著者

斉藤 了文

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.57-64, 2008-03-30 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

12

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We focus on artifact which is phenotype of a sort of genes “technological knowledge”. And we make clear the difference between science communication and technological communication mediated by artifact. Two points are essential, i. e. artifact and engineer. And then four key words are needed, requirement specification, inspection, technical standards, and manufacturing industry. We conclude that technological communication mediated by artifact is different from science communication. The point is the strangeness of “mediated by artifact”.

著者

斉藤 了文 遠山 茂朗

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.101-107, 2007-03-25 (Released:2009-07-31)

著者

横山 幹子

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.1-9, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

13

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In “From Alethic Anti-realism to Alethic Realism” Künne distinguishes between alethic realism and alethic anti-realism. This article examines whether or not alethic anti-realism is appropriate, when we take the position of using common sense to settle a philosophical problem. To that end, I will first review Künne's theory. Next, I will point out that Putnam's natural realists are alethic realists, that Wright's moderate internalists are alethic ani-realists, and that Wright argues against Putnam. Then, I will argue that Künne's conception of truth escapes the criticism of Wright's argument. Lastly I will also review Tennant's argument for anti-realism, and argue that in spite of Tennant's argument, alethic anti-realism is not appropriate when considered from a commonsense point of view.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.29-38, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

12

被引用文献数

1 1

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According to the relational view concerning the ontological nature of perceptual experience, perceptual experience is a relation between the perceiver and its object. Moreover, if it is a relation, then it must be a cross-time relation. After explicating the principal motive for the relational view, this paper considers whether the ontological nature of perceptual experience can really be construed as a cross-time relation, and argues that the relational view can be defended against objections based on a temporal ontology in the form of the time-lag argument which assumes either Presentism or Eternalism. So it is concluded that as far as temporal ontology is concerned the relational view has no serious problem.

著者

三浦 俊彦

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.39-46, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

16

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It seems necessary to reply to the review of my book Paradoxes of Bertrand Russell, by Natsuki Takamura on this journal No. 106. Takamura was involved in verbal trivialities and repeated a stereotyped view to the effect that Russell did not admit the significance of modality in metaphysics. On the contrary, Russell's idea of modality as properties of propositional functions, not of propositions, must be estimated to have anticipated the possible world semantics. My book suggested it, and many texts by Russell himself and other scholars support the interpretation.

著者

植原 亮

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.11-20, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

25

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The theory of knowledge as a natural kind holds that knowledge has a theoretical unity in the causal structure of the world. Since knowledge supports causal explanation and prediction, we can investigate knowledge empirically like other natural kinds such as water. But epistemological nihilism holds that knowledge does not have such a theoretical unity because we can always observe the diversity of knowledge. This paper aims to defend the theory of knowledge as a natural kind from epistemological nihilism. To do this, I will suggest that we can understand knowledge as a biological kind like species or organs, and then accommodate the diversity of knowledge to this viewpoint positively.

著者

森田 邦久

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.29-37, 2007-03-25 (Released:2009-07-31)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1 2

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There are three received approaches to scientific explanation: causal, unification and pragmatics. However, I will try to highlight the insufficiency of these approaches in this paper, furthermore instead, suggest a new approach: explanation by showing the essence of the phenomena. 'The essence of the phenomena' is what distinguishes the class of phenomena in question from the other classes of phenomena. Therefore, unification surely plays an important role in the scientific explanation, but its role is to clarify the essence of the phenomena.

著者

實川 幹朗

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.71-82, 2007-03-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

17

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The modern psychology and the positivism as a methodology of science in general both emerged hand in hand in the middle of 19th century. At the beginning, they regarded human consciousness as the absolute basis of knowledge, i. e. the “consciousness worship”. The misunderstanding that the consciousness is evidently known led to a false conviction that they could know all that should be known in the world. Meanwhile, natural sciences continued researches in their own way upon their own material evidences. With the decline of introspectionist psychology, the material evidences unnoticedly succeeded the overconfidence in the old evidence of the consciousness. The process opened the way to a belief that the being in the world is exhausted within the realm of positivistic science, i. e. “onto-delusion”. However, the “consciousness worship” is still in effect, because even the positivism based on material evidences cannot avoid depending upon “normal” human consciousness as a premise of objectivity. Psychology has played the central role in this delusional process. We have no right to demand universal validity from the beginning in any method of science.

著者

小山 虎

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.49-59, 2007-03-25 (Released:2010-02-03)

参考文献数

14

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In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them.

著者

野村 恭史

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.79-87, 2006-03-25 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

38

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.69-77, 2006-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

27

著者

虫明 元

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.41-50, 2006-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

6

著者

阪本 初恵

出版者

時潮社

雑誌

月刊ゆたかなくらし : わが国唯一の高齢期福祉・介護総合誌 (ISSN:02868547)

巻号頁・発行日

no.458, pp.61-63, 2020-09

著者

堀口 明子

出版者

時潮社

雑誌

月刊ゆたかなくらし : わが国唯一の高齢期福祉・介護総合誌 (ISSN:02868547)

巻号頁・発行日

no.458, pp.59-61, 2020-09

著者

重村 由香

出版者

時潮社

雑誌

月刊ゆたかなくらし : わが国唯一の高齢期福祉・介護総合誌 (ISSN:02868547)

巻号頁・発行日

no.458, pp.56-59, 2020-09

著者

久保田 知敏

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.87-93, 2005-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

3

著者

桐谷 理

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.95-98, 2005-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

13

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Millikan (1984) は, 生物の器官, 行動, 言語使用など様々な機能担体に備わる規範を, 自然選択の観点から統一的に捉える, 「直接固有機能 (direct properfunction) 」論を提出している (Millikan 1993, chapters 1 and 2, 2002も参照).直接固有機能論は固有名の使用にも適用されるが (1984, p.75), Millikanはこの理論とKripke (1980) の固有名の指示の因果説とを比較してはいない (Millikan 1993, 2000, 2004も参照).本稿では, Kripkeの固有名の指示の因果説が, 直接固有機能の定義の諸要件をすべて含意していることを論証する.それにより, Kripkeの因果説が, 固有名の使用に備わる規範を, 自然選択の観点から捉えていることを示す.まず, 第1節では, Millikanによる直接固有機能の定義の込み入った部分を明らかにしておく.そして, 第2節で, Kripkeの固有名の指示の因果説が, 直接固有機能の定義の諸要件をすべて含意していることを論証する.それにより, Kripkeの因果説が, 自然選択の観点から, 固有名の使用連鎖内の過去の使用と同じ対象を指示するという, 固有名の使用に備わる規範を捉えていることを示す.

著者

白井 仁人

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.99-104, 2005-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

2

著者

中島 敏幸

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.55-67, 2005-03-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

21

著者

三木 大史

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.19-30, 2004-10-25 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

14