著者
鈴木 啓之
出版者
日本中東学会
雑誌
日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.32, no.1, pp.37-70, 2016

This article analyzes the process of the alliance between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan from 1982 to 1987, and its effect on the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). PLO leaders, like Khaled al-Hassan, sought to become allied with Jordan for two reasons: to balance the power against opponent groups that had ties to Syria, and to prepare for possible peace negotiations hosted by the U.S.However, their alliance only lasted for a few years, until 1987. The PLO leadership realized the alliance with Jordan could not achieve political status for the PLO and even caused more severe inter-factional disputes among Palestinian groups. PLO leaders sought reconciliation among factions, but then decided to cancel the Amman Agreement. Even with the Amman Agreement's retraction, the short alliance between the PLO and Jordan introduced a direct connection between the PLO and the Occupied Territories. The PLO's leadership, especially Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), played an important role in establishing PLO-affiliated organizations inside the territories. These circumstances led to pro-PLO political activities in the territories, and led the way to the first Intifada in 1987.
著者
小澤 一郎
出版者
一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会
雑誌
オリエント (ISSN:00305219)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.59, no.1, pp.40-56, 2016

<p>The arms trade in the Persian Gulf experienced a drastic expansion in the mid-1890s, and emerged as an important issue for the polities around the Gulf. This study investigated the factors giving rise to and sustaining this trade. Analysis was conducted from the perspective of the attempts of the Qajar dynasty of Iran to suppress the trade on the Gulfs northern shore.</p><p> The Qajar government's initial suppressive attempts remained unsuccessful, revealing the two factors sustaining the trade: first, the complicated interests within the Qajar government concerning the profits from the trade, and second, the difficulty in regulation that arose from the trade's international nature, namely, the existence of Muscat as a "loophole." This situation led the Qajar government to cooperate with the British Empire. Besides strengthening the existing suppressive measures, the Qajar government permitted the British Navy's activities in its territorial waters. Furthermore, a joint Qajar-British request was communicated to the Muscat government in December 1897 asking for the introduction of more effective suppressive measures. However, the joint request did not bring about the expected result, although the various interests within the Qajar government had been reconfigured and ceased to promote the arms trade by that time. This was probably due to the trade's economic importance for the Muscat government, the Muscat government's treaty obligations to the other great powers, and the noncooperation of France. This failure guaranteed the continuation of the trade itself, which became less visible and accelerated the influx of modern arms into southern Iran.</p><p> In conclusion, the author asserts that the development and the failure of the measures taken to suppress the Persian Gulf arms trade reflected not only the characteristics of the arms trade, but also the nature of the regional order of the Persian Gulf at that time.</p>
著者
鴨野 洋一郎
出版者
関東学院大学経済経営研究所
雑誌
関東学院大学経済経営研究所年報 (ISSN:13410407)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, pp.51-63, 2016-03

1500年ごろオスマン帝国に滞在していた貿易商ジョヴァンニ・マリンギは,複数の会社や商人から商品を受け取り帝国内でそれを販売する駐在員であった。本稿では,彼がフィレンツェに送った書簡から駐在員であるオスマン貿易商の立場について考察を行った。そのさいマリンギとフィレンツェで毛織物を製造するヴェントゥーリ家との関係に着目し,同家がリオナルド・ヴェントゥーリをオスマン帝国に派遣し,マリンギが彼を受け入れるというできごとの経緯を追った。