著者

今村鞆 著

出版者

朝鮮総督府専売局

巻号頁・発行日

vol.第七卷, 1940

著者

山口 悟

出版者

大阪学院大学国際学学会

雑誌

大阪学院大学国際学論集 = INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISSN:09170561)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1・2, pp.1-31, 2014-12-30

著者

吉沢 淑 鈴木 大介 進藤 斉 角田 潔和 小泉 武夫

出版者

公益財団法人 日本醸造協会

雑誌

日本醸造協会誌 (ISSN:09147314)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.92, no.3, pp.217-223, 1997-03-15 (Released:2011-09-20)

参考文献数

5

被引用文献数

3 3

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(1) 清酒の主要な香気成分とその類縁物質をモデル清酒に添加し, その酒質への影響をプロファイル法を用いた官能評価により調べた。(2) モデル清酒のアルコール分が高いと, 添加香気物質の香りへのマスキング効果が大きくなった。(3) 酢酸イソアミル, カプロン酸エチルなどのエステルや高級アルコール, ソトロンなど多くの物質がモデル清酒の上立香や含み香を増強させ, 果実様香, エステル様香, 老酒・シェリー様香, 焦臭などを付与, 増加させた。一方, パルミチン酸エチルは上立香を低下させた。(4) これらの物質の多くはモデル清酒の味を変化させた。中でも酢酸イソアミルは甘味を, 酢酸フェネチルは酸味を顕著に増強した。(5) 顕著な効果を示した物質を2種類組み合わせて混合添加した試料の香味は複雑な変化を示した。

著者

鈴木 絢女

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_66-185_81, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

30

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Malaysia used to be categorized as one of the “High Performing Asian Economies” for its track record of high economic growth and macro-economic stability, among others. However, recent debates on the Malaysian economy point to slowing growth, being caught in a middle-income trap, persisting income inequality, budget deficit, and increasing government debt after the Asian Financial Crisis. To overcome these problems, the Malaysian government launched an economic-fiscal-distributive reform package called the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010. However, the implementation of the NEM has been faced with a series of compromises and deadlocks. This is surprising given the prior characterization of Malaysia as a “strong state.”This paper aims to reveal the weakness of the state of Malaysia by shedding light on the persisting budget deficit. Based on federal budget documents, the paper argues that the expanding public expenditure is attributed to the increase in the following: (i) redistributive programs, such as subsidy for gas and oil and cash transfers to the lower-income group as a means to earn electoral support; and (ii) particularistic distributive programs that are often allocated by the Prime Minister, benefit Bumiputera businesses and cronies of the dominant governing party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and consolidate the intra-party power basis. In addition, the Government’s failure to strengthen the revenue base given the fear of losing votes can be regarded as another driver of the persisting fiscal deficit.In spite of the NEM’s target of a balanced budget by 2020, the Malaysian government has been failing to implement fiscal reforms. The paper argues that this is a result of the lack of autonomy of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the voters and the intra-party constituency. Malaysia’s leadership has been increasingly sensitive to the demands of its broad and internal constituents owing to increasing electoral competition since the Asian Financial Crisis, glaringly manifested in the 1999, 2008 and the 2013 General Elections. Such a weak state is a historical by-product of a strong state in the 1990s that marginalized intra-UMNO opposition and laborers in order to implement development policies, and eventually brought about a face-off between the governing party that keeps cohesion through distribution of rents, on one hand, and opposition that expanded its support by exploiting the issues of lack of transparency, freedom and equality, on the other.To regain fiscal balance, the Malaysian government is faced with a dilemma. Decreasing budgetary allocation for the lower income group or the intra-UMNO interests will further weaken the government. Likewise, tax raise will turn away voters who are skeptical about the way their money is used. While the promise of fiscal accountability may persuade some of the skeptical taxpayers, vested interest groups would continue to resist such moves.

著者

増原 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_82-185_97, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

47

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Regarding viewpoints on threat perception and civil-military relations, theoretical analyses have generally concluded that under a high internal threat, civil-military relations are unstable and that a high external threat and low internal threat brings about stable civil-military relations. However, Indonesia’s experiences do not support these analyses. During the war of independence era, under the high external security environment, Indonesia’s civil-military relations were unstable because of the disagreements between the government and military concerning negotiations and the guerrilla warfare against the Netherlands. During the Suharto regime, high internal threats caused stable civil-military relations because the threat perception of the military coincided with that of the government.This paper hypothesizes that it is not external threats and internal threats that influence the stability of civil-military relations but whether or not the government and military share the same point-of-view on threat perception. I will prove this hypothesis by analyzing the threat perception of the government and military in Indonesia during the democratization era.After the decline of the Suharto regime, the military officers resigned from political and administrative posts and abolished business activities during the democratization process. The government and military met with domestic threats (e.g., separatist movements, terrorism, and communal violence). While the government tried to solve separatist movements peacefully, the military urged the government to suppress them forcefully. As a result, the difference in the threat perception between the government and military deteriorated the civil-military relations.However, domestic threats almost ended by 2005, and Indonesia began to deal with external threats. One of them was a territorial dispute with Malaysia. In 2002, Indonesia lost two small islands near the border of Malaysia based on the decision of a judge from the International Court of Justice. After the court decision, Malaysia attempted to expand its claim over the oil-rich sea area, which included the Ambalat block near the islands. The Indonesian government as well as many Indonesian citizens resented the expansion and began to view Malaysia’s territorial claim as an external threat. The military also shifted their threat perception focus from domestic conflicts to the defense and management of the border areas. Another external threat that Indonesia has had to deal with is the territorial conflict over the South China Sea. Since 2008, Chinese fishing boats have often entered the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Indonesia around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea; in 2010, Chinese military ships threatened Indonesian patrol ships that had captured Chinese fishing boats and ordered the Indonesian patrol ships to release the fishing boats.In the latter half of the 2000s, the government and military came to share viewpoints on and perceptions of the external threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity concerning the territorial dispute with Malaysia and the South China Sea conflict. This contributed to an increase in the military budget and stabilized the civil-military relations in Indonesia.

著者

毛里 和子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_146-182_149, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

著者

大原 俊一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_49-189_64, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

59

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This paper argues that the German Historical School is the original main stream of thought in classical international political science in the West, and the methodology of this school makes research in international system through historical approach possible. In the 17th century, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Samuel von Pufendorf discussed international political issues. Subsequently early 19th century, A.H.L Heeren initiated the research of international system through historical approach. The German Historical School has ever afterward been interested in the establishment of “system” in the European international order of the period between the 18th to the early 19th century, namely the maturity of the European “states system,” because it acknowledges that the European “states system” that mainly matured in the 18th century has formed the core of the world order up to the present.The first research field in the area of international system through historical approach is history of thought on international politics as “intellectual history.” In the 18th century, the theoretical evolutions of international law in the German-speaking countries, including studies by noted philosophers Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel, and the intellectual evolutions in the French-speaking countries, including studies by the noted political theorist and philosophers Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, formed the twin main streams of thought in this intellectual history. In addition, the intellectual evolutions in Britain included the studies of the noted philosopher. historian, and economist David Hume, which formed another stream of thought. They recognized and analyzed the formative process of “states system,” thereby influencing it.The second research field is investigation into the formative process of classical diplomacy called “diplomatic history.” In the middle of the 18th century, every great power reformed its own diplomacy, namely performing a “diplomatic revolution.” Then, in the second half of this century, international system of cooperation emerged as a multipolar system among great powers, preparing the way for the Concert of Europe beginning from Congress of Vienna in the early of the 19th century.The third research field is inquiry into the structural development of international system as “structural history”. The main subject of this “structural history” in the period between the 18th to the early 19th century is the transformation of the balance of power. The Machiavellian dynamic of balance of power of the early of the 18th century transformed the static and stable equilibrium in the second half of the 18th century. The above-mentioned intellectual and diplomatic evolutions contributed to this transformation for the European international order.In the maturing process of the European “states system,” thoughts and diplomacies transformed international structure through mutual interaction, resulting in the emergence of “system.” Therefore, the framework of the research of international system through historical approach is regulated by this formative process of “states system.” Every approach and research field relates to each other as the precondition of “states system.” Furthermore, the comprehension and the clarification of “states system” contributes to the understanding of the core function of the international system.

著者

小阪 真也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_118-178_131, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

49

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This paper demonstrates the contribution of Morocco’s on-going comprehensive reparation for the gradual transition of Morocco from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one after the end of the “Années de Plomb”. Previous researches tended to stress a lack of transitions of remained authoritarian regimes in Middle East including Morocco. However, this paper argues that, since 1990s, Morocco has been gradually developing its state system based on the idea of the constitutionalism that has been recently regarded as a source of the legitimacy of the sovereignty in international society. By referring to the broad concept of the reparation in the “Guideline” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, this paper builds a theoretical framework based on the idea of the hierarchical structure of the rule of law which constitutes a core component of the constitutionalism. The idea of the rule of law can be divided into two parts: broad sense and narrow sense. The broad sense of the rule of law means universal value such as human rights which constitutes a fundamental principle and defines specific laws. On the other hand, the narrow sense of the rule of law, which constitutes low level rules, means specific laws that directly rules society. Sovereign states need to build both aspects of the rule of law in order to build a constitutional state system. Based on this understanding, this paper considers that states can build the broad sense of the rule of law through re-confirming human rights norms by providing compensation or restitution as principal activities of reparation. In addition, this paper argues that, in order to take measures for guarantee of non-repetition as a critical elements of the reparation in the “Guideline” in 2005, reparation is interrelated with the institution building that is another mechanism of transitional justice. From this standpoint, this paper considers that states can build the narrow sense of the rule of law through institution building to reform specific laws and legal institutions to prevent future atrocities. Under this framework, this paper argues that the comprehensive reparation in Morocco contributed for Morocco’s transition from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one through re-building both aspects of the rule of law. For building the broad sense of the rule of law, Morocco re-confirmed human rights norms by implementing the reparation programs varied from the monetary compensation to the symbolic reparation under human rights laws. For building the narrow sense of the rule of law, Morocco implemented institution building, as a program for guarantee of non-repetition, to reform the constitution, penal code, and legal institutions. This paper concludes that, as a progress of transitional justice in Middle East, Morocco has been taking steps to a constitutional state through implementation of the on-going comprehensive reparation to build both aspects of the rule of law.

著者

中山 俊宏

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_126-180_135, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

6

著者

溝渕 正季

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.183, pp.183_134-183_137, 2016-03-25 (Released:2016-09-27)

著者

秋元 美紀

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_17-192_32, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

80

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This paper examines Japan’s cultural exchange policy toward the Middle East through the Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS) and the Japan Foundation (JF) in the postwar years. Cultural exchanges are often used by countries as a foreign policy tool to make citizens of other nations to have favorable/sympathetic views about your own country, as well as to deepen mutual understanding.This article argues that the Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East in the postwar period has been conducted largely as an ad hoc manner. When crises happen in the Middle East and the Japanese image in the region deteriorates, Japan then initiates huge exchange programs for the Middle East to cope with the crises. Although the Middle East has not been given a high priority like the US and Southeast Asia in the Japanese cultural exchange program, it is important for Japan to maintain a friendly relationship with the Middle East for economic security reasons.Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East has been gradually developed by KBS and JF. Having obtained government aid, KBS launched the first original program for the Middle East in 1962. However, the contents were mainly the photo exhibition about the Japanese industry and the education. In the high growth period, Japan did not need to expand the cultural exchange with Middle Eastern countries because Japan’s relations with the Middle Eastern nations were never threatened or in jeopardy.Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East began to change in the 1970s and 80s as a result of such events like two oil crises and the Iran-Iraq War. JF, which took over KBS in 1972, embarked on large-scale projects to promote human exchanges between Japan and the Middle Eastern countries through sports including judo and soccer. It must be noted that the Persian Gulf War of 1991 did not have a big impact on Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East because it was the crisis in US-Japan relations sparked by the Gulf Crisis rather than the Gulf War itself that had greater effect on Japanese foreign policy. The percentage of JF’s projects for the Middle East were consistently lower than major areas like North America.In the 21st century, the September 11 attacks caused a war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Japan clearly strengthened the cultural exchange for the Middle East again. JF made a framework and tackled reinforced projects including intellectual exchanges to deepen mutual understanding and trust relationship. However, it ended in 2006. If crises and conflicts had not occurred in the Middle East, Japan would not have carried out enormous programs. This indicates Japan increases cultural exchange projects for the Middle East when crises happen and when these crises might badly influence the Japanese image.

著者

林 忠行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_169-172_172, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

著者

岩坂 将充

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_132-178_145, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

40

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Under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), so-called “democratization”has been promoted on an unprecedented scale in Turkey. However, in a country where the military’s presence in politics has been very prominent, how far this democratization process has gone has not been fully investigated so far. In this article, I will seek to explain how democratization has been developed by analyzing the process of “civilianization”—which means the reducing of the military’s influence over politics—mainly under the JDP government. At the same time, by referring to the study by Ahmet T. Kuru, I will attempt to show that institution and ideology in civil-military relations have formed the background of democratization. The civilianization process in Turkey can be divided into three phases: (1) civilianization in institutions under the EU accession process; (2) the manifestation of civilianization in ideology; and (3) the civilianization of ideology through the judicial process. Before the JDP government emerged, the military developed institutions and an ideology to keep itself in power following the 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution, which I call the “1982 regime” here. In the first phase, although the “1982 regime” had strongly consolidated itself, it could not resist the EU accession process that started at the end of 1999. The regime’s institutions were reformed to move the country toward EU membership because the regime’s ideology was open to joining the EU. In the second phase, such changes in institutions weakened the political influence of the military, and, in contrast, many civilian organizations that had been under the military’s influence strengthened their autonomy. For example, as observed in the “Republic Meeting” in April 2007, civic organizations that were considered to have the same ideology as the military acted autonomously. Moreover, the Constitutional Court dismissed the closure case for the JDP and judged, in its decision of July 2008, that the party’s reform had been effective for EU accession. In the last phase, the coup plan in 2003, which seemed to involve some retired military personnel, was judged in the courts, and it damaged the military’s prestige. In this understanding, it can be said that democratization, which has shown significant progress under the JDP government, has been realized by the military’s loss of its monopoly over ideology through the civilianization of the institutions of the “1982 regime” and the emphasis on EU values, such as freedom and liberal democracy, which had been neglected for a long time. Furthermore, it also can be said that ideology still has legitimacy in a different form and context from the “1982 regime.” Such changes in ideology and legitimacy will affect the further progress of democratization and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

著者

古内 洋平

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_95-194_110, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

59

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Any government that emerges from repression or conflict faces challenges related to transitional justice. In recent years, the focus of studies on transitional justice has shifted from the prosecution of perpetrators to reparations for victims. For a government that has just emerged from repression or conflict, granting reparations to victims is a major burden in terms of finances and capabilities. There are many examples of governments that have refused to compensate victims or that have discontinued payments after a short time. Yet, an increasing number of governments have continued to grant reparations to victims since the 2000s. What is the reason for such growth? Researchers in several past studies have analyzed the processes by which transitional justice mechanisms are diffused across national boundaries, though most of the studies have focused on the spread of trials against perpetrators and trials associated with truth commissions. Only a small number of studies have addressed the spread of reparations for victims.This paper provides an analysis of the causes for the increase in governments that are granting reparations to victims, with a special focus on the 2000s. I make use of Jelena Subotic’s framework of hijacked justice to explain interactions between international actors and domestic political elites. In the 2000s, domestic political elites appeared, making strategic use of reparations to victims as a means for achieving economic growth and national security. They employed terms like collective reparation and community reparation. Moreover, international actors, including international NGOs and international organizations, began collecting information about countries that were implementing collective and community reparations, suggesting that reparation for victims could be integrated into development projects. In this paper, I refer to this idea as development-centered reparation. Once this idea came to have international influence, it allowed domestic political elites to justify their use of reparations to initiate other policies. The result was an increase in governments granting compensation to victims as a transitional justice mechanism.To ascertain processes such as the one described above, I use primary sources from international organizations and NGOs to investigate international actors’ perceptions of reparation as well as changes in their perceptions. In this paper, I examine Morocco and Colombia as examples of countries that continuously grant reparations to victims and investigate the interactions between international actors and domestic political elites in both countries.

著者

クロス 京子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_141-194_156, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

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UN Security Council Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000, which is regarded as a landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security, recognized that men and women experience conflict differently, and that women play an integral role in conflict prevention, resolution, and recovery. It urged Member States to increase women’s participation in all aspects of peace and security processes and incorporate gender perspectives into all post-conflict efforts. It also called upon all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in situations of armed conflict. This Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda developed into a comprehensive normative framework, followed by seven subsequent UNSCRs.The strengthening of the WPS norms and its spread, however, are not necessarily linked to concrete actions and results promoting gender equality in conflict-affected societies. Indeed, even though in Liberia the first female African president was elected with the strong support from women’s organizations and the United Nations PKO explicitly mandated WPS agenda was deployed, there has been no major improvement in the women’s political, economic and social situation. Women are still left in a state of insecurity even after the conflict is over. The question that comes up here is how the WPS agenda is translated and introduced into post-conflict peace-building policies and how they affect the domestic society.This paper utilizes the concept of ‘hybridity’ which is promoted by the critical peace-building scholars to explain the interaction of power between local and international actors in the post-conflict settings. It analyzes what kind of hybridity was created in a case study of gendered security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia from two perspectives, firstly from the perspective of international and local actors, and secondly considering the gender approach. Through the analysis of hybridity, this paper identifies factors that promote or impede the acceptance and implementation of international norms, that is, the power structure inherent in international/local as well as gender that causes gaps in women’s security needs.One of the key significances of this research is that it sheds light on women’s grassroots activities in promoting ‘everyday peace’ by using the WPS agenda as informal SSR activities that mainly deviates from the formal SSR framework. Most people in developing countries depend upon informal security providers such as elders and chiefs for the maintenance of order. Thus, the reform of formal security sectors such as police, military, judiciary do not necessarily directly lead to the security of women living in post-conflict societies. This research, which regards local female activists as agents in the positive creation of hybridity, aims to present a new perspective to bridge hybrid peace study and gender/feminism study.

著者

池田 亮

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_160-194_163, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

著者

下谷内 奈緒

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_125-194_140, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

51

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This article examines the nature of the rule of law in international criminal justice through a critical evaluation of deterrent theory, the most widely accepted argument supporting international criminal tribunals today. Contrary to the assumptions of deterrent theory, the premise of which is centralized enforcement of international law, it argues that the rule of law in international criminal justice is decentralized in two ways. First, it requires the consent of sovereign states to establish jurisdiction and the cooperation of states to enforce international criminal law. Second, beyond the direct execution of international criminal law, the legal norm embodied by international criminal courts to end impunity for the perpetrators of grave human rights abuses encourages states to conduct human rights trials in their domestic courts.The article begins by reviewing the logic of deterrence. Deterrent theory has become prominent as an increasing number of international prosecutions are directed at the perpetrators of ongoing violence. It is assumed that the threat of punishment will deter the perpetrators from further criminal acts and, thus, prevent the escalation of conflict. In this instance, deterrent effects are viewed as conveyed in a manner that applies domestic deterrent theory of punishment at an international level. While this domestic analogy tends to emphasize the coercive power of law, this article demonstrates that the power of international tribunals to constrain the conduct of sovereign states and individuals has been weakening. While the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were executed on the strength of the victors’ overwhelming power, today, international tribunals as exemplified in the ICC and hybrid courts basically require the consent of states.The article then investigates the normative aspect of international criminal justice. It has a high level of legitimacy—it is recognized as legitimate by a majority of states in the world. This fact encourages voluntary compliance of international criminal justice at a national level. However, the problem is what to do with the remaining countries. Grave human rights abuses are committed in a minority of undemocratic states whose levels of political liberties are extremely low. These countries tend to remain outside the international criminal system. It is difficult to prosecute atrocious state leaders without regime change, but international criminal justice as it is implemented now merely “complements” the functions of sovereign states. It has neither the power to coerce regime change nor the normative power to encourage voluntary human rights trials in national courts.

著者

青野 利彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_157-194_160, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

著者

佐藤 章

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_79-194_94, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

45

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In the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa encountered many armed conflicts and, consequently, experienced several regime changes resulting from military victories or the elections following the ratification of peace accords. In this series of events, major international actors, such as the United Nations and developed countries, intervened in Africa under the guise of peace building and promoting democracy to further their own interests in pursuing a new world order during the post-Cold War era. In such a situation, many African countries had to simultaneously accomplish numerous difficult tasks related to aspects such as security, recovery, reconciliation, and democracy. As a result, whereas some countries were successful in these tasks, others failed and had to encounter escalating political instability.Approximately 20 years have passed since then; today, one of the most important changes that one can find in Africa is the significant enhancement of the region’s political and military capacity to respond to conflicts. This paper focuses on this capacity notably exercised by several regional organizations in Africa and discusses two observations regarding this development. First, this enhancement is an outcome of fulfilling the transition toward realizing “African Solutions to Africa’s Problems,” an idea that has received international acclaim since the 1990s. Second, the cooperative task sharing that is implemented between African countries and actors outside Africa, such as the United Nations, has enhanced the region’s capacity to respond to conflicts.Further, this paper examines the unintended outcomes of this enhancement in Africa’s capacity to respond to conflicts. In recent years, several African countries have engaged in active military operations against armed Islamist groups, whose activities, on their part, have escalated the violence occurring in the region. It is true that such operations are the result of autonomous efforts by African countries to satisfy their own security interests. However, in the current global context, their activities imply that they are participating in the “war on terror” led by developed countries. In addition, the recent initiatives for conflict resolution in Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia by a regional organization in West Africa reveal that some African countries are so confident of their military capacity that they have a radical conviction that military intervention by these countries in other African counties is justified if the purpose is to secure or stabilize democracy in the latter. These unintended outcomes of capacity enhancement can be clearly described as both an ambiguity and a paradox of finding “African Solutions to Africa’s Problems.” By highlighting this aspect, this paper portrays the relationship between the new world order, regime changes, and violence in twenty-first-century Africa.

著者

古澤 嘉朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_111-194_124, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

65

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A quarter century has passed since the release of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, which, retrospectively, can be marked as the beginning of recent surge in peacebuilding research and practice. The institutionalization of the term “peacebuilding” appears to be a success, as many organizations around the globe incorporated the term framing their own activities in post-conflict and transitional countries. This can be symbolically represented by the establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005. On peacebuilding research, major publishers have released books such as Palgrave Advance in Peacebuilding and Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, published in 2010 and 2013 respectively, and the peer-reviewed journal entitled Peacebuilding was launched in 2013. So-called “liberal” peacebuilding debate is also taking place between two camps: policy-oriented research and critical research. While former seeks effectiveness of peacebuilding practices, while the latter seeks a quality of peace built as a result of peacebuilding practices. Taking these developments into account, this article will analyze a strategy of peacebuilding policy by looking into terms such as “rule of law” and “legal pluralism.” In this process, the article will look into the police reform and chiefdom police reform in Sierra Leone. The first section of the paper will explain how “rule of law” fits into peacebuilding policy by examining the police reform in Sierra Leone (1998–2005). The second section will explain how “legal pluralism” fits into peacebuilding policy by examining the chiefdom police reform in Sierra Leone (2008–2017). The paper points out that a difference between the two approaches—rule of law and legal pluralism—results from a different conception of the term “policing.” The former is based on the narrow understanding of policing, while the latter is based on the broader understanding. The paper raises following three points. First, the intent of this article is to make a point that revising peacebuilding strategy is necessary in order to improve quality of peace built via peacebuilding practices. Second, the paper argues that, instead of making peacebuilding policy and research into a normative framework and a standard set of assumptions about how post-conflict and transitional countries should be reformed, peacebuilding policy and research need to be context-based. Third, paper also points out that whether peacebuilding policy will be context-based or not will largely be affected by politics surrounding actors engaged in peacebuilding in each case.