- 著者
-
溝端 佐登史
- 出版者
- 経済理論学会
- 雑誌
- 季刊経済理論 (ISSN:18825184)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.52, no.2, pp.16-30, 2015-07-20 (Released:2017-07-03)
This paper analyses state capitalism in Russia from the viewpoint of state capital and state functions. As far as the Russia's government size (number of public servants and financial expenditures of the public sector) equals to those in developed countries, it cannot be applied as a precise indicator to characterize state capitalism. On the other side, both the state capital as a market player and the state functions can be regarded as qualitative characteristics of the Russian capitalism. As for the state capital, both privatization and state intervention have coexisted, and have simultaneously functioned for "controlling the highlands (the mainstay of state)". Moreover, the 2008 global economic crisis authorized state intervention. In order to maintain global competitiveness, the government has established strategic enterprises and has implemented preferential measures. Even though the state sector in the economy has decreased, it has enhanced its intervention into the private sector of the economy. The state has a strong influence on the economy via holding shares and regulations. Particularly, state-owned enterprises have changed their enterprise type from state corporations and unitary enterprises to joint-stock companies. In addition, "the exchange system of interests (state capture and business capture)" has been established and the state capital has openly showed its new "internationalization" behavior. The state capital has close ties with the global financial flows and it has stipulated the emergence of Russia's multinationals that are deeply connected with tax havens. Despite the offshore problem, the state sector is deeply linked with the global network and, therefore, state capitalism cannot exist without linkages with the global market. With regards to authoritarian political regime, concentration of powers, and existence of oil and gas rents, Russia is none other than state capitalism. However, functions and quality (good governance) of the state capitalism are far behind other developed countries. The Russian state is inferior in terms of state functions and state quality; the state as a coordinator of interests by grabbing hands may not be regarded as a strong one. Thus, Russia (Putin's regime) cannot be referred as "a normal middle income democratic country". Finally, low quality and authoritarian regime are mutually complementary in Russia, and the legacy inherited from the past also aff ected institutionalization of low quality state and institutional complementarities. State capitalism has also balanced interests among players. Why has state capitalism spread into the emerging and transition economies? The state sector has become a tool to correct the distorted markets. The basis of the Russian state capitalism is its global linkages with global markets (WTO accession), low-quality state coordination of oligarchs' behavior, and premature financial markets. This state intervention is old style, but it is a new phenomenon from the viewpoint of global adaptation. Global trends are common among other transition economies. However, the Russian case is based on its own historical and social thought. Thus, being both "old" and "new," Russian state capitalism seems resilient.