著者

杉浦 勢之

出版者

社会経済史学会

雑誌

社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.1, pp.31-61, 1990-06-30

被引用文献数

2

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Postal savings in Japan, after sluggish years in the latter 1890s, began a period of rapid progress early in this century, i. e. the time of the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905, through the development of savings promotion policy by the Japanese government. And in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, postal savings reached 50 million yen. After the war this increasing trend continued, and only three years later, in 1908, postal savings exceeded 100 million yen. The postal savings system began in 1875, and during the next 30 years, including the Russo-Japanese War, it reached 50 million yen, but due to the special environment created during the war, it was only three years after the war that 50-million-yen figure doubled, to 100 million. The largest factor for this remarkable progress in the postal savings was that the Japanese government paid the national treasury disbursement to individuals, increased due to the Russo-Japanese War, throngh postal savings instead of paying in cash. Therefore, the increase in postal savings during this period was not really a reflection of direct deposits, but was rather due to political reasons. Furthermore, in order to limit drawing out from the postal savings, the Japanese government decided to continue its savings promotion policy. The main reason why the government adopted this policy was to prevent a large influx of financial funds into the industrial circulation created by the war, to avoid a rapid change in domestic demand that might have initiated a post-war economic crisis, such as rising prices, increased demand for imports, and a conversion crisis. Additionally, the Japanese government tried to strengthen the supply capacity of domestic low-productivity sectors, by limiting the use of savings produced through the savings promotion policy to productive investment. This was one political measure Japan took during this period to cope with the international balance of payments imbalance. It can be said that the development of Japanese postal savings after the Russo-Japanese War reflected the position of the Japanese economy in the world economy.

著者

稲本 一夫

出版者

公益社団法人日本放射線技術学会

雑誌

日本放射線技術學會雜誌 (ISSN:03694305)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.9, pp.1275-1280, 1995-09-01

被引用文献数

1

著者

前田 英昭

出版者

駒澤大学

雑誌

法学論集 (ISSN:04393287)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.125-154, 1996-01-31

著者

内藤 一成

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.2, pp.234-260, 319-318, 1997-02-20

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The political crisis that occurred in Japan in 1916 (Taisho 5) is represents a crucial stage in the transition between 1913 and 1918 from the "Keien" settlement to the era of parliamentary government. Although many historians have investigated the process of this political crisis, which lasted from February to October 1916, they have not fully understood the political situation during 1913-1918, known as "Taisho-zenki". This paper mainly investigates the complicated situation in the House of Peers at the time of the crisis, a subject that has here-tofore been ignored by almost all historians. First, the author attempts to elucidate negotiations concerning succession to the premiership among Okuma, Terauchi and Yamagata, a "Genro", during this crisis. It is generally thought that the crisis was caused by the stubbornness of Terauchi. However, he was the only one with the flexibility to solve the problem. On the contrary, it was Okuma who refused to compromise. Secondly, the House of Peers' Saiwai club, the largest group in the House, was split into many factions. Therefore, they did not have enough power to support the Terauchi Cabinet. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives three main government Parties, the Rikkendoushi-kai Kensei-kai and Koyu Club, were united. into the "Kensei-kai" to support Takaaki Kato as prime minister. Okuma advised the Emperor to select Kato as his successor; but Yamagata opposed this move and selected Terauchi. Although Yamagata rejected Kato as primier, he did not think the new administration could stand up against both Houses. Nevertheless, contrary to Yamagata's expectations, Terauchi did not receive the support of both Houses, resulting in a new ministry that was fragile legislatively.

著者

黒野 耐

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.3, pp.323-356, 1997-03-20

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The volume in the series Senshi-sosho entitled Headquarters of the Imperial Army I holds the view that the imperial defense policy (IDP) was hardly changed by its first revisions and its nature and policy was maintained. Research conducted after the publication of "Senshi-sosho" also basically reinforced this view. This paper argues that the IDP was fundamentally and drastically revised by its first revisions in 1918. The strategic thought behind the original IDP was formulated on the supposition of a short and limited war against one single country either Russia or the U.S.. Therefore, the Army and Navy requested 50 divisions in wartime and 2 fleets consisting of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. On, the contrary, the revised IDP was devised on the assumption of a long, all-out war against the U.S., Russia and China at the same time from the lessons Japan learned during WWI. The Army upgraded the strategic force from "divisions" to "corps", and the necessary size was determined as 41 corps in all-out war, and the Navy requested. one more fleet of 16 battleships and 8 cruisers. What changed the nature of the IDP on such a large scale ? "The Necessity of a National Mobilization Plan" proposed by vice-chief of staff Tanaka Giichi was approved in 1917. It assumed that Japan would fight a war against several nations simultaneously and denied the strategic concepts based on the lessons from the Russo-Japanese war. It was proposed to make a defense policy that desired a short and limited war due to limited resouces, but also understood that Japan may have to fight a long and enduring all-out war. In its "Explanation of the Budget" to the Ministry of Finance in 1919 in accordancey with the new IDP, the Ministry of the Army requested funds for the construction and maintenance of a main force of 22 corps in peace time and 41 corps in wartime to fight an all-out war against several enemies. The idea of creating corps-oriented forces, however, was not realized; and the force was returned to the 40-42 divisions structure in 1920, because of popular opposition to any kind of enlargement of the army, the financial crisis caused by the depression, and disagreement inside the Army over how to organize an all-out war posture. The first IDP revision had two significant points. First, the concept of "National Mobilization Posture" made clear the vulnera-bility of Japan's limited resources and low manufacturing capacity. Therefore, a consensus was built up not only within the military, but also among politicians, that Japan should seek its insufficient resources in China and build a self-sufficiency structure. As a result, the strategic area of the new IDP was expanded to all of East Asia, including mainland China. As more and more Japanese made their way into China, the U.S.-Japandde rivalry grew more fierce, and the possibility of Anglo-Japanese confrontation heightened. Soon Japan became internationally isolated. Secondly, ideological confrontation over the posture fot an all-out war emerged within the military. Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige found an all-out war posture essential and advocated a transformation of the army, while Uehara Yusaku and Fukuda Masataro regarding an early stage of war as vital, insisted on the maintenance of the status quo. This rivalry continued into the Showa era.

著者

谷光 太郎

出版者

山口大学

雑誌

山口經濟學雜誌 (ISSN:05131758)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.5, pp.875-938, 1997-07-31

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経ビジネス (ISSN:00290491)

巻号頁・発行日

no.1551, pp.44-48, 2010-07-26

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誰もが一度は口にしたことがあるお馴染みの商品。実はこの商品、日本で一番売れている菓子ブランドということをご存じだろうか。 1日208万袋、年間では約5億5000万袋も生産されている。年間の売上高は約540億円。ライバルである湖池屋の「コイケヤポテトチップス」は約100億円程度と見られ、明治製菓の「カール」は約80億円程度だ。その差は歴然だ。

著者

飯田 耕二郎

出版者

大阪商業大学

雑誌

地域と社会 (ISSN:13446002)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.69-90, 1999-10-01

著者

住友 豊

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社アメリカ研究 (ISSN:04200918)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.165-175, 2000-03

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研究ノート, Research Note

著者

望月 和彦

出版者

桃山学院大学

雑誌

桃山学院大学経済経営論集 (ISSN:02869721)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.105-149, 2001-06

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In this paper, we try to review the economic turbulence of Japan in 1920's through our perspective of 1990's. In both periods we have the same experience about the bubble economy. We have interested in the policies in the burst of bubbles. And those who charged with the policies of post-war era also engaged with policies of crisis of Showa era. We try to explore the events of Taisho era, in order to get lessons from the experiences in Taisho economic policies. For that purpose, we must analyze the Taisho bubble economy. By the WWI the Japanese economy made rapid economic development. It got huge trade surplus and gold which increases money supply in the gold standard system. The economy soared so much. The Japanese government took fiscal and monetary policies which encouraged industries and exports. When the WWI was over, many Japanese thought the economic boom was over too. But the economic boom wasn't over. After the war the Japanese economy experienced a boom more drastic than in the war. And the government sticked to the expansive policies in the boom despite the inflation. But the boom colllapsed in March 1920. That is the beginning of the stagnation which caused the financial turmoil in the Showa era.

著者

菅原 洋一

出版者

立正大学

雑誌

立正大学文学部論叢 (ISSN:0485215X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.73, pp.51-80, 1982-07-10

著者

西本 匡克

出版者

プール学院大学

雑誌

研究紀要 (ISSN:09110690)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.37-46, 1988-03-01

著者

小林 幸男

出版者

京都学園大学

雑誌

京都学園法学 (ISSN:09164715)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.153-194, 2003-08-20

著者

信岡 資生

出版者

成城大学

雑誌

成城大學經濟研究 (ISSN:03874753)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.163, pp.103-137, 2003-12-20

著者

李 相哲

出版者

龍谷大学

雑誌

龍谷大学国際社会文化研究所紀要 (ISSN:18800807)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.265-282, 2004-03-25

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This article describes about the history of Korean newspapers in the northeast Asia, especially in and around Korean Peninsula under the rule of Japan. The first Korean Newspaper, "Independency Newspaper (Tokurip Shinmun)" made in April 7, 1896. According to my research, since the first Newspaper issued more than hundred Korean newspapers had been published until the end of World War II. The purpose of this article is to study the significance of Korean journalism in the Northeast Asia under the rule of Japan.

著者

朴 廷鎬

出版者

東京大学

雑誌

本郷法政紀要

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, pp.229-271, 2005

著者

井竿 富雄

出版者

山口県立大学

雑誌

山口県立大学國際文化學部紀要 (ISSN:13427148)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, pp.1-12, 2005-03-25

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This Article describes the Mobilization of the 42nd infantry regiment from Yamaguchi. This regiment was mobilized to Siberia in August, 1919, The WWI came to an end. Confusion surrounded Intervention in Siberia. In Yamaguchi, soldiers were mobilized immediately following an event celebrating the end of WWI. In this article, the author will explain the system of Mobilization in the region at that time.

著者

井竿 富雄

出版者

山口県立大学

雑誌

山口県立大学國際文化學部紀要 (ISSN:13427148)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.1-12, 2006-03-07

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This article is an analysis of articles about Japan's Intervention in Siberia as reported in Japanese Newspapers. At the time of Japan's Intervention in Siberia, local newspapers in Yamaguchi Prefecture contained many articles about legions dispatched from Yamaguchi. Many of the articles were letters written by soldiers and officers in Siberia. In these letters, the soldiers and officers wrote about the battles with Russia and the peoples living in Siberia. The letters from Siberia had a certain reality about them, but they introduced biased views about Russia and Russian Peoples. In Japanese Newspapers, there were many articles praising those who died in the war. These articles were of a stereotypical pattern. The author analyses this problem.

著者

大濱 徹也 郡司 淳

出版者

北海学園大学

雑誌

北海学園大学人文論集 (ISSN:09199608)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.A1-A123, 2006-03-20

著者

大木 康充

出版者

大東文化大学

雑誌

大東法学 (ISSN:02870940)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.41-69, 2006-03-30