著者
黒田 友哉
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_85-182_97, 2015

<p>Today, it seems that the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is at a turning point. During the Cold War era, the status gap between the European Community (EC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was quite large. In fact, the EC was considered to be highly institutionalised and the most developed region, while ASEAN was considered as an association of developing countries. However, in the post-Cold War era, the status of Asia as compared to that of Europe has significantly risen. The establishment of Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 among heads of states as 'equal partners' is a striking example. In addition, ASEAN will have a community in place by the end of 2015, while Europe has struggled from its sovereign debt crisis to such an extent that it showed its eagerness to learn even from Asian countries. Finally, the EU is now expected to play a role as a 'soft power'ally with ASEAN.</p><p>Based on multiple archives (French, German, and EC archives), this article retraces the course of EC/EU–ASEAN relations, from the origins of ASEAN until the establishment of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of 1975, considered as a formal institutionalisation of EC–ASEAN relations. It aims to clarify why and how this formal institutionalisation occurred. Actually, in 1972, an informal dialogue between the EC and ASEAN began. Thereafter, in June 1975 the regional organisations established JSG between the European Commission and the ASEAN member states. It can be interpreted as a precursor to the EEC-ASEAN cooperation agreement signed in 1980, in that this event is in certain times considered as a 'turning point'.</p><p>EC/EU–ASEAN relations have been widely discussed. The existing research derives mainly from political scientists. Most early research has stressed ASEAN as a 'stepping stone' to the 'Asia-Pacific' region, in other words, an economic valuation of ASEAN as the reason why the EC deepened its relationship with ASEAN. Other studies have underlined ASEAN's value as a reliable partner to break an impasse in the North-South negotiations. However, existing literature ignores a strategic aspect. This article establishes the decisive strategic reason for the EC to have chosen a formal relation with ASEAN: to have a substantial presence in a region where US presence declined after the Vietnam War. This viewpoint is especially supported by Sir Christopher Soames, British Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Relations. Focusing on this strategic aspect, based on the method of diplomatic history, this article also tries to analyse the impact of international contexts such as the Asian Cold War and North–South affairs on the EC's decision-making process.</p>
著者
Maughan Deryck C.
出版者
日経BP社
雑誌
日経ビジネス (ISSN:00290491)
巻号頁・発行日
no.873, pp.70-73, 1997-01-13

米国債不正入札から5年,米証券ソロモン・ブラザーズが復調した。東京支店長から本社会長となったモーン氏は,専門分野で世界のトップ3に入るという目標を掲げる。円の国際化や日本の株式市場活性化には「規制緩和が必要」と指摘,緩和しなければ「円は敗北する」と警告する。最初の1年はまさに「サバイバル」スキャンダル発覚直後は,まさに非常事態でした。
著者
難波 ちづる
出版者
慶應義塾経済学会
雑誌
三田学会雑誌 (ISSN:00266760)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.108, no.2, pp.353-378, 2015-07

故岡田泰男名誉教授追悼特集 : 経済学部における歴史研究 : 日本, アジア, そしてアメリカ第二次世界大戦の勃発を前にして, フランスは約2万人の労働者をインドシナから徴用した。戦後, 彼らを祖国に戻すことがフランス新政府にとって喫緊の課題となるが, インドシナ戦争の勃発により, 送還事業はさまざまな困難に直面することとなった。本国が遂行する戦争に植民地住民を動員するという, いわば帝国の「結束」を強化する政策の清算に, 戦後フランスは多大な労力を払うこととなり, 植民地再支配の試みへの足枷となったのである。When World War II broke out, approximately 20,000 Vietnamese were sent to France as workers. After the war, repatriating these workers involved many difficulties for various reasons, including the outbreak and escalation of the Indochina War. Mobilization of local citizens in a colony was a policy employed by the Meropole to strengthen the unity of the empire. After the war, however, France had to put in a lot of effort to settle the debt created by this policy. These workers, who were mobilized to aid the parent country during the war, ended up endangering the re-establishment of the French colonial rule.
著者
渡辺 昭一
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.81, no.3, pp.303-321, 2015-11-25

1957年ころ,インドは,開発援助の支柱であったスクーリング・バランスの激減により,五ヵ年計画が頓挫する危機的状況に陥った。世界銀行は,新たな援助システムとしてインド援助コンソーシアムを結成した。本論文は,1960年代のインド援助コンソーシアムとの関連で,イギリスの対インド政策の展開過程を検討することを目的とした。コンソーシアムのもとで1960年代のイギリスの対インド援助は,輸出信用保証局によって行われた。同局は,1957年以降イギリス輸出業者に対する保険を担保する権限とともに貸付権限をも付与された。イギリスは,この制度によって多額の援助を実施し,しかも1960年代半ば頃よりプロジェクト援助からノン・プロジェクト援助へと変化させた。1960年代後半にインドが債務返済に窮した際に,イギリスは,世界銀行を通じて自らの援助方法を他のドナー諸国に適応を促した。イギリスは,キッピング・ローンや維持目的の援助(一般目的)を拡大することによって対インド輸出権益の保持拡大を狙っていたのである。
著者
井澤 龍
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.81, no.3, pp.359-377, 2015-11-25

イギリス政府は,第一次大戦中に顕在化した所得の国際的二重課税問題に対応するため,1920年財政法第27条にて救済制度を設けた。この救済制度は,イギリス帝国内で活動する法人・個人にのみ外国税額控除を供与し,その額も限度額を設けていた。本稿では,まず,この帝国内外で差別的で,帝国内でも限定的な救済措置を講じた税制の成立経緯を明らかにした。この税制が生まれた理由は,イギリス政府が帝国内の一体性を求める声に配慮するも,税源の欠損を出来る限り避けようとし,これに成功したためであった。それには,1919年に開催された所得税王立委員会で,帝国外救済を求める民間の声が強くなかったことも影響していた。民間側である経済団体代表は,1918年以前に二重所得課税問題が帝国内の問題であると主張していた過去に制約された。また,本稿では,二重所得課税がイギリスの対外投資に与えた影響についても明らかにした。1920年財政法第27条は,両大戦間期にイギリスが帝国内へと投資を偏らせた一因となったことが分かり,幅広い産業に影響を及ぼしていたことが分かった。
著者
中谷 直司
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_111-180_125, 2015

What was it that eventually put a period to the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the beginning of the interwar years, a treaty that had been the most successful treaty in East Asia to that moment, through two victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First World War of 1914–1918? As many previous works have claimed, was the strong pressure from the United States decisive in terminating the alliance? Or else,as some British works in relatively recent years have argued, was the opposition of the United States no more than the last push to bring down the curtain on the arrangement, if discarding the alliance had already become all but a foregone course in London by the time Washington made clear its opposition?This study will challenge both accounts. First, it will show that the American opposition alone was not and could have not been enough to put an end to the alliance, even though this opposition did indeed create the international dispute itself over whether or not the alliance should be continued. At the same time, the study will deny that London was almost independently decided on the matter. The British government did need something external to help it with its decision; however, that was not the increase of American pressure but the restoration of the credibility of America's commitment to a new international order-building program, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. To this point, American diplomacy had had trouble displaying this commitment, due to the country's failure to join the League of Nations that the US itself had conceived.Therefore, secondly, this work will emphasize the serious dilemma that the British alone confronted in the international politics that led to the lapse of the alliance. That dilemma can be well understood as a variety of the "security dilemma in alliance politics" very well known to IR students. Major previous works,especially in British research, believe that Japan consistently held the alliance to be more significant than Britain did until the last day of the treaty, because the former gained greater advantages through an alliance with the leading power in world politics. However, this study will largely revise this view by describing both Britain's international political dilemma and Japan's diplomatic changeover in the aftermath of the Great War.