1 0 0 0 OA 官報

著者
大蔵省印刷局 [編]
出版者
日本マイクロ写真
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1922年04月29日, 1922-04-29
著者
名古屋鉄道局 編
出版者
名古屋鉄道局
巻号頁・発行日
vol.大正12年度, 1925
著者
名古屋鉄道局 編
出版者
名古屋鉄道局
巻号頁・発行日
vol.大正14年度, 1934
出版者
鉄道作業局
巻号頁・発行日
vol.明治36年度, 1906

1 0 0 0 OA 官報

著者
大蔵省印刷局 [編]
出版者
日本マイクロ写真
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1903年06月20日, 1903-06-20
著者
前田 徹
出版者
一般社団法人 日本オリエント学会
雑誌
オリエント (ISSN:00305219)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.43, no.1, pp.119-126, 2000-09-30 (Released:2010-03-12)
被引用文献数
1

In this brief paper, I will examine the lines 100-115 of “Gilgamesh and Agga.” I agree that, in this part of the text, the speaker was Gilgamesh and he was addressing Agga. However, I do not agree with the interpretation that Gilgamesh was expressing his gratitude for the mercy Agga had shown him, since we have no evidence to prove this situation. I offer an alternative interpretation for this part of the text; Gilgamesh allowed Agga to be an official in the army under his command, since Agga had no status and no privileges after he had been defeated in battle and had been abandoned by his own army. Gilgamesh released Agga. Agga served as his general and representative of Gilgamesh's rule over Kish.

1 0 0 0 IR 丁謂と茶

著者
池澤 滋子
出版者
中央大学
雑誌
中央大学論集 (ISSN:03889033)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, pp.27-33, 2015-02
著者
樋口 真魚
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, no.6, pp.1097-1132, 2014-06-20

This article investigates Japanese attempts to reset its political relations with the League of Nations (hereafter, the LN) after the former's withdrawal from the League, focusing on the Japanese stance at the Montreux Conference of 1936, which was held three years after Japan's withdrawal for the purpose of revising articles concerning the demilitarization of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, first declared in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Close examination of Japanese diplomacy during the Montreux Conference indicates that its decision makers were seeking some ideal means by which to reset the country's political relations with the League throughout the mid-1930s. They were particularly sensitive towards the LN Covenant, which in their opinion appeared to offer a legal basis for imposing sanctions on any country of the world, including Japan. Such sensitivity sharped from 1934 on after the Soviet Union joined the LN, due to the perception that the outbreak of Soviet-Japanese hostilities was highly imminent, leading to fears that the Soviets might call for the LN to impose sanctions on Japan if war did break out. These concerns are the reason why the Japanese government was very active during the Montreux Conference, in addition to regarding the Conference, which was marked by a fierce debate regarding the legal relationship between the revised treaty and the LN Covenant, as the touchstone leading to the future of Japan's diplomatic policy toward the LN. There were two constrasting opinions within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho 外務省) over the stance to be taken towards the revised treaty. One line, advocated by Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro, was to attempt to block LN intervention altogether. The other, advocated by Sato Naotake, the Japanese delegate to the Montreux Conference, argued that Japan should seek means of coexisting with the LN. In more concrete terms, Arita intended to block intervention by calling for a treaty signing congress (teiyaku kokukaigi 締約国会議) as a diplomatic platform opposing the LN and asserting that the text of the revised treaty should seek to avoid LN interference by separating the new convention from the LN Covenant. In opposition to Arita's assertions, Sato was prepared to partially accept "a treaty supplementary to the LN Covenant", which European members, such as the Soviet Union and France, aspired to conclude. By doing so, Sato intended to create a legal setting which would enable LN member countries and "contracting parties" (the latter including Japan) to enjoy equal standing vis-a-vis each other. Although Sato succeeded in persuading Arita that it was necessary to reset Japan as "a state withdrawing from the LN that could coexist with the LN", the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese war about a year after the Conference resulted in sanctions being imposed on Japan by the LN, which left Japanese decision-makers with no other option but to abandon any hope of coexistence.
著者
樋口 真魚
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, no.6, pp.1097-1132, 2014

This article investigates Japanese attempts to reset its political relations with the League of Nations (hereafter, the LN) after the former's withdrawal from the League, focusing on the Japanese stance at the Montreux Conference of 1936, which was held three years after Japan's withdrawal for the purpose of revising articles concerning the demilitarization of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, first declared in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Close examination of Japanese diplomacy during the Montreux Conference indicates that its decision makers were seeking some ideal means by which to reset the country's political relations with the League throughout the mid-1930s. They were particularly sensitive towards the LN Covenant, which in their opinion appeared to offer a legal basis for imposing sanctions on any country of the world, including Japan. Such sensitivity sharped from 1934 on after the Soviet Union joined the LN, due to the perception that the outbreak of Soviet-Japanese hostilities was highly imminent, leading to fears that the Soviets might call for the LN to impose sanctions on Japan if war did break out. These concerns are the reason why the Japanese government was very active during the Montreux Conference, in addition to regarding the Conference, which was marked by a fierce debate regarding the legal relationship between the revised treaty and the LN Covenant, as the touchstone leading to the future of Japan's diplomatic policy toward the LN. There were two constrasting opinions within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho 外務省) over the stance to be taken towards the revised treaty. One line, advocated by Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro, was to attempt to block LN intervention altogether. The other, advocated by Sato Naotake, the Japanese delegate to the Montreux Conference, argued that Japan should seek means of coexisting with the LN. In more concrete terms, Arita intended to block intervention by calling for a treaty signing congress (teiyaku kokukaigi 締約国会議) as a diplomatic platform opposing the LN and asserting that the text of the revised treaty should seek to avoid LN interference by separating the new convention from the LN Covenant. In opposition to Arita's assertions, Sato was prepared to partially accept "a treaty supplementary to the LN Covenant", which European members, such as the Soviet Union and France, aspired to conclude. By doing so, Sato intended to create a legal setting which would enable LN member countries and "contracting parties" (the latter including Japan) to enjoy equal standing vis-a-vis each other. Although Sato succeeded in persuading Arita that it was necessary to reset Japan as "a state withdrawing from the LN that could coexist with the LN", the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese war about a year after the Conference resulted in sanctions being imposed on Japan by the LN, which left Japanese decision-makers with no other option but to abandon any hope of coexistence.
著者
桃川如燕 講演
出版者
国華堂
巻号頁・発行日
1910
著者
吉田 敦
出版者
明海大学
雑誌
明海大学経済学論集 (ISSN:09157638)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.1, pp.35-49, 2014-09
著者
加治屋 智実
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.80, no.3, pp.315-328, 2014-11-25

本稿では,戦前期の都市(東京)における庶民金融の一端を,かつて東京市芝区に存在し,慶應義塾に隣接していたT質店を事例として検討した。T質店史料『人名簿』『質物台帳』を用いて,利用状況(第2節)・顧客の居住地(第3節)や職業階層(第4節)など,質屋利用者の実態の分析を試みた。まず利用状況としては,年末及び5月や6月の質入れが多く見られた。また従来の「貧窮時に質屋へ行く」というイメージの再検討の必要性を示唆した。顧客の居住地としては,芝区住民が大半を占めていたことから,地元密着型の質屋であることが確認されたが,次第に他区住民の割合が増加していた点にも注意が必要である。顧客の職業階層としては,当時芝区が工場地帯であったことから職工の利用人数が多かったが,取引金額については10数%を占めるに過ぎないことを示した。一方で学生は,人数はそれほど多くないにもかかわらず,取引金額は30%を超えており,慶應義塾に隣接するという立地条件を反映した結果を示した。
著者
細谷 亨
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.80, no.2, pp.149-171, 2014-08-25

本稿の課題は,戦時期に展開された満洲への分村移民を,農家の移住形態と母村の変容過程に着目しつつ検討することでその歴史的特質を明らかにすることである。農家戸数と耕地面積の調整を意図した適正規模論にもとづく分村移民では,農村労働力流出の型でいえば挙家離村(全戸移住)が重視されていた。だが,親戚管理を通じた耕地処分のあり方にみられるように帰村を予定していた農家が多く,実際は母村からの農家世帯の流出はあまりみられなかった。家の存続と家産の保全を目的とする農家にとって分村移民は非現実的な政策にほかならなかったが,その一方で農家の家族移住者が相当数に及んだことは,労力不足による農業生産力の低下を招くなど送出後の母村・集落に与える影響は決して小さなものではなかった。かかる事態に対応すべく政策側は送出後の母村整備に着手していく。農家の対応と母村の政策遂行が密接な連関をもっており,そのことが分村移民の展開を強く規定していたのである。