著者
麻生 博之
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.61, pp.85-104_L7, 2010

If one were to reread Marx's writings today, which would be the phase of Marx's thought that would merit special attention? In this paper, I find that one core of Marx's thoughts lies in &ldquo;critique.&rdquo; I would therefore like to explore the significance that this critique can have as a form of fundamental thought. With this in mind, I want to consider Adorno's and Benjamin's interpretation of Marx's thought, with particular reference to their emphasis on &ldquo;history&rdquo;. <br>Adorno characterizes Marx's thought as &ldquo;a critical theory of society&rdquo; and thinks that it is only understandable as &ldquo;a historical theory&rdquo;. Adorno's view is remarkable in that it characterizes Marx's thought as a form of &ldquo;interpretation (Deutung)&rdquo; of &ldquo;natural history (Naturgeschichte)&rdquo;. This can be seen as an attempt, on the one hand, to show that various societal realities that should have historical reality appear as something inevitable or as things which obey &ldquo;the coercion of nature&rdquo;, but on the other hand, to perceive such realities in the form of something natural or eternal which have become historically, therefore as things which are fundamentally contingent. Benjamin, in contrast, thinks that one core of Marx's thoughts consists in the recognition of history as a &ldquo;critique&rdquo; to uncover &ldquo;the memory of the anonymous (das Ged&auml;chtnis der Namenlosen)&rdquo;. In Benjamin's view, when history up to the present is grasped as something continuous, it is just a &ldquo;continuum of the oppressors&rdquo;. Benjamin defines the form of history description that liquidates &ldquo;the epic element&rdquo; of this continuous history as &ldquo;construction&rdquo;, and tries to understand an essential part of the Marx's thought as such an attempt to explode &ldquo;the continuum of history&rdquo; and to rescue &ldquo;the tradition of the oppressed&rdquo;.<br>In this paper, through my clarification of Adorno's and Benjamin's understanding of Marx's thought, I attempt to examine the significance of Marx's &ldquo;critique&rdquo; of &ldquo;history&rdquo; and, through it, offer a worthy topic for further discussion.
著者
浜野 正浩
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
no.104, pp.33-44, 1999-12

投稿論文1. はじめに2. Kirby-ParisのHydra Game3. GentzenのPAのためのcut除去法4. cut除去法による定理1の証明5. まとめWe give a direct independence proof of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game [9] from Peano Arithmetic (PA). This is done by giving a relationship between Gentzen's consistency proof [5] for PA and the Hydra Game. Compared with Kirby-Paris' and Cichon's [3] proofs, our proof is direct in that we do not use any finite characterization theorem of the PA-provably recursive functions. We prove that one step reduction of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game corresponds to finite steps of Gentzen's proof reduction. With the help of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, Kirby-Paris' unprovability result follows.
著者
乙部 延剛
出版者
政治哲学研究会
雑誌
政治哲学 (ISSN:24324337)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.25, pp.78-90, 2019 (Released:2019-04-10)
参考文献数
10
著者
三浦 宏文
出版者
実践女子大学
雑誌
実践女子大学短期大学部紀要 = The bulletin of Jissen Women's Junior College (ISSN:21896364)
巻号頁・発行日
no.37, pp.63-78, 2016

本稿では、日本の刑事ドラマである『踊る大捜査線』シリーズの初期の作品に注目して、この作品の社会的・哲学的背景を考察した。『踊る大捜査線』では、90 年代後半のバブル経済崩壊後において「誰かのために」「誰かとともに」生きるという哲学を主人公青島俊作刑事の行動指針として描いていた。これは、自己実現や成果主義とは異なり、仏教哲学者椎尾辨匡の「共生(ともいき)」思想に繋がる新しい生きる指針であった。The purpose of this paper is to consider the philosophy of symbiosis which can be abstructed as philosophical cannotation from a "Bayside Shakedown(Odoru daisousasen)", a Japanese Detective drama series, which has got great popularity in 21st century Japanese society, and to investigate its social background. The thought of symbiosis, which is the style of 'For Somebody' and 'With Somebody', was drawn as principle of Syunsaku Aoshima's behavior of the hero in this drama. This Aoshima's principle of behavior is the new guideline of lifestyle for the Japanese person in the late 90's of the post-bubble-economy collapse. And this Aoshima's philosophy can be connected to the symbiosis-movement (Tomo-Iki-undou) of Benkyo Siio, a Buddhist philosopher.
著者
益田 理広
出版者
公益社団法人 日本地理学会
雑誌
日本地理学会発表要旨集
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, 2015

1.研究の背景と目的 地理学という分野に冠された「地理」なる語が,五経の第一である「易経」,詳しく言えば,古代に記された「周易」本文に対する孔子の注釈である「十翼」中の一篇「繋辭上傳」に由来することは,漢字文化圏において著されたいくつもの地理学史や事典にも明記された,周知の事実である.しかし,その「地理」はいかなる意味を持つのか,何故地理学の語源となり得たのか,といった概念上の問題については,余り深く注視されてはこなかった.確かに,「繋辭上傳」の本文には「仰以觀於天文,俯以察於地理」とあるのみで,そこからは「天文」と対置されていること,「俯」して「察」るという認識の対象となっていることが読み取られるばかりである.それ以上の分析は,「地」「理」の二字の意味を知るよりほかはないであろう.「土地ないしは台地のすじめであり,大地における様々な状態つまり「ありよう」を指したもの」(海野,2004:44)「地の理(地上の山川で生み出される大理石や瑪瑙の筋目のような形状)」(『人文地理学事典』,2013:66)といった定義はまさに字義に依っている.辻田(1971:52,55)も「易経でいう地理をただちに今日的意味で理解するのはやや早計」としながらも,「古典ギリシャ時代の造語であるゲオーグラフィアに相当する地理という文字」とする.また,海野は後世における「地理」の使用例から,客観的な地誌的記述と卜占的な風水的記述をあわせ持った,曖昧模糊たる概念とも述べている. それでは,この「地理」なる語は古代より明確に定義されぬままであったのであろうか.実際には,「地理」の語義は「周易」に施された無数の注釈において様々に論じられてきた.そしてその注釈によって「地理」を含む経典中の語が理解されていたのも明らかであり,漢字文化圏においてgeographyが「風土記」ではなく「地理学」と訳された要因もこうした注釈書に求められよう. 中国の研究においてはそれが強く意識されており,胡・江(1995)は「周易」の注釈者は三千を超えるとまで言い,「地理」についても孔頴達の「地有山川原隰,各有條理,故稱理也」という注に従いながら「大地とその上に存在する山河や動植物を支配する法則」を「地理」の語義としている.また,于(1990)や『中国古代地理学史』(1984)もやはり孔頴達に従っている.ただし,孔頴達の注は唐代に集成された古典的なものであり,「地理」に付された限定的な意味を示すものに過ぎない.仮にも現代の「地理学」の語源である「地理」概念を分析するのであれば,その学史的な淵源に遡る必要があろう.そしてその淵源は少なくとも合理的な朱子学的教養を備えた江戸時代の儒学者に求められる(辻田,1971).「地理学」なる語も,西洋地理書の翻訳も,皆このような文化的基礎の上でなされたものなのである.従って,現代に受け継がれた「地理学」の元来の概念範囲は,この朱子学を代表とする思弁的儒学である宋学における「地理」の語義を把握しない限りは分明たりえないであろう.以上より,本研究では,宋学における「地理」概念の闡明を目的として,宋代までに撰された「周易」注釈書の分析を行う. 2.研究方法 主として『景印 文淵閣四庫全書』(1983) 經部易類に収録されたテキストを対象とし,それらの典籍に見出される「地理」に関わる定義を分析する.また,上述のように「地理」は「天文」と対をなす語であるため,この「天文」の定義に関しても同様に分析する.なお,テキストは宋代のものを中心とし,その背景となる漢唐の注釈も対象とする. 3.研究結果 「天文」および「地理」なる語に対する古い注釈としては王充の論衡・自紀篇の「天有日月星辰謂之文,地有山川陵谷謂之理」および班固の漢書・郊祀志の「三光,天文也&hellip;山川,地理也」がある.周易注釈書としては上述の孔頴達の疏が最も古く,これは明らかに上記二者や韓康伯の系譜にあり,「天文地理」は天上地上の物体間の秩序を表すに過ぎない.ところが,宋に入ると,蘇軾は『東坡易傳』において,天文地理を「此與形象變化一也」と注し,陰陽が一氣であることであるという唯物論的な解釈を行い,朱熹は「天文則有晝夜上下,地理則有南北高深」と一種の時空間として定義するなど,概念の抽象化が進んでいく. 【文献】 于希賢 1990.『中国古代地理学史略』.河北科学技術出社.海野一隆 2003.『東洋地理学史研究・大陸編』 .清文堂. 胡欣・江小羣 1995.『中國地理學史』. 文津出版. 人文地理学会編 2013.『人文地理学事典』.丸善書店. 中国科学院自然科学史研究所地学史組 主編 1984.『中国古代地理学史』. 科学出版社. 辻田右左男 1971.『日本近世の地理学』.柳原書店.
著者
古賀 徹
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1994, no.44, pp.254-263,8, 1994-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Adorno kritisiert Husserls Phänomenologie in "Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie". Er trachtet Husserls erkenntnistheoretischen Positivismus kraft darin vorhandener Widersprüche selbst zu sprengen. Der Positivismus, daß das Subjekt bloß die Vorfindlichkeiten hinnehmen soll, steckt in Husserls "Korrelation" von Noesis-Noema und ihrer eidetischen absoluten Angemessenheit. Der darauf gebildete phänomenologische Wahrheitbegriff ist nach Adorno unwahr. Denn das Objekt wird durch die Identifizierung mit dem Subjekt subjektiviert und damit verletzt. Dagegen wären vielmehr die phänomenologischen Möglichkeiten eben im echten Positivismus zu suchen. Er hebt die Differenz zwischen Objekt und Subjekt heraus und ermöglicht weitere Erforschungen. Die Möglichkeiten werden als "Horizont" des Bewußtseins in Husserl gezeigt. Von diesem Standpunkt wird Adornos dialektisches Verfahren umgekehrt kritisiert.
著者
和久 希
出版者
筑波大学哲学研究会
雑誌
筑波哲学 (ISSN:09162046)
巻号頁・発行日
no.22, pp.95-113, 2014-03
著者
須田 朗
雑誌
人文研紀要 (ISSN:02873877)
巻号頁・発行日
no.77, pp.165-198, 2013-10-10

本稿は哲学的良心概念を手がかりにカントとハイデガーの思想を比較するものである。カントは良心を道徳法則から発せられる「内的裁判官の声」と呼ぶ。良心の声は、現象的存在者としては自然必然性に支配される人間に、自らが理性をもつ自由な叡知的存在者であることを告げるという。本稿は人間のこの両面を時間概念に即して解釈する。良心現象は現象を支配する「自然的時間」とは別の「倫理的時間」のごときものを示している。これが本稿のカント解釈の真骨頂である。他方ハイデガーは『存在と時間』で良心論を展開する。良心は、世間に頽落した現存在に対して本来的自己が発する呼び声である。おのれが負い目ある存在であることを自覚するように促す呼びかけなのである。これに応えることが覚悟性であるが、それは同時に本来的な時間性を自覚的に生きることでもある。それはもはやおのれの手中にない、いやそもそもおのれの手中にない非の根拠を引き受けることを意味する。一方カントが良心に見たものも、過去を現在の瞬間として引き受ける責任であった。このようにカントとハイデガーはまったく違う文脈ではあるが、同じように良心現象に人間存在の本来性を見ていたという共通点をもつ
著者
森村 修
出版者
法政大学国際文化学部
雑誌
異文化. 論文編 : Bulletin of the Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Hosei Univeresity (ISSN:13493256)
巻号頁・発行日
no.19, pp.85-109, 2018-04

The purpose of this series of papers, starting with the current work, is to critically examine metaphysics of Heidegger's philosophy of technology (Technik), and to question the kind of "arts of existence" in the Foucauldian sense. I consider the possibility of overcoming nihilism in "art (Kunst)", in contrast to "technique (Technik)", which Heidegger dealt with in a lecture on The Question Concerning Technology (Die Frage nach der Technik) (1953). Heidegger argued that "art of technology (Kunst)" provides effective way to overcome modern nihilism. Depending on his most favorite poet Friedrich Hölderlin's paradoxical words, Heidegger thought that the most critical situation should be salvaged. In other words, he believed that if our world fell into the most critical situation of nihilism due to technology (Technik), it must be saved by art of technology (Kunst). Relying on Canadian sociologist Arthur Kroker's The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Marx (2004), I examine the philosophy of contemporary art and technology, in order to relativize the "art of technology (Kunst)" assumed by Heidegger and his philosophy of technology itself. Kroker argues that Heidegger's metaphysics of technology should be adopted in order to overcome the present nihilism. According to Kroker, "completed nihilism" in which nihilism is realized in a perfect form is called "hyper-nihilism." According to him, Nietzsche predicted that the age of nihilism will arrive from the 19th century to the 2nd century. Kroker characterizes the present age as the age of "a passive resentment and a suicidal will to nothingness," and "the age of the storm of nihilism." Moreover, according to Kroker, in the age of completed nihilism (hyper-nihilism) of "late modernity" in which we live, the economy, politics and even religion have undergone fundamental transformation; in our daily life "fundamental attunement (= profound boredom)" prevails. To properly illuminate the "logic which rules the culture and society" in the present age, where "the will to technology" reaches its summit, Kroker turns to Heidegger to examine the relationship between technology and (hyper-) nihilism. While the sum of Kroker's insights into Heidegger's philosophy of technology falls outside the scope of the present set of papers, I will focus on four specific points. First, I consider the metaphysics of Heidegger's philosophy of technology (in particularly, the "Bremen" lecture (1949) delivered soon after World War II, the lecture titled "Building Dwelling Thinking (Bauen Whonen Denken)" (1951) at the Darmstadt Conference, and The Question Concerning Technology (Die Frage nach der Techinik (1953)). In doing so, I primarily focus on the question of Heidegger's war responsibility and post-war responsibility that concerns his entire philosophy. I argue that Heidegger's philosophy of technology is not only related to the political aspect in his philosophy, but is also based on an "antihumanistic inhumanism." In that sense, I argue, it is problematic to criticize his philosophy from the viewpoint of "humanism." As is well-known, Heidegger suggested the possibility of overcoming "humanism" in his Über den Humanismus (Letter on Humanism) (1946). As Kroker points out, Heidegger's philosophy showed signs of the idea of the "post human." It is therefore necessary to shift the ground of the discussion from the viewpoint of "humanism" to that of "post-humanism" in order to examine Heidegger's own war responsibility and post-war responsibility. Second, I re-read Heidegger's "philosophy of technology" in the context of contemporary philosophies of technology. While contemporary philosophies or ethics of technologies seems to be based on anti-humanistic and non-humanistic post-human thought superficially, it is not as anti-humanistic as Heidegger's "philosophy of technology," and is not even non-humanistic. For example, Peter-Paul Verbeek, a contemporary philosopher of technology, discusses the ethics of technology in Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things (2011), and argues for a "moralization of technology." While he claims that his position is beyond humanism, I argue that this is not the case, and Verbeek's work is an extension of anti-humanism. I argue that his ethical position is not as radical as Heidegger's. I also examine Don Ihde's philosophy of technology, which arrives at a post-phenomenological position through a critical reading of Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's philosophy of technology, and influences Verbeek's ethics of technologyThird, I consider the problematic of "posthuman" thought in Heidegger's philosophy of technology. In this context, I examine Peter Sloterdijk's Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter on Humanism (1999). According to Verbeek, Sloterdijk holds a position of "postphenomenology," in which the post-human point of view is missing. However, I think the problem raised by Verbeek is not limited only to the postphenomenological position, but rather is nothing but the problem of posthumanism held by Heidegger's philosophy. As Kroker points out, the posthuman problematic is potentially included in Heidegger's metaphysical thinking of Technology. In this sense, it is necessary to consider Heidegger's philosophy of technology in order to confirm the validity of Sloterdijk's point of view. Moreover, the essence of Heidegger's "post-human" philosophy of beyond humanism is non-human (inhuman). We need to examine Heidegger's Über den Humanismus to verify the validity of Sloterdijk's criticism of Heidegger. Fourth, while Heidegger's anti-human "post-human" thinking is nonhuman, it is preparing Verbeek's optimism of "moralizing technology" in a sense. It is considered that the danger of moralization of technology also possibly exists in the future. In my opinion, the moralization of technology not only bears a mutual relationship with the politicization of technology, but also presents the danger that morality may be eroded by the political. Moreover, it should be noted that technology and the technological may possibly intervene between the ethical and the political. As Heidegger also pointed out, technology and politics are closely related, and technology itself is political. In the context of these questions, the current series of papers will address the links among the moralization of technology, the politicization of technology, as well as the aestheticization of technology. As Walter Benjamin already pointed out, the aestheticization of politics and the politicization of aesthetics arise from the same roots. Based on the dual meanings of the word technē in Greek, Heidegger interprets the German Kunst as technology on the one hand, and as art on the other hand. This inevitably results from the fact that, just as the Greek technē is inseparable from the Greek poiēsis, the German Technik (technique or technology) is inseparable from Kunst (art or technology). I argue that, though Heidegger aims to overcome hyper-nihilism through Kunst as art, it is possible that Kunst as technology will strengthen rather than overcome hyper-nihilism. This is because Kunst as technology and as art includes the possibility of generating hyper-nihilism by evoking the inseparable relationship between the aestheticization of technology and the politicization of technology. In the first paper in the series, I will focus on the first and second issues. Particularly, I first confirm the historical background that Heidegger's philosophy of technology was conceived. What is interesting to me is that Heidegger gave lectures on technology (Technik or Kunst) at some organizations deeply related to arts and crafts. For Heidegger, the problem of technology (Technik or Kunst) is closely related to the place where it is told.