著者

賀 耀明

出版者

岡山商科大学

雑誌

岡山商大論叢 (ISSN:02868652)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.109-157, 2014-11-28

著者

メベッド シェリフ

出版者

南山大学

雑誌

アカデミア. 文学・語学編 : Journal of the Nanzan Academic Society (ISSN:03898431)

巻号頁・発行日

no.95, pp.131-152, 2014-01

著者

岡野 邦宏

出版者

養賢堂

雑誌

畜産の研究 (ISSN:00093874)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.7, pp.747-750, 2013-07

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秋田県八郎潟残存湖(以下,八郎湖)は秋田県西部,男鹿半島の根本に位置し,八郎潟調整池,東部承水路,西部承水路を合せた湛水面積は48.3km2となっている。かつては琵琶湖に次いで日本第二位の面積(220km2)であったが,1957年に着工した八郎潟干拓事業により約17,000haの干拓地が造成され現在の形となった。防潮水門の設置により汽水湖から淡水湖に変わった八郎湖の水質は,湛水面積の減少,人口増加,農地造成などにより悪化の一途を辿り,1977年の事業竣工から24年後の2001年に全国ワースト5位(COD濃度)となっている。2006年には,アオコ(藍藻類の大量増殖)により近隣地域で取水制限も行われ,水質もワースト3位となった。このような現状を鑑みて,2007年12月に湖沼水質保全特別措置法(湖沼法)の指定を受け,全国で11番目の指定湖沼となった。翌年2008年度より「八郎湖に係る湖沼水質保全計画(第一期)」が策定され,悪化した水質の改善が進められている。一方で,秋田県をはじめとする農山村地域を多く持つ地域では生活排水処理において各戸での合併浄化槽に加えて,比較的小規模な集合処理施設である農業集落排水施設が大きな役割を担っている。実際に,秋田県では全体計画処理人口の13.8%(2012年現在)がこうした農業集落排水施設によって生活排水処理が行われている。八郎湖流域では,前述の八郎湖に係る湖沼水質保全計画(第一期)に基づき,農業集落排水施設の高度処理化や広域下水道への接続が進められている。しかしながら,高度処理化されていない施設は水域の富栄養化の一因となる可能性があることから,既設施設の高度処理化は重要な課題といえる。また,農業集落排水施設のような比較的小規模な施設には広域下水道処理施設とは違い,低コストかつ持続可能な高度処理技術が求められる。本稿では,11番目の指定湖沼となった八郎湖の汚濁状況をアオコ問題を中心に解説するとともに,農業集落排水の高度処理技術について植生浄化法の1つであるバイオジオフィルター(Bio-Geofilter)水路を用いた技術について紹介する。

著者

重田 守輝

出版者

国際短期大学

雑誌

紀要

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.11-25, 1995

著者

白石 俊昌

出版者

東北大農研

雑誌

土壌微生物通信

巻号頁・発行日

no.48, pp.4-6, 1978

著者

森 美矢子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.217-248, 2000

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This paper looks at the attempts made between 1987 and 1988 to reform and revive Komsomol under the pressure of political and social change, and their consequences that paradoxically led to the collapse of Komsomol. When we explore the process of Perestroika and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, we tend to perceive Perestroika simply as the prologue to the collapse of the Union and interpret all factors and phenomena during Perestroika from the perspective of how they contributed to the demise of the Soviet system. While it is true that Perestroika ultimately brought about the collapse of the old regime, ten years have elapsed since the beginning of Perestroika. I believe that a more critical and historical examination of the complicated and contradicted process of Perestroika is necessary. Upon reconsidering the historical meaning of Perestroika, it is puzzling to realize how the measures were first initiated to make the system work better, and then transformed intentionally or unintentionally under given circumstances, thus deviating from their original aims and reaching completely different results. Komsomol, as I will examine later, is a good example of this process. Komsomol was one of the major 'social organizations' with enormous membership and a very high saturation rate among the Soviet young. It had been an indispensable part of the Soviet political system, functioning as a mobilization and indoctrination machine since the early years of nation construction. Therefore, even though it had little actual importance and autonomy in political decision making, it did have the potential to exercise great influence on the potential of Perestroika as a driving force of political and social change. As a matter of fact, Komsomol played an important role in determining the direction of Perestroika. It came to be an avant-garde of economic change and secure a position as a leading actor in the emerging market economy and consumerism. In the chapters of this paper, I will investigate the transformation process of Komsomol, which resulted in its eventual fragmentation and collapse, in close connection with the destination of Perestroika. This paper is composed as follows. First of all, I will survey the critical situation of Komsomol just prior to Perestroika and the measures of the Party to make Komsomol more effective as a doctrination machine. Several months after the introduction of Perestroika, the glasnost' uncovered the pathological reality of Komsomol, triggering harsh attacks on it from the society. Holding serious concerns for the future of Komsomol, the Party and Komsomol officials at last proclaimed to start genuene reform. In the second chapter, I will examine the consequence of his reform and discuss the problems, especially the draft of the new "ustav" which was presented at the 20th Komsomol Congress. This marked the actual starting point for making the new Komsomol. In the following section, the two principal directions of Komsomol reform will be elucidated separately in detail. The first is the giving of greater autonomy to the local organizations. The second is the representation of youth interests as an interest association. Komsomol's post-reform direction will then be discussed in the conclusion. Up to the end of 1986, Komsomol seemed to be very reluctant to do anything special even amidst the criticism that was being leveled against it. It rather belatedly declared to hold the 20th Congress in April 1987 to revise the "ustav" (rules) of the organization. Complains and opinions about Komsomol were concentrated on the widening gap between Komsomol and ordinary young people. In the course of active discussions in preparation for the Congress, a general consent was formed that Komsomol should be more responsive to young people's interests through the establishment of local organizations, especially primary organizations. It was believed that Komsomol should grant these organizations rights to decide policies, and allocate budgets for staffing and activities such as local recruitment. The aim was to reform Komsomol from a youth mobiliser to a youth representative. At the 20th Congress, the directions referred to above were officially confirmed and the "ustav" revised accordingly. Therefore it was in the 20th Congress that Komsomol took the first step to remake itself to survive under the unique circumstances brought about by Perestroika, showing not only the members but also the other organizations which Komsomol was working with Komsomol's two new directions of giving local organizations more autonomy and becoming an initiator of the youth interests not a mobiliser of the youth force. Despite this, real change inside Komsomol had not begun yet. An exploration of the practical changes that emerged after the Congress and their effects on the future of Komsomol is necessary. The ideal image of the new Komsomol formulated by the 20th Congress was one that would be activated by the initiatives from the below. Empowerment of local organizations, especially the primary organizations, thus was essential for real change. The authorization of primary organizations to make final decisions on recruitment and the abolishment of membership targets was welcomed by the local organizations that had in the past been prevented from other substantial activities. The effectiveness of local organization largely depended, however, on the quantity of funds and the quality of staff. Thus from 1987 to 1988, local organizations were only gradually given autonomy form the central committee not only on the jurisdiction of the activities, but also on the budget and the personnel administration. The measures mentioned above gave the local organizations the incentive to earn funds because they had to survive on their own at the time the membership began to decline. This meant that through local organizations getting autonomy more and more, Komsomol was becoming more and more centrifugal instead of a united active political force supported from below. This contradicted development can also be seen in the another direction Komsomol took to transform itself under Perestroika. For a long time, Komsomol had been functioning as the main mobilization machine to provide human resources for economic purposes. It had been in charge of students construction brigates (SSOs) and Komsomol storming units (KUOs), sending labor fources to destinated sites or factories that had high economic priority. But this had largely been against their will and interests according to rank and file members. So when it confronted the difficult situation around 1987, in order to restore authority among the members, it was natural that Komsomol turned to the very members who were accusing it of being indifferent to the welfare of the nation's youth through a failure to resist hindrance by governmental or economic organizations. The members appealed to its status as the only representative of the youth, arguing that it should be a reliable promoter of their interests through acquiring the right to determine how much labor forces to supply, where to send brigades and so on. Moreover, through 1987 and 1988, local organizations began to mobilize labor to create profit-making enterprises under Komsomol auspices. The professed aim of the measure was to increase the income of the participants of SSOs or KSUs by giving them the chance to make profits at their own discretion. It should not be overlooked that Komsomol's interest in the measure was to utilize these enterprises to make money because it had to maintain the organization and support the staff in spite of the declining membership and income from membership fees. SSOs, KSUs and other forms like youth housing complexes (MZhKs) which were originally made to provide young workers opportunities to acquire dwelling through social competition got to be the foundation for Komsomol to develop profit-making enterprises which would be leading to genuine Komsomol businesses in the near future. In other words, the Komsomol transformation into be the representative of youth interests entailed the shift from political activities to profit making ones. As a consequence, we can consider Komsomol to have been one of the leading pioneers in making of the market economy in the Soviet Union. As was already mentioned, Komsomol's underlying rationale for reform was to survive the radical political and social change around 1987. Thus it took fundamental actions to be responsive to the demands of youth and to the circumstances under Perestroika. Its breakdown was not due to the obstinate resistance of the stubborn conservative careerists in Komsomol. It was also not the result of any students' revolts or social uprisings. At the present stage, it is necessary to further illuminate the process by which Komsomol reformed itself and should refrain from assertive conclusions. However, it can be assumed that the collapse of Komsomol was an unexpected outcome inadvertently brought about by actions aimed at creating a new Komsomol, but that these actions deviated gradually from their original purpose and drove Komsomol into fragmentation and finally collapse. This paper attempts to analyse this process and serves as a preliminary step to further investigation.

著者

芝田 英昭

出版者

医学書院

雑誌

公衆衛生 (ISSN:03685187)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, no.9, pp.708-716, 2008-09

被引用文献数

1

著者

日野 美代子 大下 健幸

出版者

尚絅学院大学

雑誌

尚絅学院大学紀要 (ISSN:13496883)

巻号頁・発行日

no.71, pp.17-26, 2016-07

著者

中園 亜由美 小出 洋

雑誌

第54回プログラミング・シンポジウム予稿集

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, pp.113-118, 2013-01-11

著者

内山田 竹志 小宮山 宏

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経エコロジー = Nikkei ecology (ISSN:13449001)

巻号頁・発行日

no.210, pp.38-41, 2016-12

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特別対談 トヨタ自動車が昨年10月に公表した「トヨタ環境チャレンジ2050」が注目を集めている。「新車CO2ゼロ」や「工場CO2ゼロ」などの高い目標を掲げた狙いはどこにあるのか。小宮山 「トヨタ環境チャレンジ2050」に対する内外の反応はいかがですか。

著者

川喜田 哲哉

出版者

化学工学会

雑誌

化学工学 (ISSN:03759253)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.7, pp.391-395, 1998-07-05

参考文献数

16

著者

永嶋 伸也 辻田 浩志 飯高 洋一

出版者

日本結晶学会

雑誌

日本結晶学会誌 (ISSN:03694585)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.173, 1991

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経ベンチャ- (ISSN:02896516)

巻号頁・発行日

no.177, pp.34-37, 1999-06

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千葉県を中心にカー用品のディスカウント店を展開するオートウェーブ(千葉市)は、九九年三月期、消費不況をものともせず増収増益を達成した。売上高は前年比七・二%増の一七九億円、経常利益は四億七三〇〇万円と前年の三倍以上に増えた。六月に予定される栃木県小山市での新店オープンを皮切りに、全国展開も始める。

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経ビジネス (ISSN:00290491)

巻号頁・発行日

no.1053, pp.69-71, 2000-08-07

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「毎日オイル交換ヒトスジです」。7月6日、千葉県成田市にほど近い富里町。東関東自動車道の富里インターチェンジを降りてすぐの場所に、こんな看板を掲げた店がオープンした。カー用品店、オートウェーブ(千葉市)が展開する「オイルボーイ」だ。 看板どおり、自動車のオイル交換だけを業務とする店だが、開店後、来店客が途切れることはない。

著者

大原 信一

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社外国文学研究 (ISSN:02862832)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, pp.62-85, 1992-12-15

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研究ノート(Note)

著者

小西 雅子

出版者

社団法人日本気象学会

雑誌

天気 (ISSN:05460921)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.133-138, 2000-02-29

著者

富岡 修

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経エコロジー = Nikkei ecology (ISSN:13449001)

巻号頁・発行日

no.208, pp.64-66, 2016-10

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アスクルは、8月末からロハコで配送効率向上と環境負荷削減を両立するサービス「ハッピー・オン・タイム」を東京と大阪の一部地域で開始した。このサービスは、事前に商品の到着時間を1〜2時間の単位で指定すると、前日に到着予定時間を30分の幅でスマートフ…

著者

藤岡 伸明 今野 晴貴

出版者

Posse ; 2008-

雑誌

Posse = ポッセ

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.134-145, 2017-09

著者

森谷 峰雄

出版者

国際生命情報科学会

雑誌

Journal of International Society of Life Information Science (ISSN:13419226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.176-179, 2006-03-01

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この世には、2種類の霊性が支配している:善い霊性と悪い霊性である。その起源・第一原因は超越水準に求められるべきである。善い霊性は真の救済を生み、悪い霊性は人間を狂気にする。善い霊性とは真の実在を含むものであり、悪い霊性はそれを持たないものである。

著者

Ueno Keizo NAGAMATSU Tetsuro

出版者

公益社団法人日本船舶海洋工学会

雑誌

西部造船会会報 (ISSN:0389911X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.41, pp.1-18, 1971-03-31

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There have been many investigations into the effect of restricted water on wave-making resistance. In numerical calculation of the wave-making resistance, however, ship forms were represented by source distributions obtained for the unbounded water instead of those for the restricted water. In the present study the authors consider the effect of restricted water to obtain source distributions and calculate the wave-making resistance to compare with the results derived from the source distributions in unbounded water. Numerical calculations are carried out on a ship in a canal with rectangular cross section. The ship is represented by stepped distribution of sources and sinks on the centre plane. The side walls aud the bottom of the canal are replaced by infinite series of image sources and sinks. Calculations are made on the following ship form and canal sizes. Ship form Parabolic water line and frame line L/B=L/T=10 Canal size W/L=0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 H/L=0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0 where L=ship length, B=ship breadth, T=draft, W=canal width, H=canal depth From the results of the calculations, the following conclusions are derived. (1) The source density representing the same ship form increases with the presence of canal walls and decreases with the presence of canal bottom. (2) For practical purposes, the wave-making resistance in restricted water may be calculated by using the source distribution obtained in unbounded water. (3) When the canal is wider than 3/2・L and is deeper than 3/4・L, the efect of restricted water may be neglected in practical application.