著者
吉川 美華
雑誌
東洋文化研究 (ISSN:13449850)
巻号頁・発行日
no.11, pp.157-178, 2009-03-31

This paper will try to elucidate the major impact that the family registration law had on Korean society by examining how Japan introduced and revised the law. As part of its colonial rule of the Korean peninsula, Japan enacted this law in 1909 to grasp information on the Korean residents so that it could carry out the policing of the colony more effectively. The law was revised in 1915. Japan’s political intention behind the law will also be investigated. To strengthen its ability to maintain order in Korea without causing a strong local backlash, Japan incorporated many aspects of the colony’s indigenous customs into the law. Yet when it was amended six years later, other elements of the traditional Korean traits that afe characterized by those kin-centered values-which disdain or even exclude people who are not related by blood-were included to a considerable degree. As a result, these custom-which until then I(oreans had not necessarily been very conscious of-came to be clearly recognized by them as‘‘original”ones. After it gained independence from Japan, Korea further developed this notion of kindred as a unique national characteristic. Consequently, Japan’s intervention during the colonial period became aturning point for the shaping of a modern Korean social institution: enactment and revision of the family registration law played a key role in inducing the Korean nation to choose a particular type of family system which may otherwise well have taken many different forms.
著者
田邉 咲智
出版者
関西大学大学院東アジア文化研究科
雑誌
文化交渉 : 東アジア文化研究科院生論集 : journal of the Graduate School of East Asian Cultures (ISSN:21874395)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.51-71, 2018-11-30

This research is a consideration of the early works of the modern Japanesestyle painter, Hishida Shunsō (1874-1911), who played an active part in the Meiji era art scene. Particular emphasis will be placed on the works of Shunsō, who was enrolled in Tokyo Bijutsu Gakko (Tokyo School of Fine Arts). Previous research on Shunsō has mainly focused on two areas: on moro-tai painting techniques and the study of the artist's later works. In particular, a focus on moro-tai painting techniques forms the basis of most of the research conducted on Shunsō. Because of this, Shunsō's early works have been largely ignored. In this paper, the education that Shunsō received at Tokyo Bijutsu Gakko, and an analysis of his early works, are therefore afforded much consideration in this paper. For instance, the ideals of Okakura Tenshin (kakuzō) (1863-1913), who served as the principal of Tokyo Bijutsu Gakko at that time, are analyzed. From these considerations, the intention of Shunso's early works becomes clear.
著者
堀内 圭子
出版者
京都大学
巻号頁・発行日
2002-11-25

新制・論文博士
著者
齊藤 正彰
出版者
北海道大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
北大法学論集 (ISSN:03855953)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.72, no.2, pp.1-63, 2021-07-31
著者
村上 友章 MURAKAMI Tomoaki
出版者
三重大学教養教育機構
雑誌
三重大学教養教育機構研究紀要 = BULLETIN OF THE COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES MIE UNIVERSITY
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.1-20, 2017-03-31

本稿は、明治末期に三重県に存在した近代的水産缶詰会社の先駆けたる東洋水産株式会社(以下、東洋水産)の興亡の全容を詳らかにし、その歴史的意義を再検討した。殖産興業の中でも缶詰産業の発展は他の諸産業に遅れをとっていた。だが日露戦争以後、中央(牧朴真・農商務省水産局長)・地方(石原圓吉・三重海産組合代表)の両方から軍需缶詰工場を輸出向鰮いわし油漬缶詰製造工場に転換する着想が芽生え、それが、両者の対立を経つつも妥協に転じて東洋水産設立に至る。だが鰮の不漁、輸出不振が続くや、大株主が離反し、同社は再編を余儀なくされる。加えて一九〇七年不況がこれに追い打ちをかけ、海外市場はおろか国内市場でも同社の水産缶詰は売れず、結果として同社は軍需缶詰工場へと再び回帰せざるをえなかった。こうした中、東洋水産の経営を支えたのが、農商務省から技師として派遣された高碕達之助であった。高碕は中央の最新技術を地方にもたらすと同時に、地方の窮状を中央に訴えるユニークな役割を果していく。また、同社が軍需缶詰工場に転換するや、その責任者(技師長)として経営再建に尽力した。だが刃折れ矢尽きた高碕は渡米を決断、石原もこれを快諾した結果、東洋水産は事実上の解散を迎えるに至った。このように東洋水産は時代の徒花に終わった。だが、その遺産は少なからぬ地方の人々の生活を支えたと同時に、後の日本缶詰産業発展のために不可欠な経験となった。
著者
石川 美澄
出版者
観光学術学会事務局(地域・研究アシスト事務所内)
巻号頁・発行日
2012-07-07

本稿の目的は、新聞記事分析を通して、「ゲストハウス」と称される施設や場所の変遷を整理することである。その上で、その1つであるゲストハウスやバックパッカーズなどと呼ばれる比較的低廉な宿泊施設(以下、宿泊型ゲストハウスとし、宿泊施設以外の意味を含む場合はゲストハウスとする)の特性を仮説的に提示する。近年、新聞記事を中心に、宿泊型ゲストハウスの増加が指摘されている。一方、国内の観光研究分野や観光庁が実施する調査では、このような指摘や報告はほとんど確認できない。したがって現時点では、メディアが語る「宿泊型ゲストハウス増加説」を学術的に証明することは困難であると同時に、その増加の社会的背景などについても不明瞭であると言わざるを得ない。しかしながら、低料金で1名から宿泊することができ、泊食分離が実践されている宿泊型ゲストハウスは、宿泊旅行をより身近で気軽・容易なものにする可能性がある。特に、宿泊型ゲストハウスは、旅先での自然・文化資源だけでなく、地元の人びとや他の旅行者との出会いを創出する場として地域に存在しうる点が、今後の観光のあり方を検討する上で示唆に富むと考えられる。なお、本稿の目的を達成することで、今後の宿泊型ゲストハウスを事例とした観光研究の基礎的資料を提示できる。
著者
植木 久行
出版者
弘前大学人文学部
雑誌
人文社会論叢. 人文科学編 (ISSN:13446061)
巻号頁・発行日
no.26, pp.1-24, 2011-08-31
著者
塩川 伸明
出版者
北海道大学スラブ研究センター
雑誌
スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, pp.155-190, 1999

Hitherto, Soviet language policy was often interpreted to be aimed at "Russification." Although this viewpoint is not entirely groundless, it is often exaggerated and tends to lead to a one-sided picture. It is true that many non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union have been, more or less, linguistically russified. But it cannot be denied that some nationalities, especially those with Union republics, have retained their national languages to a fairly high degree. Thus, it is necessary to investigate the language situation more fully on the basis of empirical data. It is well-known that in the 1920s the Soviet authorities adopted the policy of "korenizatsiia," which meant extending education among nationalities by their own national languages. For the central political leaders, this policy was merely a means for spreading the official policy to the masses. In the localities, however, some activists tried to use this policy for nationalistic purposes. Thus, the meaning of the policy of "korenizatsiia" was ambivalent and the process of its implementation was not consistent. The 1930s saw several policy changes, but the process of the changes was not so straight-forward as was often supposed. First of all, at the beginning of the decade political centralization was greatly enhanced, and as a result some republican leaders were demoted. This personnel change entailed the strengthening of political control over nationalities. It is important, however, not to confuse this political centralization with Russification, for Russian people also suffered severely by the political control, and the old Russian national tradition was not officially glorified, at least until the mid-1930s. The attitude of the Soviet authorities toward old traditions began changing around the mid-1930s. The fervent anti-traditionalism of the early revolutionary days subsided and the queer amalgam of Sovietism and pre-Revolutionary tradition came into being. This situation made it possible for Russian nationalism to creep into the official ideology. This, however, did not necessarily mean that the policy of Russification was established once and for all. Along with Russian nationalism, Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek and some other kinds of nationalism also crept into the official ideology, although it is clear that the latter were relatively low-ranked in comparison with Russian nationalism. The Soviet nationality policy after the late 1930s was characterized by its hierarchical nature. At the top of the hierarchy, needless to say, stood Russians. Some relatively large nationalities, such as Ukrainians and Uzbeks which had their own Union republics, came on the second echelon. Then followed the third-ranked nationalities, such as Tatars and Bashkirs, which had Autonomous republics or Autonomous regions, as contrasted with Union republics. At the bottom of the ladder there were minor ethnic groups which were not officially recognized as separate nationalities. The lower an ethnic group was ranked in the hierarchy, the stronger it underwent the tendency of Russification. In contrast, the relatively high-rank ed nationalities maintained their own national languages, with the only exception of Ukrainians and Belarussians who belong to the Eastern Slavic family and are easily russified without administrative pressure. After Stalin died, Khrushcev took an ambivalent nationality policy. On the one hand, he rehabilitated some "punished peoples" who were deported en masse by Stalin and took several decentralizing measures, which enhanced the autonomy of some nationalities. On the other hand, he advocated the all-out construction of full communism and the complete fusion of nationalities under communism. The 1958-59 education reform abolished the principle of compulsory education in native languages and instead introduced the principle of an optional system, which meant that parents could choose which school to send their children to, i.e., to a national- language school or a Russian- language one. Thereafter, education in national languages has continued to decline and some minorities have tended to lose their national languages. It is clear, then, that some of Soviet language policies were explicitly aimed at extending the education of the Russian language among non-Russian nationalities. Among the most prominent were: the 1938 decision to make it compulsory to teach Russian in non-Russian schools; the 1958-59 education reform referred to above; and the more intensified policy of extending the Russian language after the late-1970s. This, however, does not mean that the aim of these policies was the straightforward Russification. As far as the relatively large nationalities were concerned, education in their own nationality language was maintained and Russian was taught as the second language. In this case the official aim was not simple Russification but the spread of bilingualism. As concerns the smaller nationalities, in contrast, the education in their own national language was impossible to enforce, and therefore the Russification progressed through education in Russian. Thus far, we have surveyed the history of the official Soviet language policy. But the effect of the policy is another matter of discussion. In the Soviet Union, especially under Brezhnev, the official policy was often proclaimed only on paper, and the real situation was left far from the state at which the official ideology aimed. It is necessary, therefore, to investigate the real situation on the basis of empirical data. Although the Soviet statistics and sociological research are poor both quantitatively and qualitatively, it is not impossible to examine this situation which differs greatly from the official ideology. Most of the relatively large nationalities, with a few exceptions, have kept their own national languages as mother tongues. Besides, those languages were used quite extensively in education and publishing. As concerns publishing activities in 1985, the number of items published per population was highest in Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Georgian. Russian came in at the fifth place and Armenian the sixth. In contrast, Belarusian and Ukrainian came in at the sixteenth and eighteenth, respectively. As for education, Soviet languages were classified into three categories: first, those used extensively both in general and higher education. This category includes not only Russian, but also the three Baltic languages, Georgian and Armenian. The second category , which included the Central Asian languages, Moldovan and Azerbaidzhan, was used widely in general education only. In these national republics higher education was mainly conducted in Russian. Finally, the third category, to which Ukrainian and Belarusian belonged, was scarcely used whether in general or in higher education. Those facts we have examined above clearly indicate that the language situation varies from one nationality to another. What factors, then, explain the variation? We may suppose that at least six factors are related. The first one is the position held by each nationality in the Soviet federal system. As was already noted, the Soviet federal system constituted a unique hierarchy, consisting of Union republics, Autonomous republics, Autonomous regions, Autonomous okruga, and those without national autonomy. This hierarchy was closely related to education policy, and the latter influenced the language situation of each nationality. The second factor is the cultural-ethnic proximity of each nationality to the Russians. In this regard, the two Eastern Slavic nationalities, Ukrainians and Belarusians, are, needless to say, most easily russified. Those nationalities who were converted by the Russians into Orthodox, e.g. Chuvashi, Udmurtians, Mordvins etc., have also been greatly russified. In contrast, the degree of Russification of most Moslem and Turkic nationalities remains generally very low. Thirdly, we have to consider the tradition of literary and scientific works in national languages. The greater tradition a nationality has, the more strongly it tends to cling to its own national languages. The Baltic nationalities and Georgians are clear examples. Fourthly, the degree of urbanization influences the process of Russification. In major cities the language of official administration is usually Russian, and Russification proceeds more intensively than in rural areas. This fact is especially important in the Central Asian republics, where the percentage of rural population remains still high. The fifth factor is the percentage of Russians among the population. Needless to say, in the localities where Russians live in mass, Russification tends to be stronger than other areas. Lastly, we have to consider the degree of diaspora of each nationality. Those nationalities who reside scattered all over the whole Soviet Union tend to be more strongly russified than those who live closely in their home republic. It suffices to mention the contrast between Jews, Tatars, or Armenians, on the one hand, and Georgians and the Baltic nationalities, on the other hand. These six do not exhaust the related factors, but we can surmise that these are among the most important ones. By combining these factors, we can make a typology of the language situation of Soviet nationalities. We hope this typology can serve as a solid stepping stone for further investigation.