how they would control the human and commodity flows through them. In the early 1990s, Russia originally had to tackle how to receive ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet Union, how to resettle them, and how to control their increased flow. The revised law on forced migration in 1995 decreased the number of forced migrants from the former Soviet Union to Russia, and in turn a massive flow of Chinese migrants to Russia, especially to the Russian Far East, became the center of public attention. The Russian public and government considered the increasing numbers of Chinese migrant workers a threat to Russia and often dubbed such immigration the “yellow peril.” However, recent academic research on Chinese migration studies in Russia tends to draw a clear line against such alarmist discourse and to explore the realistic features of Chinese migrants living and working in Russia. Such research showed that most Chinese migrant workers are traders and businessmen temporarily staying in Russia and are actively exploring business opportunities and creating employment. Chinese migrant workers are indispensable for the Russian Far East where the labor shortage is critical. But in general, Chinese migrant workers find jobs, not due to the traditional demand of Russia’s labor market, but due to the demand created by Chinese businesses. The recent majority of foreign workers are from Central Asia. They are allowed to cross Russia’s border without visas and to look for jobs without visas or work permits. Central Asian workers living in Russia are embedded in the Russian labor market and occupy unqualified and low-paid jobs at the bottom of the market, filling jobs Russians do not want. Central Asian workers are employed with the traditional demand that Russia’s society always requires. Russia cannot maintain her economy and daily life without Central Asian workers. The Russian government, however, still fails to establish good governance to allow them to work legally, doesn’t protect their human and labor rights, and doesn’t ease the vulnerability they face as foreign workers. Migrant workers face much trouble in their daily lives and bureaucratic barriers to obtain legal status to stay and work in Russia. Without protecting their human and labor rights, the establishment of a common labor market in Eurasia, which is often mentioned in Russia, remains far from realization. Therefore we must scrutinize the real features of foreign workers in Russia’s labor market and tackle the problems faced by foreign workers in Russia.

著者

工藤 仁子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.42-57, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper attempts to analyze politico-military relations in Russia, providing a perspective on the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate. Political leaders from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin had needed support from the military for governing the state. The military had expanded its influence on politics, based on this politico-military cooperation. The political leadership had placed its foremost priority on military policy, which had coincided with the military's interests. However, the political leadership is currently seeking to put more emphasis on economic development than military policy, for stabilizing Russia's domestic and external environment. This policy shift may provoke dissatisfaction from the military, which regards the national security as Russia's top concern. Therefore, the political leadership will strengthen its control over the military, for the purpose of keeping political superiority on military. Nevertheless, strengthening control over the military contains a dilemma in which strong objection from the military would lead to secession of the military from the political leadership, losing military support for politics. When the duumvirate collapses, a problem on which leader the military chooses will emerge. Therefore, unless the dilemma is settled, the politics will have to give way to, or pay the price for pacifying the military in case of confrontation with the military.

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no “clashes of civilizations” between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.

著者

袴田 茂樹

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.3-16, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most serious problems for today's Russia is how to establish stability and identity as a nation.There are two reasons this problem is especially serious in Russia. First, because of historical, social psychological and other reasons, Russian society has trouble creating autonomous public order. The present writer calls this aspect of Russian society a ‘sand-society’, which means a society where stable order and a market economy are difficult to establish without some measure of authoritarianism. The high rate of support for President Putin reflects, not stability, but a public fear of instability. Second, Russia, in spite of the social characteristics mentioned above, is trying to keep up the appearance of an advanced G8 nation with a civil society based on the rule of law and democratic values. It was in order to cope with this dilemma and to justify his government that Vladislav Surkov set forth his ‘Sovereign-Democracy’ theory of Neo-Slavophilism.There is a strong distrust towards the Western world behind this theory, which insists on Russian individuality and is inimical to interventions or ‘exportation of democracy’ by the West, as in the cases of the collapse of governments in Georgia and Ukraine. This theory above all justifies the great power of the Russian State, emphasizes Russian individuality or peculiarity and affirms people's demands for order, stability, and especially a strong leader.This theory is based on the ideas of Ivan Il'in, who was a Russianist religious thinker condemned for being a reactionary and deported from Soviet Union in 1922. Il'in describes Russian culture as synthetic, intuitive, and organic, while characterizing Western culture as analytic, materialistic, and logical. Surkov's theory retains the basic tenets of Slavophilism, which set Plato above Aristotle and was closely related to German Romanticism and mysticism, while making no deeper interpretation of its roots.Surkov points out three features of Russian political culture—‘centralization’, ‘idealization’, and‘personification’.‘Centralization’ means that strong centralized power guarantees stability.‘Idealization’ means that the Russians feel uncomfortable without an ideal or a mission such as ‘the Third Rome’ or ‘the Third International’. ‘Personification’ means that, in Russia, a person (leader) is considered more important than institutions.The problem of establishing identity in Russia is the problem of stabilizing a ‘sand-society’. Considering these three features in relation to this problem, there are two requirements for stabilizing the ‘sand-society’. One is a ‘mold’ or a ‘framework’ to give sand a form, and the other is ‘cement’ to fix it. Of the three features in Surkov's ‘sovereign-democracy’ theory, ‘centralization’, and ‘personification’ are the ‘mold’ or ‘framework’, while ‘idealization’, and ‘personification’ make up the ‘cement’. Against this Neo-Slavophilism or ‘sovereign-democracy’, so-called modern, Westernizers, democrats, reformists and social democrats-are criticizing Surkov. Curiously, therefore, the controversy between Slavophiles and Westernizers that occurred 150 years ago is now repeating itself. One Russian political scientist describes this phenomenon as a déjã vu and says it means that the problems dating back to the middle of the 19th century have not yet been solved.

著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.3-12, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In this essay, the present author researched the impact of the criticism of the‘Cult of Stalin, ’in the context of its implication on global socialist regimes. Above all, its impact over Asian socialist countries are analyzed. Special attention is paid on the Chinese communist party and DPRK. Emphasis is put on the fact that Hungarian and other East European revolution have un precedent impact over the fragile democratization in Asia. Kim IL Sung could perpetuate its ‘Cult of Chuch'e, ’because Moscow had to concentrate on Eastern socialism.