著者

宮岡 孝尚

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

no.13, pp.233-256, 1998-03-31

---

Bu konu ile ilgili olan arastirmalari dis politikanin karar verici unsurlarina gore, 'Sovyet Tehdidini Onemseyenler' ve 'Italyan Tehdidini Onemseyenler' olmak uzere ikiye ayrilabilir. Birincisi Batililar tarafindan desteklenip, Carlik Rusyasi ile Osmanlilar arasindaki tarihsel dusmanligin surdurulmesini vurgulamaktadir. Ayni zamanda bu tezi savunmalar arasinda Soguk Savasi doneminde ortaya cikan tarih dusunceleri abartip, Kurtulus Savasindaki Sovyetlerin yardimlari ile Turk-Sovyet dostlugun ilerledigini hafife almaktadir. Ikincisi ise, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde yaygin olan ltalyan tehdidi ve Turk-Sovyet dostlugunu vurgulamaktadir. Fakat oncekine alternatif olup Sovyetlerin tehdidini yadsimasindan, Italyan tehdidini nispi olarak buyutmektedir. Bunun icin bu makalede basta olarak 'Italyan Tehdidini Onemseyenler'e karsi bazi tenkit noktalarini savunmak istiyorum. Turkiye 1930'lu yillarda "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh" sloganin altinda dostca politikasi izlemektedir. Bu yuzden Akdeniz'de somurge politikasi izleyen Italya ile arasindaki iliskisi kotulesmistir. Aksine Turkiye Almanya'nin Sudet bolgesini ilhak etmesine kadar suren bazi haraketler ile Versailles duzenini yikmasina anlayis gosterip, Cekoslavakya Istilasi (1939.3.15) na da kaygsizca bakiyordu. Ama Alman-Roman Ticaret Antlasmasinin imzalanmasi (1939.3.23)ndan sonra, Turkiye Almanya'yi tehdid unsuru olarak degerledirmeye basIamistir. Turkiye'nin Londra Buyukelcisi Tevfik Rustu Aras'in Ingilizlere Turkiye, Yugoslavya ve Yunanistan'in Ingiliz-Italyan Akdeniz Anlasmasina katilacagini onermesi de bu var sayimi ispat etmektedir. 'Italyan Tehdidini Onemseyenler'in bas sebebi Arnavutluk Isgali (1939.4.7) dir. Ama bu olay sirasinda Turkiye tarafsiz kalacagini gostermistir. Yine, Maresal Fevzi Cakmak Bakanlar Kurulunda Italya'nin Bulgaristan'in cekimserligi ile Turkiye'yi istila planini terk ettigini ve ordusunu Habesistan'a gonderdigini bildirdi. Turkiye Italya'yi o kadar tehdid unsuru olarak gormuyordu. Bununla birlikte, Almanya Turkiye'nin Ingiltere'ye yaklasmasinin ana nedeni Arnavutluk Isgali kaynaklandigina inanip, bu olaydan sonra Alman Buyukelciligine atanmis olan von Papen Turk-Italyan munasebetini iyilestirmek icin cabalar harciyordu. Turkiye ise Almanya'nin durumunu yanlis anlamasindan istifade edip, Italyan tehdidini asiri olarak vurgulamasi ile Ingiltere'ye yanasmak zorunda kaldigini anlatmaktadir. Bunun icin Almanya'nin istegi uzerine Italya Turkiye'ye bir saldirmazligi teklifi vermisti. Ancak Turkiye bunu reddedip, Turk-Ingiliz Ortak Demecini yayinlamistir (1939.5.12). Alman-Italyan askeri ittifak muzakereleri ilerlememesine ragmen Ribbentorop ile Ciano arasindaki Milano gorusmesinde Italya bu Ittifak birdenbire onaylayip (1939.5.6-7), 'Celik Pakti' imzalamistir (1939.5.22). Bu Pakti imzalanmasin etkileyip simdiye kadar gozlemimizden kacmis olan unsurlardan Turk-Ingiliz muzakereleri surecinde ortaya cikip Mihver devletadamlarin kulaklarina geldigi haberlerin buyuk onem olusturdugu soylenebilir. Sonunda Italya onceden beli istedigi Akdeniz'deki Ingiltere'nin Ortak yerini kaybetmesini aciga vurmaktadir. Hem Almanya'dan hemde Ingiltere'den ayricalik verilmeye calisilan Italya'nin yanliz Almanlarin tarafina yonelmesinin nedenlerinden biri Turkiye'nin dis politikasi oldugunu soyliyebiliriz. Ikinci Dunya Savasi'nin patlamasindan ertesi gunu Italya butun dunya'ya karsi 'Nonbelligerenza(Savas disi)' Demeci'ni yayinladi. Buna ragmen Turkiye yine Italyan tehdidini vurgulamaya devam ediyordu. Donemin Turk dis politikasi sadece 'bekleme politikasi' degil, Ikinci Dunya Savas'nin esiginde uluslararasi munasebetlerinde onemli bir rol oynamaktadir. Turkiye'nin Italyan tehdidini vurgulmasinin gercek amaci Almanya'nin Balkan Yanmadasina inmesini engellemektir. Ancak bu amacini saklamistir. Turkiye Almanya'yi kisirmadan Ingiltere ile ittifaki etmeyi basarmistir.

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

千葉大学

雑誌

千葉大学社会文化科学研究 (ISSN:13428403)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.39-68, 2000-02-20

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

千葉大学

雑誌

千葉大学社会文化科学研究 (ISSN:13428403)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.3-25, 1999-02-28

---

かつて筆者は、在華権益拡張策と新4国借款団の関連性を論じた際、原内閣が対米英協調に終始することなく独自に国益を拡充せんとしていたことを明らかにした。加えて原内閣は、時としてウィルソン政権(Woodrow Wilson)の新外交に強い違和感を示し、国益拡充のためには対英協調を基本方針とした。原内閣期最大の国際会議である パリ講和会議への対応は、まさにそのことを示している。このパリ会議に関する研究は少なからず存在するものの、日英協調や日米摩擦を原外交の中に位置づける視点は十分に確立されてこなかったように思われる。この点に加えて本稿では、中国外交文書を交えて中国側が調印拒否に至る過程を跡づけるとともに、米英の動向が後のワシントン体制成立との関係でいかに位置づけられるのかを探っていきたい。

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.122, pp.54-68,L9, 1999

---

The general evaluation of the Beijing government's treaty revision diplomacy is not high because the Beijing Special Tariff Conference from 1925 to 1926 resulted in a barren result. However, the fact is that the Beijing government built an important cornerstone towards the revision of unequal treaties. It was not accidental that political estrangement was caused between Japan, America, and Britain; and that a better environment for Chinese treaty revision was created.<br>What has been emphasized on this point conventionally was the materialization of the Kellogg-Johnson line as a pro-Chinese line. This should be, at least partly, interpreted as the result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy. In particular, the formation of the pro-Chinese line in the Department of State was, to a large extent, the response to the plan which the Beijing government instigated. Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin esteemed relationships with America to ensure diplomatic support from Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, while the activity of Chinese Minister to America Alfred Sze satisfied the expectation of the Beijing government Foreign Ministry. Considering the political process of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, that situation was rather an exceptional success in Chinese diplomacy history.<br>British diplomacy, whose mediation between America and Japan had been effective in the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in the past, did not work this time. This, again, was the result of what the Beijing government had planned. The Chinese side differentiated their attitude towards Britain from their policy towards America and Japan, because of the fact that Britain had shown the severest attitude at the beginning. When British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs J. Austen Chamberlain approached America in order to convert his previous policy, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro's stiffened economism was revealed. In this sense, the isolation of Shidehara diplomacy could be understood in context as a result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy towards America and Britain.

著者

服部 竜二

出版者

日本政治経済史学研究所

雑誌

政治経済史学 (ISSN:02864266)

巻号頁・発行日

no.387, pp.1-9, 1998-11

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

千葉大学

雑誌

千葉大学社会文化科学研究 (ISSN:13428403)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.7-32, 1998-02-28

---

In treating the Hara cabinet's railroad policy in China, this paper analyzes Japanese economic expansion in China during the immediate post World War I era and reexamines Japanese foreign policy toward the New Consortium which has been regarded in general as a typical case of cooperative diplomacy with America and Britain. The Hara cabinet inherited from the former Terauchi cabinet the policy to extend the Nanchang-Jiujiang railway line in northern Kiangsi. Supported by the Hara cabinet, Toa Kogyo Company took the initiative in the negotiations with China and finalized a loan contract with Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway Company to extend the Nanchang-Jiujiang railway line. This Sino-Japanese loan contract was intended for the building of the Nanchang-Pingxiang railway line. However, this line was part of the larger Nanjing-Hunan railway line whose loan contract had already been offered to the New Consortium by British bankers. Japan, in other words, reached an agreement on the loan contract to extend the Nanchang-Jiujiang railway line without notifying the New Consortium, which had already been granted the rights to build the Nanjing-Hunan railway line. Trying to expand its economic concessions in China, Japan slighted cooperation with America, Britain, and France. The Hara cabinet, in addition, tried to extend the Siping-Zhengjiatun railway line in Manchuria and concluded the Siping-Taonan Railway loan contract, supporting the negotiations between the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Chinese government. Japan promised to offer funds to a faction in the Chinese government during the negotiations, which contradicted the basic foreign policy of the Hara cabinet that Japan, in line with America and Britain, would never offer funds to China until China was united. While knowing that the New Consortium did not permit any country to build the Zhengjiatun-Tongliao railway line, which was a branch line of the Siping-Taonan railway line, Japan went ahead and built that railway. We can therefore see that the Hara cabine

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

神戸大学法学部

雑誌

神戸法學雜誌 / Kobe law journal (ISSN:04522400)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.763-807, 1996-03

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

神戸大学

雑誌

神戸法學雜誌 (ISSN:04522400)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.763-807, 1996-03

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

拓殖大学政治経済研究所

雑誌

政治・経済・法律研究 (ISSN:13446630)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, no.3, pp.152-149, 2003-03

著者

大竹 万里

出版者

Society for Human Environmental Studies

雑誌

人間環境学研究 (ISSN:13485253)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.2, pp.69-80, 2006

---

This paper introduces four specific materials to discuss the complex and difficult negotiations of the United States and Japan during the London Naval Conference of 1930. The first is a telegram sent by Stimson, head of the American delegation, to President Hoover which shows that before the conference opened Stimson had resisted the Japanese firm claim for a 10:7 ratio in auxiliary vessels because the United States Senate would not accept it when it was submitted. As the conference went on, however, Stimson received a telegram from William R. Castle, the American Ambassador to Japan, reporting about the current situation in Japan and Castle's impression on how the Japanese leaders like Shidehara Kijuro were thinking. Stimson sent a confidential letter to President on February, 17 to give him some background information about the progress made in the conference so far. Furthermore, he expressed his expectation that Wakatsuki Reijiro, head of the Japanese delegation, would make a decision to accept the American proposition. Stimson explained the benefits of the three-power agreement for the United States in the hearings before the United States Foreign Relations Committee on May 12, 13, and 14. Ultimately, the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was ratified by a vote of 58 to 9.

著者

飯森 明子

出版者

常磐大学国際学部

雑誌

常磐国際紀要 (ISSN:13430645)

巻号頁・発行日

no.8, pp.213-231, 2004-03

著者

真田 久

出版者

社団法人日本体育学会

雑誌

日本体育学会大会予稿集

巻号頁・発行日

no.64, pp.387-388, 2013-08-28

著者

土田 宏成

出版者

国立歴史民俗博物館

雑誌

国立歴史民俗博物館研究報告 (ISSN:02867400)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.126, pp.53-66, 2006-01

---

満州事変後における軍部の宣伝活動が、国民世論を軍国主義的な方向に導くうえで大きな力を発揮したことはよく知られているが、これまでの研究では陸軍の宣伝に関心が集中しており、海軍についてはあまり注目されてこなかった。海軍の宣伝は内容、規模、影響力ともに陸軍に及ばなかったとみなされているからである。海軍の宣伝が陸軍の宣伝に及ばなかった最大の原因は、海軍の国民的基盤の弱さに求められる。陸軍の宣伝が強力だったのは、国民の間に多数の会員を持ち、「軍隊と国民との媒介者」の役目を果たした在郷軍人会を利用できたからである。陸海軍の軍隊としての基本的性格の違いから、在郷軍人の数において陸軍が海軍を圧倒していた。そのため在郷軍人会は陸海軍共通の組織ではあったが、事実上陸軍の組織であったのである。しかし、一九三〇年代海軍も陸軍と同様に国防宣伝を行う必要に迫られ、その弱点である国民的基盤の弱さを克服しようと試みる。具体的には、陸軍の在郷軍人会に相当するような国民的組織を持つことが目指されるのである。海軍が採用したのは、既存組織である海軍協会の拡充という方法であった。そして海軍協会は、海軍当局の指導と支援の下に、海軍の長老で政治力もある斎藤実を新会長に迎え、全国府県単位に知事を長とする支部を設置し、大々的に会員を募集した。そして、一九三四年の第二次ロンドン海軍軍縮会議の予備交渉、三五年の本会議に向けて、宣伝活動に力を入れていく。その主張は海軍の立場を代弁するもので、現行の海軍軍縮条約体制を批判し、英米との軍備平等を求めるものであった。このように従来の軍縮会議の際には見られなかった、組織的な宣伝活動が展開された結果、国内世論は強硬論で統一され、日本は国際的な海軍軍縮条約体制から離脱していったのである。It is well known that the propaganda of the Japanese military following the Manchurian Incident exhibited considerable power in leading public opinion in the direction of militarism. However, until now research has centered on the propaganda of the Army, with little attention paid to the Navy. The reason for this is that the contents, scale and impact of Navy propaganda are regarded as having been inferior to that of the Army.The biggest reason why propaganda of the Navy did not match that of the Army can be found in the weakness of the Navy's popularity. Propaganda of the Army was strong because the Army was able to use the reservists' association that had many members among the people and played the role of intermediary between the military and the people. The fundamental differences in the nature of army and naval forces meant that an overwhelming majority of reservists was from the Army. Consequently, although the reservists' association was an organization for both the Army and Navy, it was in effect an army organization.However, during the 1930s, the Navy was pressured to propagandize the national defense, as was the case with the Army, whereupon it tried to reinforce its weak popularity. The method chosen by the Navy to do this was to expand the Navy League, an existing organization. With the guidance and support of naval authorities, the Navy League welcomed as its new chairman Makoto Saito, a naval senior who yielded considerable political clout. It set up sub-branches in each prefecture of Japan with the prefectural governors as chairmen, and went all out to recruit members. They put considerable effort into propaganda directed at preliminary negotiations for the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference held in 1934 and the conference proper that was scheduled for the following year. Their assertions represented the opinion of the Japanese Navy, criticizing the current treaty system for naval disarmament and seeking parity in arms with Britain and the United States. This organized propaganda, which had never been seen at earlier disarmament talks, united national opinion behind hard line policy and resulted in Japan's withdrawal from the international naval disarmament treaty system.

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.142-146, 1968

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社アメリカ研究 (ISSN:04200918)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.59-65, 1967-11-16

---

資料, Note

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社アメリカ研究 (ISSN:04200918)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.3-21, 1965-03-31

---

論文

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社法學 (ISSN:03877612)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.92-121, 1998-03-10

---

論説

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

同志社法學會

雑誌

同志社法学 (ISSN:03877612)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.3, pp.1737-1755, 2011-09

---

講演(Lecture)加藤友三郎海相はワシントン会議において対米妥協の軍縮を決断した。しかし一九二三年、加藤の没後は、強硬派が力を得るようになり、一九三四年には政府はワシントン条約の破棄を決定する。これに抗する形で、かつて加藤の軍縮政策を支持した人々が、その遺徳を讃えて銅像を建立した。しかし、「第二の加藤出でよ」の悲願もむなしく、海軍は「真珠湾への道」を突っ走ることになる。近年、加藤は再評価され、二〇〇八年に再建された銅像では、加藤を「軍縮の父」としてだけではなく、「平和・国際協力」のシンボルと位置づけている。In August 2008 a ceremony was held in Hiroshima (his birth place) to dedicate the statue of Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. This was the second Kato statue; the first one had been built in 1935. Studying these statues casts interesting light on Japan's changing views on national defense.

著者

倉松 中 大橋 真貴子

出版者

青山学院大学

雑誌

青山国際政経論集 (ISSN:02895129)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.249-261, 2003-08

著者

桑畑 洋一郎

出版者

梅光学院大学子ども未来会議

雑誌

子ども未来学研究 (ISSN:18817424)

巻号頁・発行日

no.8, pp.55-70, 2013