著者

鹿島 正裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.132-148,L15, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

16

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To be sure, there has been a rather impressive accumulation of research into the regional politics of the Middle East, centering on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Gulf wars and the involvement of the super-powers therein. However, most of the monographs are more “descriptive” than “theoretical-analytical, ” whether they are historical studies or report on current affairs. While it is perhaps not an exaggeration to claim that most of the related works in Arabic and Japanese are such, some among those in English are theoretical-analytical works, reflecting the heightened demand, especially in the United States, for more social scientific approaches within area studies.A typical work in this genre is Steven Walt's The Origins of Alliances (1987), which may be said to have used area studies to establish a social scientific theory, rather than introduced social scientific approaches to area studies. Works that are more based on area studies include Michael Barnette's Dialogues in Arab Politics (1998) and Raymond Hinnebusch's The International Politics of the Middle East (2003). Barnette's work discusses the politics among Arab states, the core of the Middle East states, as does Avraham Sela's The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict published in the same year, although not particularly in a theoretical-analytical way. Both works should be considered as studies in the regional politics of the Middle East, as the conflict with Israel has been strongly tied with the various rivalries among Arab states. Walt's and Hinnebusch's works discuss the regional politics in the Middle East, which involve, in addition to Arab states and Israel, Iran and the great powers.In terms of their theoretical tenets, Walt's and Sela's are (neo-) realist and Barnette's constructivist, while Hinnebusch's is liberal, incorporating not only realist frameworks but also constructivist and pluralist (liberal-institutionalist) concepts and even (neo-Marxist) structuralist perspectives. I describe these basic theoretical arguments and delineations of historical phases found in each work, finding Hinnebusch's argument most comprehensive and persuasive.Moreover, I look at some other books and articles, among which is Paul Noble's “Systemic Approaches Do Matter, But…” (2004) In this article, Noble tries to apply systemic approaches to the study of the Middle East system and offers a set of regional and sub-regional systemic factors in addition to global systemic factors as explanatory variables. I take up his argument of the global systemic factor change in the post-Cold War period and raise some issues to be explored concerning this on-going period, such as democratization, privatization, and regionalization in Muslim and “rentier” states of the region, especially after the Iraq War (2003).

著者

小林 由佳 渡辺 和広 大塚 泰正 江口 尚 川上 憲人

出版者

公益社団法人 日本産業衛生学会

雑誌

産業衛生学雑誌 (ISSN:13410725)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.2, pp.43-58, 2019-03-20 (Released:2019-03-25)

参考文献数

40

被引用文献数

2

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目的:従業員参加型職場環境改善(以下,参加型職場環境改善)はメンタルヘルス不調の一次予防として有効性が示された手法であり,ストレスチェック制度の施行に伴い関心が高まっている.しかし,従業員の関与,上司の姿勢,職場の風土などにより活動の効果が一貫しないことが指摘されており,運用上の課題解決が求められる.本研究では,職場環境改善の実施手法の検討に際して職場の準備状態を見立てる観点,および組織を発達させるという組織開発の観点が有効と考え,参加型職場環境改善が有効に機能するまでに発達した職場の定義およびその獲得に必要な要因の検討と,機能する状態に向けた準備状態を段階別に把握するためのチェックリストを開発することを目的とした.対象と方法:専門家間の議論,および実務者からの意見にもとづき,参加型職場環境改善の機能する職場の状態(理想的な状態)の定義を行った.そしてその状態の獲得に必要な要因に関するアイテムプールを作成し,日本人労働者300名(男女比1:1)を対象にインターネット調査を行い,探索的因子分析にて因子構造を確認した.さらに,職場の状態のチェックリストを作成するため,理想的な状態を外生変数,その獲得に必要な要因に関する項目を内生変数としたロバスト最尤法推定によるカテゴリカルパス解析を実施し,項目ごとに閾値(threshold, θ),およびパス係数(γ)を推定した.項目ごとの閾値にもとづいて項目のレベル(その項目を達成することの難易度)を設定し,そのレベルごとに最もパス係数が高く,かつパス係数が0.60以上の項目をチェックリストに採用した.最後に各レベルと理想的な状態,および関連項目(職場の心理社会的要因,ワーク・エンゲイジメント,心理的ストレス反応)との関連を分散分析にて確認した.結果:収集された77項目のアイテムプールにおける探索的因子分析の結果,71項目3因子構造が妥当であった(第1因子「職場の受容度」,第2因子「上司のリーダーシップ」,第3因子「職場での議論の熟達」).チェックリスト作成のためのカテゴリカルパス解析の結果,第1因子から3項目,第2因子から2項目が抽出された.第3因子では理想的な状態との関連が十分でなかったため該当項目はなしと判断した.最終的に,肯定的回答率をもとに設定された4段階のレベルを5項目から判断するBODYチェックリストが作成され,各レベルと理想的な状態,および関連項目とで分散分析を行った結果,すべての指標において有意な差が認められた.考察と結論:参加型職場環境改善が有効に機能する状態の獲得に必要な要因は,職場の受容度,上司のリーダーシップ,職場での議論の熟達に整理され,これらを日常的に高めることでより有意義な改善活動につながることが示唆された.また,BODYチェックリストを用いて職場の準備状態を測定することにより,職場環境改善活動を企画する際に各職場にあった目標を設定することが可能になった.今後は,BODYチェックリストの職場単位の分布の確認および参加型職場環境改善の実施効果との関連を確認していく必要がある.

著者

有川 一 吉田 貫司 久保 あゆみ 坂本 太一 渡邉 孝士郎 今井 一

出版者

日本武道学会

雑誌

武道学研究 (ISSN:02879700)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.1-9, 2020 (Released:2020-09-19)

参考文献数

24

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Research suggests that psychological stress due to competing against opponents of different skill levels affects exercise intensity during kendo gokaku-geiko. However, few studies have clarified the relationship between psychological stress measured using objective indices and exercise intensity. In this study, we measured psychological stress, exercise intensity, and physical activity in players during kendo gokaku-geiko with opponents of different skill levels using objective, non-invasive, simple measures.Six male members of the university kendo team participated in this study. They performed kendo gokaku-geiko for 3 minutes with highly skilled, equivalently skilled, and non-highly skilled opponents. We measured psychological stress indices (salivary amylase activity and autonomic balance [LF/HF]), exercise intensity indices (heart rate [HR], peripheral oxygen saturation [SpO2], rate of perceived exertion [RPE]), and physical activity indices (number of steps and strikes) during keiko.We observed an increasing tendency of salivary amylase activity, HR, RPE, and physical activity indices during keiko with highly, but not with non-highly, skilled opponents. On the other hand, we detected an increasing tendency of LF/HF with both types of opponents.These results suggest that in keiko with highly skilled opponents, the participants experienced tension (i.e. a “fight-or-flight response”) caused by strong pressure and attacks from their opponents; thus, they increased their physical activity and exercise intensity and were likely to experience high stress. On the other hand, in keiko with non-highly skilled opponents, the participants experienced low stress due to a lack of exercise intensity and low physical activity.

著者

吉武 信彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.128, pp.66-83,L9, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

36

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Danish-EU relations, paying attention to domestic politics in Denmark, and to show developments of the interaction between domestic and international politics in European integration.Denmark is only a small country in the EU, but, when her successive governments coordinated their policy towards the EU with sceptical sentiments of the people, they faced many difficulties, which sometimes resulted in crises of domestic politics and of the EU itself, for example, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93. This is based on the political system in Denmark, which makes it possible to give impacts to European integration, i. e., democratic control of the government's policy towards the EU by the Danish parliament, especially the European Committee (Europaudvalget), and by referendum, which has been held seven times on European integration since 1972. This democratic control helps political parties and the people to participate in the European integration process.There are two important cases in the Danish-EU relations to examine the interaction between domestic and international politics. They are the political processes of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93 and of joining the single currency “Euro” in 2000. The outcomes of the referendums, which were held in June 1992 and in September 2000, were “No” in both cases, but the impacts on the EU contrasted sharply. The former resulted in delaying the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty for 10 months. In this process, domestic politics was closely connected with negotiations between the Danish government on the one hand and other member states and the EC Commission on the other hand. However, the latter did not give rise to any serious problem for the EU, because the referendum in 2000 decided whether Denmark would join the single currency or not, which had been started by most of the member states since 1999. Denmark was not eligible to exercise the veto over this project. This concept of promoting integration is called “variable geometry” or “multi-speed integration.” It is stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, as “closer cooperation” and “the principle of flexibility.” The Nice Treaty, which was signed in 2001, also emphasizes this concept and it is aiming to change the weighting of votes for a “qualified majority” in the Council of Ministers, with the result that small member states like Denmark might diminish their power in the EU decision-making.The concept of “variable geometry” could lead to two groups of member states in the EU: a group which is willing to accelerate integration and the other group which is reluctant to do so because of domestic problems. In this case, domestic politics of the reluctant group cannot have a great influence on the EU decision-making. However, each member state even in the willing group has difficulties with a perception gap between the elite and the people. This might deteriorate rapidly by further integration and domestic politics of member states could change to a stumbling block to integration. Therefore, it is indispensable to pay attention to domestic politics of member states in the EU.

著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.79-94,L11, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

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The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.63-78,L10, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

53

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Among the member states of the European Union (EU), Sweden is one of the most EU-skeptic countries. Opinion polls have shown strong skepticism of the Swedes since Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995. This article examines anti-EU and EU-skepticism in Sweden and tries to investigate reasons why many Swedes are skeptical about the EU.The first part of this article discuses Sweden's change of support rating for the EU and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), presenting data from opinion polls. The Swedes strongly favored EU membership in 1991, and although their support declined after 1992, it increased again during 1994. After Sweden's entry into the EU, the Union's popularity immediately slumped and a majority of the Swedes became anti-EU. Then support for the EU gradually increased and supporters of the membership outnumbered its opponents in late 2001. Support for EMU has fluctuated since 1997, and by 2004, half of the population opposed the introduction of the “euro” to Sweden.The second part of this article examines the anti-EU/EU-skeptic faction, and investigates its activities and assertions in the campaign of referendum on Sweden's EU membership in 1994 and the European Parliament elections in 1995 and 1999. The anti-EU camp consisted of the Left Party and the Green Party (anti-EU parties), some trade unions, and members of the Social Democrats and the Center Party. The lack of transparency in EU decision-making is their prime issue. Slightly more than half of the electorate voted “yes” to Sweden's EU membership in the referendum and Sweden became an EU member state in 1995. In European Parliament elections, voter turnout was fairly low and anti-EU parties, the Left and Green Parties, gained higher vote percentages compared to national elections.The third part of this article analyses Sweden's referendum on the euro in 2003 and the European Parliament election in 2004. The anti-euro camp opposed further transfer of Sweden's policy-making power to the EU. A majority of the Swedes voted “no” to the adoption of the euro, effective from 2006. An EU-and Federo-skeptic political organization, Junilistan (The June List), which was established for the European Parliament election, became the third largest political party in Sweden's European Parliament delegation, though voter turnout was the lowest of any nation-wide Swedish election in over 80 years.In Sweden, the rise of anti-EU sentiments spawned anti-EU and EU-skeptical groups. These groups would seek to reform the EU. Many Swedes are not satisfied with the democracy, openness, transparency, social policy and environmental policy of the EU.

著者

韓 放

出版者

日本社会情報学会

雑誌

日本社会情報学会全国大会研究発表論文集 日本社会情報学会 第24回全国大会

巻号頁・発行日

pp.262-265, 2009 (Released:2010-02-26)

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This paper reviews the current situation of Media Literacy education in Taiwan from following aspects, the role of university, the cooperation between university and NPO/NGO institutions, the application in primary school and community education. Through the investigation of the development of Media Literacy education in Taiwan, it was found that the cooperation pattern between organizations. University is supposed to play a main role, but the cooperation with other social, educational organizations is important as well. Media Literacy education starts from school, but not just limited in school. It should be beyond class, and explored in a larger and complex social environment.

著者

荻野 沙織 斉藤 美香

出版者

松田 壯正

雑誌

盛岡赤十字病院紀要 = Medical Journal of Japanese Red Cross Morioka Hospital (ISSN:13412612)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.72-77, 2016-08-31

著者

西野 京子

出版者

日本臨床麻酔学会

雑誌

日本臨床麻酔学会誌 (ISSN:02854945)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.4, pp.523-530, 2013 (Released:2013-09-13)

参考文献数

5

被引用文献数

1

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手術中に地震が起きたならば,まず自分,患者,周囲の安全を確保した上で,手術を速やかに終了させ,患者の生命を守らなければならない.しかし,手術室が損壊したり,電気,医療ガス等のライフラインが途絶すると,これが不可能になる.そのためわれわれは平時より地震に強い環境整備を行い,ライフラインのバックアップ体制を整え,災害時のマニュアルを作成し,実際に手術時に地震が起きたことを想定してシミュレーションを行う必要がある.

出版者

写

巻号頁・発行日

vol.第5冊,

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.132-149,L16, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

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The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia —Malaysia including Singapore— was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empireNationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.

著者

深川 美奈

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.79-95,L12, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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John J. McCloy, the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when Konrad Adenauer won the election of parliament in 1953: “We cannot in my judgment, lift our hand and influence from the internal German developments. The roots of sound parliamentary behavior are not deeply enough embedded in German soil for us to take a different position. This is a great step forward domestically but German nationalism and its demoniac counterparts have not been completely exorcised.” Why did he point out that German society was not yet democratized after more than five years of defeat? This paper deals with the formation of democratization policy of American military Government and its successor, the American High Commission. It focuses on the period from defeat of Germany (May 1945) to June 1952 in which American democratization program ended at the local level. I pay attention to the formation and development of denazification policy by both the American Military Government and German and re-education (re-orientation) program by Kreis Resident Officer of Land commission. In this paper, I divide the period into four parts according to its peculiarities. I examine how American policies developed and why these policies failed finally. American Military Government carried out denazification and re-education on purpose to democratize German society. How and where did Americans locate democratization policy after a switch in economic recovery policy in 1947?Denazification in the American zone was carried out with initial severity. In applying the rough-and-ready procedure to Germans, the consequences have been more than ordinarily severe. Proof of this action can be seen in the dismissal not only of those whose removal was required by the directive but also of those in whose case discretion was allowed. Since the influence of Nazism was rather stronger than American authority had predicted, American officials realized that denazification could not be accomplished without German help.German law, entitled “For Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, ” which was enacted on March 5, 1946, classified ideological offenders in terms of past guilt and future danger and tried to assess penalties proportionate to the guilt and danger. But the number of cases to be handled by judicial machinery was amounting to the great majority of the adult population that the process of rectification was slow as the complications accumulated. Germans were not satisfied with prohibition and restriction of employment.Though process of denazification was promoted by amnesties and amended law, staffs of local authority on denazification could not deal with the cases of major offenders. As a result, the ex-Nazi forces which succeeded in rehabilitation were much more than those who were politically purged.It was estimated that denazification policy ended in failure or was not completely carried out. However, the matter was not so simple for the democratization in postwar west Germany. Although denazification was not completely carried out as a whole, it contributed to change in the German top leadership in the postwar era. American army authority appointed the persons on the “White List, ” who were anti-Nazi or non-Nazi, and could be pro-American to the post of leadership after the examination of denazification. They proceeded to democratization with collaboration with the American Military Government. Hence, antidemocratic power could not be strong when the Federal Republic of Germany was establised.Nevertheless, denazification of the middle class was not fully carried out. Since the influence of Nazism mostly penetrated into the middle class, it was impossible to eliminate the influence completely by denazification.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.180-196,L21, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

49

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The official concepts of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, formalized in three policy papers issued in the 1970s, preempt the philosophy of cultural activities in the interdependent and globalized world of the late 1990s. In the three papers, the German government does not actively constitute a “national culture” through presenting publicly authorized cultural elements to people in foreign countries, but it rather promotes transnational relations by encouraging free activities by various social actors across national borders.The formalization of these uniquely “liberal ” concepts —or, the “reform” of foreign cultural policy— resulted from multiple factors at different levels of the policy process concurring during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Although students of German politics might be tempted to regard the “reform” as a variable dependent upon general political change such as the formation of the social-liberal coalition and Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik, the reality of policymaking and the content of policy papers, such as the key idea “enlarged concept of culture”, cannot be explained by such a parsimonious model.By tracing the history of the policy process, especially the development of the philosophy of cultural relations itself, one can recognize two factors which were of vital importance for the formalization of new concepts: the changing identity of policymakers, which lay at the base of the very formation of the Brandt government, and the reform initiative within the policy process taken by Ralf Dahrendorf, then the Parliamentary State Secretary of the Foreign Office. On the one hand, the quest for a new “FRG-identity” in the transition period of postwar international relations, which also meant the quest for a new Federal Repubulic open toward the world and contributing to international cooperation, was embodied in the “enlargement of the concept of culture” in the new philosophy. On the other hand, Dahrendorf influenced the making of the policy papers not only in the sense that he took the first step in the “reform” process of the Foreign Office, but also that the opposition party in the Bundestag felt obliged by this popular sociologist to organize a parliamentary inquiry committee for foreign cultural policy, which would produce a thorough report supporting the core of liberal ideas proposed by Dahrendorf himself.Although Dahrendorf left the Foreign Office within 10 months, he played a decisive role in the formalization of new concepts because Dahrendorf, with his progressive liberal theory and distinguished career in the Anglo-American social scientific field, personified the new identity and reform-mindedness of FRG-policymakers at that time. The fact that he could not stay in office for a long time indicates that the genuine Reformeuphorie was transient, but the timing for his initiative was good enough to get the “reform” started. The new concepts of the official FRG-cultural relations are not the byproduct of Brandt's new Ostpolitik, but, through the personality of Dahrendorf, rather reflects the Zeitgeist of the time, which sought for democracy and open-minded transnational cooperation in a changing world.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.42-55,L9, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters.The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956.The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter.These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration.Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.

著者

三尾 真琴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.140-156,L15, 1999-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this paper is to portray two different aspects of Hizbullah: that of a radical armed organization-some scholars refer to it as a typical “terrorist” organization, and as a “social welfare party, ” especially for Shiite communities. In addition, through the study of relations between the Hizbullah and other actors, this paper tries to point out its effects on Lebanese society and on politics of the Middle East.Hizbullah was born in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. It is not always clear by what process it was established and organized. It is estimated, however, that Hizbullah is composed of several independent sects leaded by a collective “Ulama, ” like Iran. At present, members of Hizbullah are around 15, 000 and it has come to share influence on the Shiite population with Amal.The basic goals and strategies of the Hizbullah are 1) establishment of a Lebanese Islamic state modeled on Iran, 2) Liberation of south Lebanon (a “security zone” occupied by Israel), 3) struggle against Israel and support for the establishment of a Palestine state, 4) the abolishment of “confessionalism, ” which refers to fixed rights and political power given to each religious sect, 5) support for Shiite communities. In order to complete these objectives, and especially in order to liberate south Lebanon and fight against Israel, Hizbullah took Western foreigners hostage and performed “suicide” bombings against buildings such as the embassy or military compounds of Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.Since 1992, however, Hizbullah carried out a big change in accordance with the realities of the Lebanese political system and became one of the political parties representative of Shiite communities. Because Hizbullah took great care of agriculture, infrastructure, school education, social welfare in Shiite residences, which the Lebanese government has been ignoring so far, it gained support in Shiite communities and took twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament in 1992.It is true that Hizbullah is increasing its political power in Lebanese society. However, the situation surrounding Hizbullah is quite complicated. For example, most of Hizbullah's budget still depends on Iran, and much of the freedom given to Hizbullah is only allowed by Syria. Furthermore, the relation between the Hizbullah and Christian sects, a domestic matter, has remained strained and dangerous. Therefore, this paper concludes that we need to study Hizbullah from the point of view of political relations in the Middle East, and at same time from that of religious balance in Lebanon.

著者

Y. Nakabayashi M. Saitoh T. Ishihara T. Numata K. Uchida J. Koga

雑誌

2010 International Conference on Solid State Devices and Materials

巻号頁・発行日

2015-09-17

著者

山口 真有美 瀬戸 奈津子 清水 安子

出版者

公益社団法人 日本看護科学学会

雑誌

日本看護科学会誌 (ISSN:02875330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.176-183, 2018

被引用文献数

1

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<p><b>目的:</b>初期・二次救急外来で勤務する救急看護認定看護師の入院せず帰宅する患者に対する看護実践を構造化することである.</p><p><b>方法:</b>近畿圏内の救急看護認定看護師12名に半構造化面接を実施し,質的統合法(KJ法)を用いて分析した.</p><p><b>結果:</b>救急看護認定看護師は入院せず帰宅する患者に対し【医師が診察したあとの看護としての観察とアフターフォロー】,【援助を必要としている患者を見捨てない最後の砦となる】,【入院が必要か否かを探りつつ,帰宅後の生活も想像する】,【救急患者の不安や緊張を思いやり共感しながらも入院不要の納得を得る】,【短時間で帰宅後のリスク回避の方法を説明する】,【重症化の危険に備え,多職種との連携をはかる】,【医療・介護スタッフ,地域住民への救急対応教育】を実践していた.</p><p><b>結論:</b>患者の健康回復のみならず患者を元の生活に戻すことに責任を負う救急看護認定看護師の実践が明らかになった.今後は救急看護師の介入による救急外来再受診や一般外来への定期受診への影響について検討を要する.</p>

出版者

千葉県警察彰功会

巻号頁・発行日

1911

著者

宮原宏輔

雑誌

No Shinkei Geka

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.335-339, 2001

被引用文献数

2

著者

土佐 弘之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.110, pp.195-198, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)