著者
佐藤 啓介
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.57-69, 2012 (Released:2019-09-18)

Gianni Vattimo, who is an Italian contemporary philosopher, regards the process of secularisation as a neccesary event of the history of Being. For, interpreting Heideggerian Being with Verwindung, Vattimo thinks Being itself derives from its presence. This proccess of Being’s derivation has affinity with Christianity. The God in Christianity has incarnated into the human Christ, and Vattimo interprets this event as the infinit derivation from origin. So, both the history of Being and Christianity have “weakness” in essence. This weakness is free from the violence which Western metaphysics has possessed. Vattimo, however, thinks there is an irreducible core in this weak Christianity (or weak Christian God). It is charity. So, according to Vattimo, if we interpret Christian messages in light of the weak ontology, they contribute to the developpment of the sociery based on love, and moreover, the establishment of the plural democrary in West. Vattimo’s concept of charity is important because in the contemporary philosophy of religion, the relation between being and love is to be taken seriously. The assessment that Christianity can contribute to democrary closes Vattimo to Rorty.
著者
中 敬夫
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.1-18, 2013-03-31 (Released:2019-08-08)

Exista-t-il vraiment «le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française» au sens d’une déviation de la phénoménologie, comme le soutient D. Janicaud? Nous chercherons à y répondre négativement, examinant la relation entre la transcendance divine et la phénoménologie chez Marion, Lévinas et Henry, et cela en considérant le rapport entre l’altérité d’autrui et celle de Dieu, celui-ci étant pensé comme lieu de l’intersubjectivité. Marion déclare par exemple qu’autrui ne me devient accessible que dans le détour par Dieu qui, comme «meilleur amant», est le «lieu de soi que je veux et ai à devenir». Selon Lévinas à son tour la responsabilité pour autrui est le «lieu où se place le non-lieu de la subjectivité» et ce lieu ou cet espace intersubjectif est «essentiellement asymétrique», la «courbure» en étant la «présence même de Dieu». Mais ce lieu éthique lévinassien n’est pas si originaire de notre propre point de vue génétique ou archéologique ; pour le démontrer, nous recourrons à la dernière pensée de Henry touchant Dieu en tant que lieu de la naissance de l’ego et de l’alter ego. Ce que nous approuverons en fin de compte, ce sera une phénoménologie de l’affectivité, effectuée surtout par Henry et même Lévinas.
著者
築山 修道
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.24-40, 2012 (Released:2019-09-18)

In general, Suzuki Daisetsu is known well as a man of Zen Buddhism. However, he had also deep concern and understanding about Shin Buddhism, and taught us much of it. The aim of this paper is inquiring into his thought of the Land of Purity. For that, we approached this matter from the following three points of view: First in the section 1, we inquired into how Daisetsu saw Teaching of the Land of Purity in the whole history of Buddhism. In other words, his positioning of Pure Land Buddhism and its view-point were cleared up. Secondly in the section 2, the fundamental standpoint and distinctive features of his understanding and interpretation about Shin Buddhism doctrine were examined and explained. Finally, Daisetsu’s own thought of the Land of Purity was investigated. What should be here paid attention to is the following two things: His own thought of the Land of Purity is distinguished from his understanding or views of Shin Buddhism doctrine, and it means the thought of Pure Land Buddhism which Daisetsu himself had grasped. Another is that the idea of the Land of Purity, Birth in Amida’s Land of Purity, the relationship of the Land of Purity to the world, and Recitation of Amida’s name i.e. to say ‘Namu Amidabutsu’ are main problems there. On one hand, his such thought of the Land of Purity discovered the universal significance and possibility of Myokonin’s religious experiences, on the other hand it was more concreted and deepened through his encounter with them.
著者
吉永 進一
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.11-23, 2012 (Released:2019-09-18)

The writings of Suzuki Daisetsu (1870-1966) sometimes cause misunderstanding and unnecessary criticism because they often depended on their historical contexts. It seems necessary to examine his biography to understand his writings. In this lecture I pick up the few years between Suzuki’s entering the University of Tokyo (1892) and leaving for America (1897) , and show the relationship between Suzuki and other progressive young Buddhists during those years. In Meiji 20s Suzuki was one of those reform-minded young Buddhists called Bukkyō Seinen. He became a member of a society of such progressive Buddhists called Keiikai. This was the predecessor of the representative modernizing Buddhist movement, Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai, of which Suzuki later became a member, too. The leading member of Keiikai was Furukawa Rōsen (1871-1899), who was said to be an ideological originator of Shin Bukkyōto Dōshika. Furukawa wrote an article about Tibetan Buddhism in 1895. In it he pointed out the vogue of Theosophy in Europe as an evidence to indicate the necessity of mystical experiences in conquering skepticism, and stressed the importance of Tibetan Buddhism. This opinion was influenced by his friend, Taoka Reiun (1870-1912), who tried to build his own mystical philosophy, which included Zen and the western Mysticism. In 1896 Suzuki wrote an article comparing Zen and the Western mysticism. This seemed to be written in response to other modernized interpretations of Zen. In Meiji 20s he was creating his own thoughts about Zen and Buddhism by exchanging opinions with other young Buddhists.
著者
井上 克人
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.41-56, 2012 (Released:2019-09-18)

Der Satz der Identität bedeutet auch für den Zen-Buddhismus, dass ein Ding mit sich selbst identisch ist. Ein Berg ist durch und durch ein Berg. Äußerlich gesehen, gibt es hier keinen Unterschied zwischen der gewöhnlichen Logik und der Zen-Logik. Aber schon auf der Anfangsstufe nimmt Zen einen anderen Standpunkt ein. Die gewöhnliche Logik entwickelt den Satz der Identität weiter zum Satz vom Widerspruch (A ist nicht nicht-A), die Zen-Logik aber entwickelt ihn zu einem offenbaren Widerspruch 〈A ist nicht-A〉. Zen behauptet 〈Der Berg ist nicht-Berg〉. Damit man diese Aussage verstehen kann, muss man eine völlige Bewußtseinsveränder­ung voraussetzen. Er muss fähig sein wahrzunehmen, dass A seine eigene A-heit durchbricht und ihm sich dieser formlose und aspektlose Aspekt ent­hüllt. Die Formel 〈A ist nicht-A〉 wird folgendermaßen paraphrasiert: 〈A ist so durch und durch A, dass es nicht mehr A ist〉. A ist hier nicht-A im positiven Sinne, indem es absolut jenseits der Bestimmung und Begren­zung der A-heit ist. Aber gleich darauf folgt die nächste Stufe (oder wir sollten eher sagen: diese konstituiert sich gleichzeitig wie die Stufe des 〈A ist nicht­ A〉): 〈A ist (wieder) A〉 . Dies bedeutet, dass wir auf der letzten Stufe wieder zur Anfangsstufe zurückkehren. 〈Der Berg ist (wieder) Berg〉. Diese Identität, die drei Stufen hat, wird auch folgendermaßen para­phrasiert: A ist nicht A; deswegen ist es A. 〈Ein Berg ist kein Berg; des­halb muß er Berg genannt werden〉 („Diamant Prajñā Sūtra“, 『金剛般若経』). Und eben diese Identität ist nichts anders als die sogenannte 〈 Soku-hi no Ronri 即非の論理〉 bei Daisetsu Suzuki .
著者
手島 勲矢
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.1-15, 2011 (Released:2019-09-18)

Since the time of Aristobulus and Philo of Alexandria, through the age of Moses Maimonides and Judah Halevy, Jewish thought has always developed within both sympathies and antipathies with Greek philosophy. This paper will argue that the ambivalent postures of Jewish thought to Greek philosophy has not only cultural motives but also a logical base in Jewish understanding of human language, which tends to appreciate the “private name” which is for calling one another in the speech of I-Thou, more than the “proper name” for identifying an object as “It” in the general analysis of philosophy. The claim is inspired by the theory of Abraham Ibn Ezra, a Hebrew grammarian in the 12th Century, who distinguishes two kinds of name, i.e., shem ha-etzem (the name of substance) which is the private name used to recognize the only one as unique irreplaceable being, and shem ha-toar (the name of appearance) which is to signify the groups, the types, or the kinds of things by observation of similarities and dissimilarities. Ibn Ezra understands that the reality can not be truly grasped except addressing it as unique with shem ha-etzem, whereas he explains shem ha-toar as a name expressing the imaginative side of reality as perceived by human sense and reason, therefore, connoting the semantic hollowness of generalization by human language. Because of this distinction of the two names, the paper will maintain that Jewish thought reaches the explanations of the world, human, and God as different from those of Greek philosophy, since the latter emphasizes more on the importance of the general name for identifying kinds and types which human language creates about phenomena, while Jewish thought tends to respect more the other name which functions to recognize not only God but everyone of human being as unique and only one in the universe.
著者
長谷川 琢哉
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.30-43, 2011 (Released:2019-09-18)

A partir des années 80, le thème de la justice apparaît au premier plan des considérations philosophiques de Paul Ricœur. Pour lui, la réflexion concernant la justice a été guidée par le motif de s'interroger sur le social. Or, quand Ricœur considère le problème de la justice, il traite cette question simultanément avec les concepts de l'amour ou du pardon, concepts qui ont souvent une implication religieuse. Pourquoi une réflexion à propos de la justice qui devrait porter essentiellement sur la société doit-elle être liée à la religion ? Pour Ricœur, qui distingue rigoureusement la religion et l'éthique, le court-circuit entre l'amour et la justice doit être évité. Donc, dans cet article, tout en examinant minutieusement le problème de la justice chez Ricœur, nous mettons clairement en évidence un paradoxe inévitable pour la justice. C'est justement ce paradoxe qui met en lumière la relation qui doit lier la justice et le pardon.