著者

羽田 正

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.523-530, 1992-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

崔 昌模

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.27-50, 2012

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It is to explore possibilities of a new interpretation in the <i>Honil kangni yŏktae kukto chido</i> (hereafter referred to as the <i>Kangnido</i>) by focusing on discourses of map and map contents. For this it will be provided a general historical background knowledge of maps, such as intentions of map-making, the process of map-making, geographical information reflected on map, and map-makers etc, in the context of how political power has shaped those elements of map-makings. And also I attempt to grasp the perception of the 'external world,' which is in particular Arabia-Africa region by focusing on Arabia-Africa geographical and topographical characters and place-names, identified with about seventy-one names consisted of twenty-four names of places in Arabia and forty-seven names of places in Africa. A history of map can be interpreted as a historical discourse or a form of representation. Cartography is theoretically related to literary criticism, history of art, the sociology of knowledge. Map is never value-free, rather value-laden. Map knowledge is a social product. Any history of cartography which demeans the politico-social significance of its expression and description in the map would be an 'ahistorical' history.

著者

渡部 良子

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.185-216, 1997-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

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During 13-14th century in Iran under the Ilkhanids, it has been noted that Iranian local societies were independent because Mongols were unable to control their settled societies. This was in particular emphasized in the south-west part of Iran, where many local ruling families had semi-independent dominance. But, what kind of administrative policy and system the Ilkhanids had toward such local societies is still obscure. Fars, one of the south-west regions of Iran, had some noticeable characteristic which were different from such a general understanding. First, it was financially important for the Ilkhanids. Second, the local ruling family Salghurids, was abolished in its earlier stage. And lastly, after collapse of the Ilkhanids, a new ruling family, the Injuids appeared. Although the Ilkhanids fiscal administration in Fars was studied by Dr. A. K. S. Lambton, her study was limited to listing of the confused aspects of Mongol fiscal control. Therefore in this paper, I have presented the analysis of (I) the processes of establishment of Ilkhanids' administrative system and policy in Fars, (II) the characteristics of the system and policy, (III) the background of the emergence of the Injuids, and (IV) the relationship between the Ilkhanids' rule and Shiraz society. Mongol administrative and fiscal system were first introduced to Fars by Salghurid atabeks, who were recognized their rule and established the relationship with the Ilkhans' family by marriage; Then various new taxes which the Mongols introduced to Iran, and the crown land inju were established. After the diminishment of the Salghurids' power, Fars was put under control of the governors(hakims) who were sent from the central government. But those who played the most important role in controlling Fars were the merchants of the Indian Ocean trade, the Sawamilis, rulers of Qays Island in Persian Gulf. They emerged because of the importance of Shiraz (the capital of Fars) in trade route between the Indian Ocean and inland regions of Iran, and Ilkhanids' strong interest in commercial wealthes. On their cooperation, muqata' ah system, the Ilkhanids' basic tax-collecting method had a great effect. But on the other hand, the relationship between the Sawamili who were the outsiders in the local society of Fars and other diwan officers who were in charge of tax-collecting was never free from hard conflicts. During the reign of seventh Ilkhan Ghazan, Ilkhanids' policy to Fars changed. First, though fiscal reform in Fars failed, Fars got more importance because its inju lands were Ghazan's own property. Second, since Sawamilis' Qays was defeated by Hurmuz which administratively belonged to Kirman, Sawamilis' contract got less effective in controlling the wealth of the Indian Ocean trade. Because of these changes, after the Sawamilis lost their position in Fars, the Injuids (inju administrators in Fars and bureaucrats of high office in the central government) finally held domination over Fars. In the background of the rise of the Injuids, there were the strict controls over Fars by the central government, and the financial importance of inju land system in the Ilkhanids. Then, the question is what kind of influence such a administrative policy of Ilkhanids had over Shiraz society. We can observe it in the appointment of the qadi al-qudat, and in the charitable activities toward public institutions of Shiraz. The change in three families of the qadi al-qudat of Shiraz in Mongol period, the Tabataba' is, the Baydawis and the Falis, reveals that the Ilkhanids made a lot of the request from Shiraz notables in the appointment of the qadi al-qudat. But Majd al-Din Fali's close and personal relationship with Rashid al-Din, the prime policy maker of the later Ilkhanids, suggests the political role of intellectual circle which Rashid al-Din organized in Ilkhanids'(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

森 千香子

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.323-351, 2005-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

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The <<fear of Islam>> is not a new subject in France : this country's geographic location, in permanent contact with the Arab Islamic world, always brought complex relations, both close and strained, with the Islamic world. A combination of different reasons has led to the present situation : ancient history (France is a catholic nation, particularly active during the Crusade), recent history (the Iranian revolution, increasing number of <<fundamentalist's terrorist acts>> in Algeria, the September 11 attacks...), and France's sociological situation itself (with an important Muslim community). However, since several years, a sort of mutation has been taking place in Islam's representation, while the number of anti-Muslim acts is on the rise. What does this mutation consist of? What is exactly the <<new anti-Muslim phenomenon>> in French society? To answer these questions, we analyze the new anti-Islam discourses and focus on its promoters, in order to grasp the crucial issues and the underlying ideas of this phenomenon in French socio-political context. First of all, this paper will outline some of the principal characteristics of Islamophobia in France, especially the relations between ultranationalist xenophobia and current Islamophobia. Then, new forms of critical discourses towards Islam are to be studied and their relations with new Islamophobia's logics. The objective of this paper is to analyze if the latest outbreak of anti-Islamic attacks is only a variation of <<traditional>> anti-Arab racism, or if current Islamophobia presents, on the contrary, some new peculiarities, partly or entirely distinct from traditional xenophobia. Our analysis will clarify two points : first, ultranationalist racist ideology plays a nonnegligible part in the contemporary Islamophobia. This point of view, systematically amalgamating <<terrorists>>, <<fundamentalists>>, <<Muslims>> and <<immigrants>>, consists in considering the Islam as a <<potential threat>> to the French nation and, on the basis of an essentialist ideology, in excluding Islam from the phantasmagoric fabrication of a so-called <<French identity>>. Secondly, the present-day Islamophobia is nevertheless clearly irreducible to the ultranationalist anti-Arab racism : <<criticism of Islamic fundamentalists>> by several actors (experts of <<New anti-Semitism by Muslims>>, defenders of <<universal values>> or even <<Moderate Muslims>>), also exercises sometimes-in its own ways- some vicious influences on the reinforcement of anti-Muslim stereotypes, potentially leading to some latent legitimatization of its overstepped forms.

著者

佐々木 あや乃

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.215-221, 1995-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

吉枝 聡子

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, pp.305-318, 1996-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

岡崎 弘樹

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.67-95, 2013-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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The purpose of this article is to examine the concept of “Just despot”, which was mentioned in 1899 by an Egyptian thinker Muhammad ‘Abduh. Although he was said to be an Islamic idealist, he was deeply aware of the harsh realities of the Egyptian society. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of a national leadership, whereas he understood the people who have internalized the oppression under the hierarchical system of despotism. In fact, his ideas were, to a great extent, influenced by the preceding ideas. First, the terminology of istibdād signified literally “decisiveness” it only began to be used in the sense of “despotism” in the mid-19th century. Second, the first generation of Nahda considered the despotism as a problem of the abuse of power until the 1860s. Third, in the late 1870s, Afghānī emphasized the necessity of a leader’s ability, whereas Isḥāq began to describe the despotism as a mechanism of reproduction of power. In short, the concept of “Just despot”, employed by ‘Abduh, was, in general, a product of his adaptation and development of these two points of view. He reached the meaning of a modern political concept following the efforts of their predecessors.

著者

秋葉 淳

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.1, pp.129-143, 2013-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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本稿は、イスタンブル・ムフティー局附属文書館所蔵の文書にもとづき、オスマン帝国が1889-90年に日本に派遣したエルトゥールル号に関する新事実を紹介する。その文書からは、スルタン・アブデュルハミト二世がエルトゥールル号によって日本にウラマーを派遣してイスラームの普及を図ろうとした、という実現しなかった計画が明らかになった。スルタンは、エルトゥールル号派遣の直前にシェイヒュルイスラームにウラマーの派遣を打診し、日本でイスラームの知識を教えることのできる人物を選ぶよう依頼した。その文書(スルタンの勅旨)によれば、日本人は「啓典の民」ではないが、近年の進歩の実績に鑑みれば、近いうちに多神教を捨てて一神教を受け入れる傾向があるのだという。しかし、スルタンは、日本に派遣されるべきウラマーに英語あるいはフランス語の能力を求めて、最初に選ばれた二名の人物を却下したため、結果的に君主の要望に見合う人物は見つからなかった。こうして、エルトゥールル号によるウラマーの日本派遣の企図は廃案となった。実現しなかったとはいえ、日本への宗教使節派遣案が出されたという事実は、アブデュルハミト二世のイスラーム政策について新しい観点を提供する。今日の研究では、エルトゥールル号の派遣は、インドや東南アジアのムスリムに対するプロパガンダの手段であったと解釈され、日本のイスラーム化は問題外だったとされる。しかし、本稿が用いた史料は、アブデュルハミト二世が世界のムスリムの結束のみならず、イスラーム教徒のいない地域への宣教活動をも視野に入れていたことを示している。また、日本人のイスラーム改宗という発想は、日露戦争後にオスマン人や世界のムスリムの間で広く流通し、日本がイスラームを国教とする用意があるといった根拠のない噂が流布した。しかし、本稿で紹介した文書は、日本のイスラーム化という発想が、より以前の時期に遡り、アブデュルハミト二世がその初期の提唱者の一人であったことを示している。いずれにしてもこの発案は実現せず、その後もスルタンが日本に宗教指導者を派遣することはなかった。しかし、エルトゥールル号事件の生存者と遺族への義捐金を届けにイスタンブルに渡った時事新報記者野田正太郎が、しばらく後にイスラームに改宗すると、彼の帰国とともに日本にウラマーが派遣されて改宗が進められていると外国の新聞で報道された。その意味でアブデュルハミト二世は、ウラマーを派遣せずに、派遣したのと同じ効果を国際世論に反映させることに成功したのである。日本へのウラマー派遣の試みもまた、その意味でアブデュルハミト二世のイメージ政策の枠組みのなかで理解されるべきであろう。

著者

髙岡 豊 浜中 新吾 溝渕 正季

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.1, pp.35-58, 2012-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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The paper considers the experiences and the perceptions of the Lebanese toward cross-border movement and explains its effects on contemporary Lebanese politics and societies. To this end, we analyzed the results of “Middle East Opinion Poll (Lebanon 2010),” which was conducted by the Beirut Center for Research and Information (BCRI) in May and June 2010. There are some widespread stereotyped images about the Lebanese; for example, they are cosmopolitan, multilingual, and business-oriented, and tend to be entrepreneurial. These images have led the Lebanese to be commonly known as the “New Phoenicians” or a typical case of “Trade Diasporas.” However, the credibility of these images has not necessarily been verified. In this paper, therefore, we attempted to verify the stereotyped image that all the Lebanese are cosmopolitan, by scientific methods and rethought conventional wisdom. The result suggests that all the Lebanese and Lebanese emigrants not necessarily embody the stereotyped images of “New Phoenicians” and “Trade Diasporas,” and there is room for further research on the patterns of cross-border movement of the Lebanese.

著者

阿久津 正幸

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.241-268, 2010-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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Several modern studies have treated the ulamā as quasi-bureaucrats, influential urban elites, distinguished families, etc. However, I attempt to consider them mainly as professional intellectuals, regardless of their social position, in order to disclose the Islamic nature of the society that they established. First, we need to reveal their “institution” for the transmission of ilm, partly because the ulamā could not have been passed down (succession) without this process and partly because Islamic society should be understood on the basis of Arabic-Islamic values, not a non-Arabic-Islamic bias. How the changing situation in society has been approved by the professional ulamā and the evaluation of social environments that led to such attitudes of intellectuals are discussions related to this point. As indicated previously, an interdisciplinary attempt (historical sociology in this case) is necessary to look beyond the existing sense of values in Middle Eastern studies.

著者

岡崎 弘樹

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.2, pp.33-61, 2015-01-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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The purpose of this article is to examine Adīb Isḥāq (1856–1884)’s interpretation of freedom and despotism. According to him, the population has already been deprived of its natural rights through social customs and manners, such as compulsory right-handedness in Europe and foot-binding in China. If so, it is evident that civil and political freedom is not guaranteed by the authoritarian tradition. The despotic state does not repress the people in the name of “repression” but creates, by giving the public the illusion of freedom, a triangular system of fear, jealousy, and mutual suspicion, as Montesquieu framed it. Additionally, the autocratic Khedival regime in Egypt at that time was strengthened by European colonialism. Under these circumstances, Isḥāq admitted the difficulty of banishing foreign powers by force of arms. He instead suggested gradual reforms, including the establishment of public education. According to him, compulsory education would be the only way to teach the public the value of freedom and isolating the cycle of authoritarianism – from the dictatorship of the state to the patriarchy of the family. His idea differed greatly from the conventional way of thinking of political thinkers of the time: the idea of the just despot. In short, Ishāq’s original, meticulous analysis of despotic power systems was an important contribution to the development of Arab political thought.

著者

山尾 大 浜中 新吾

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.1, pp.1-32, 2014-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This paper aims to clarify ‘revised sectarianism’ substantially by analysing the ‘political party support structure’ based on the poll that our research team conducted in Iraq in October 2011. Based on the logit model on the survey data of Iraqi citizens, the following four points became clear. First, the sectarian tendency in party support became relatively clear in analysing macro data such as the results of elections. Second, on the other hand, it became clear that the tendency toward sectarianism undoubtedly varied across sectarian groups when we analysed the micro data of the poll; Sunni voters, in particular, were less subject to sectarian factors in supporting their party. Third, considerably different policies were supported by the voters who supported the same sectarian and ethnic parties. On the other hand, supporters of both the Shi’ite and Sunni parties often showed similarity in terms of policy preferences. Fourth, as the majority of voters tend not to express support for a political party, the main Iraqi parties are losing their support. These four discoveries demonstrate that it is inappropriate to analyse Iraqi politics based on sectarian and ethnic factors alone, and that ideology and policy orientation can also play a significant role.

著者

黒田 賢治

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.75-97, 2010-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This paper aims to consider the state control of the Iranian Shi’ite Islamic jurisprudence academia under Kamenei’s leadership based on a survey of literature and fieldwork from September 1, 2008 to October 29, 2008. Specifically, I will focus on the process of administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom (Ḥowze-ye ‘Elmīye-ye Qom) under his leadership and the recent condition of monthly stipend for students in the madrasa complex of Qom. On June 4, 1989, the Assembly of Experts held a meeting and decided to elect Khamenei, who had been president, as the new supreme leader. But Khamenei was a middle-ranking Islamic jurist, Ḥujja al-Islam wa-l-Muslimīn, unlike former supreme leader Khomeynī. This was not accordance that Article of the constitution of 1979, that the supreme leader must be a marja‘-e taqlīd (source of emulation; the title of a highly educated jurisconsult who has his followers) recognized by a large majority of the citizens. This contradiction of Khamenei’s appointment with the constitution was solved by revising the constitution that Khomeini had ordered before his death. In addition, the state encouraged Khomeini’s followers to obey two marāja‘-e taqlīd (pl. of marja‘-e taqlīd) who were recommended by the state. This meant the ruling structure was divided into two spheres: a political sphere and a religious sphere. At the same time, direct control by the state was limited to the former sphere. Thus it was a solution for only one side of the dualistic ruling structure that the state promoted Khamenei for a marja‘-e taqlīd. In 1994, Khamenei was nominated one of the recommended marāja‘-e taqlīd by two ruling support groups. Some researchers pointed out that repressive measures such as house arrest were taken against some high ranking Islamic jurists and their relatives. In other words, the violation by the state was a way of control over the jurisprudence academia. On the other hand, some researchers referred to Khamenei’s leadership in the administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom. In addition, they also referred to Khamenei’s financial support there. If their indication was correct, the solution was not only based on the violation. However they did not give enough explanation about not only the administrative reform but also the monthly stipend. Therefore, I attempted to refine their discussion and analyze the way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia. As a result, I found out the control of the ruling body through an institution based on the above two topics. First, the administrative reform in early 1990s provided institutional connection between the state and new administrative body of the mardasa complex of Qom. Second, there were two types of the monthly stipend system. One was “informal,” the other was “formal.” In the “informal” system, insolvent marāja‘-e taqlīd paid students personally. On the other hand, in the “formal” system, the center for monthly stipend under the new administrative body collected money from each solvent marāja‘-e taqlīd and distributed this to students. At the same time, Khamenei absorbed more than thirty percent of total amount in the “formal” system. Then, these results meant a way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia based on institution.

著者

山浦 公美子

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.315-359, 2000

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本論文は,日本のパレスチナ問題および中東和平プロセスに対する政策について,外務省が政策を公式に表明している『外交青書』を中心として分析するものである。1973年から1999年までを対象とする。外交青書は政策決定者の意見が表れ,彼らが政策において強調している個所を見極められるという点で高い資料価値があるにも関わらず,これまで十分に研究が行なわれてこなかった。本論文では,外交青書の内容を通商産業省の通商白書との比較を加えつつ分析した。外務省の対パレスチナ政策声明には3つの分岐点がある。1973年の第一次石油危機,89年以降のドナー大国化,湾岸戦争後の国際貢献への参加である。第1次石油危機によって公式に表明された政策は,急速に親アラブに傾いた。外交青書はイスラエルとの関係に一線を画すことを明言し,親アラブ色を前面に出している。次に,89年以降のドナー大国化により,日本政府は外交青書を通して経済的,物的支援一辺倒であった国際貢献を拡充することを提案している。それは90年代の湾岸戦争後に実行に移される。湾岸戦争の終結により,日本政府は国際的,国内的な世論の高まりを背景に,親平和政策をもとに「国際貢献」を推し進めることを表明した。1991年のマドリッド中東和平国際会議,1992年のモスクワ会議を経て,外交青書は日本政府の貢献を誇らしげに列挙している。また日本政府の国際貢献においてPKOとODAが90年代の主要な柱であることを表明している。外交青書の分析を通して,日本政府が2つの原則を主張していることが判明する。国連安保理決議242号,338号の遵守と,当事者の合意を前提として援助を行うという政策である。これらは日本政府の親平和政策に基づいており,武力による領地併合の不可,交渉による平和的解決という政策を反映している。外交青書は,平和の確立は当事者の合意に基づいて行われるべきであるという日本政府の政策声明を明示している。1993年のオスロ合意以後,日本政府がパレスチナ問題への政治的参加を開始したのは,平和構築を目指す当事者の合意が成立したと見なしたからである。対パレスチナ援助において,日本政府は外交青書を通じ,当事者の民生と独立以後のパレスチナ社会支援という観点から,一層の政治的参加の必要性を強調している。

著者

飯山 陽

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.197-220, 2005-03-31 (Released:2018-03-30)

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Furu^^-', in Arabic, has been translated in English as 'positive law' by contemporary scholars since J. Schacht wrote 'positive law is called furu^^-' 'in his famous book An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964). The concept of positive law, however, is essentially different from that of furu^^-'. Most of the contemporary scholars have taken furu^^-' as positive law without authorities and founded reasons, but some of them like N. Calder and B.M. Wheeler translate it simply as rules or regulations. In this article, I present two examples of Muslims' conceptions of 'law' through the books of usu^^-l al-fiqh so as to reconsider the appropriateness of translating furu^^-' as positive law. Muslim scholars such as Juwayni^^- (d. 478/1085) and Qara^^-fi^^-(d. 684/1285) regarded furu^^-' as shari^^-'a, that is, orders the God set down. For furu^^-' is originated in the God and derived from revelations by following strict principles and methodologies, it is shari^^-'a no less. Moreover, in the historical reality, furu^^-' had been applied to real cases at least by the end of 19th century and it can be said that this explains the perception. For in Islam, lawgiver is only the God. The two scholars have never denied the probability of furu^^-', but at the same time, they have never regarded furu^^-' as the law which man can legislate and change. In the center of the concept of positive law, there are some fundamental factors. For example, it is regarded as the counterpart of natural law, and is legislated by man, and is fallible and changeable. These factors, however, are not found in Muslim scholars' perceptions of furu^^-'. In addition, contemporary scholars apply the western-originated dichotomy (natural law / positive law) to Islamic law even if the dichotomy dose not exist in Islamic law originally. To identify furu^^-' as positive law contradicts perceptions of furu^^-' of Muslims. In my opinion, it is not appropriate to translate furu^^-' as positive law. The words 'positive law' would just drive us far away from understanding its original meaning and semantic structure. It is sufficient to translate furu^^-' just as concrete rules or norms like N. Calder dose. It seems that contemporary scholars have studied Arabic texts through the filter of translated concepts, using the words 'positive law'. As a result, they regard Islamic law as if there is a dichotomy between shari^^-'a and furu^^-' in it just as western law (natural law / positive law) although Muslim scholars such as Juwayni^^- and Qarafi take furu^^-' as a part of shari^^-'a. Islamic law should never be to studied through western-originated concepts or explained in western contexts. We have to study the texts in original language paying attentions to the words' own semantic structures so as to respect the uniqueness of Islamic law and derive its universality as law. I believe this approach should contribute to the more sincere study of Islamic law in future.

著者

大渕 久志

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 = Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.1-33, 2018

著者

吉村 貴之

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.1, pp.173-190, 2005-09-30 (Released:2018-03-30)

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At the end of the Turco-Armenian war in 1920, the Red Army unexpectedly invaded the Republic of Armenia. This compelled the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) government to form a coalition cabinet with the Communist Party on December 2. Immediately thereafter, the communists expelled Dashnak officials such as Dro and Nazalbekian, and requisitioned food from Armenian farmers. This triggered a nationwide uprising in February 1921. People led by the Dashnak Right, clashed with the communists in Zangezur. However, the rebellion failed because of disputes among the Dashnakists, the NEP (i.e. the Soviet government promised the farmers that their agribusiness would be liberated), and due to a widespread famine that struck the people. After the fall of Zangezur, the Dashnak Right attempted to recapture their land from the Soviet government. They organized soldiers and discussed the strategy to accomplish their goal in their general meetings. However, they were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Ramkavar-azatakan (Liberal Democratic) Party (LDP), which consisted of the Armenian elite in the Ottoman Empire, continued to be involved in organizing political activities, even after the Armenian massacres in 1915. The LDP was occasionally in opposition to the Dashnak party, on the issue of initiatives in the Armenian diaspora abroad. During the Lausanne Conference, the two parties argued on the settlement of the dispute over the "haykakan ojakh" (Armenian homeland). While the LDP wanted to unite with Soviet Armenia, the Dashnak party did not. This leads to the obvious question of why the LDP, an Armenian bourgeois party, was so eager to cooperate with the communists. Following the Armenian massacres in 1915, the LDP lost their country. A. Darbinian, who was a member of the LDP, visited Soviet Armenia in January, 1922, and was welcomed by A. Miasnikian, chair of the Soviet government. The newly formed country impressed the LDP politician, and he therefore recommended that the party help the Soviet government with the task of economic reconstruction. The LDP attempted to influence Soviet Armenia and gain more importance than the Dashnakists in their communities overseas, with the help of the Communist Party. In turn, the Communist Party wanted to make use of the funds of the LDP and the Armenian Benevolent Union to rebuild the economy of its own country. The reconstruction of the economy strengthened the Communist Party's authority in Soviet Armenia. This led to the "self-liquidation" of the Dashnak Party in Soviet Union on November 23, 1923, under the pressure of the Soviet government. In short, Soviet Armenia became the homeland of all Armenians through the coalition between the bourgeois nationalists and the communists, despite their different aims.

著者

溝渕 正季

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.2, pp.199-203, 2012

著者

鈴木 啓之

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 = Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

no.32, pp.37-70, 2016

著者

鈴木 啓之

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.37-70, 2016

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This article analyzes the process of the alliance between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan from 1982 to 1987, and its effect on the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). PLO leaders, like Khaled al-Hassan, sought to become allied with Jordan for two reasons: to balance the power against opponent groups that had ties to Syria, and to prepare for possible peace negotiations hosted by the U.S.However, their alliance only lasted for a few years, until 1987. The PLO leadership realized the alliance with Jordan could not achieve political status for the PLO and even caused more severe inter-factional disputes among Palestinian groups. PLO leaders sought reconciliation among factions, but then decided to cancel the Amman Agreement. Even with the Amman Agreement's retraction, the short alliance between the PLO and Jordan introduced a direct connection between the PLO and the Occupied Territories. The PLO's leadership, especially Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), played an important role in establishing PLO-affiliated organizations inside the territories. These circumstances led to pro-PLO political activities in the territories, and led the way to the first Intifada in 1987.