著者
藤田 富雄
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.1-15, 1992 (Released:2018-03-21)

In the religious world today, there are two global movements of enormous vitality. One is conservative Islam, the other conservative Protestantism, notably Pentecostalism. Since Iranian revolution a good deal of attention has been paid to the former, but the latter remains ignored even by the people in Europe and in North America. The explosion of Pentecostalism in Latin America, especially in Brazil, still widely regarded as the largest Roman Catholic country, is the most dramatic case. But in Brazil Pentecostalism has two rivals; Umbanda of Afro-Brazilian religion and the base-communities within Catholicism. They expanded alongside Pentecostalism over roughly the same time-span of modernization, industrialization and urbanization. Comparing the history and contemporary situation of these three groups, I conclude that, while Pentecostals are conservative, Umbandistas are innovative and members of base-communities are progressive. Needless to say, the phenomena vary from country to country both in its religious characteristics and social consequences. At the same time there are striking similarities everywhere. This essay deals with Brazil only and other countries in Latin America, South Korea and South Africa are omitted, because I believe Brazil is a typical case. Spiritual communications of healings and tongues (glossolalia) and other rituals will be treated in my next essay.
著者
小田 淑子
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.36-51, 1991 (Released:2018-03-21)

The literal meaning of the Sharî‘ah, usually rendered as Islamic law, is the Path which God ordained for believers. This spiritual Path became highly articulated into various rules, such as ritual, moral and even legal rules, in the course of the early Islamic history. This article intends to elucidate the soteriological meaning of the Sharî‘ah in Islam. This is primarily clarified in relation to the basic soteriology exposed in the Qur’ân. The concept of faith in the Qur’ân means to be guided by God to the Path in this world till the Day of Resurrection in the future, rather than the liberation from the original sin done in the mythical past. The other concept, ummah,is the crucial key-term to understand the reason for the precise articulation of the Path. Being a genuine religious community, it never leaves out the socio-political sphere necessary for human life, where Muslims raise their family and live by economic activities. A believer who is, as the solitary one, faced with God cannot but live in, and also is responsible for, the Ummah in this world. Therefore, the Path necessarily contains many social rules. Among several types of the Qur’anic discourses, the narrative of the eschatology most impressively reminds man of the transcendent dimension where man is ever faced with God. It is the fear of the eschatological Judgment that makes man realize both the vanity of this-worldly life and the true significance of his temporary action, making man aware of his own sins. And God forgives man who repents. The Qur’ân keenly and concretely points out man’s intrinsic weakness or propensity to evil in the fact that man does not only commit sins but often evades selfawareness of his sins. God sets the Sharî‘ah for fallible Muslims to live in the Ummah. Without the sharî‘ah, the Ummah could not be maintained, and hence Muslims could not exist in history in a full sense. For the Sharî‘ah may remind Muslims of God at every moment of action, and bring them back from forgetfulness of God to faith.
著者
宮永 泉
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.71-84, 1989 (Released:2018-03-19)

À la veille de sa conversion définitive, Pascal prit conscience du péché qui habitait en lui, comme Paul dans l’Épître aux Romains (Ⅶ). La conception des 《contrariétés》dans l’Entretien de Pascal avec Saci est l’expression philosophique de cette conscience et la conception de la《confusion》dans son traité : Sur la conversion du pécheur est l’expression psychologique de cette même conscience. Selon Pascal, dans ce dernier traité, l’homme peut se tirer de l’abîme de《confusion》 par trois moyens : la raison, l’habitude et les charmes. Le premier moyen est de considérer toutes les choses de ce monde comme périssantes et même déjà péries et, après quoi, de faire en sorte que Dieu (le vrai bien qui a ces deux qualités, l’éternité et la félicité) se manifeste à l’âme, par 《sa raison aidée de la lumière de la grâce》. Le deuxième moyen est de se soumettre à 《l’habitude dans la piété》comme nous le faisons dans la messe ou les prières. Le troisième moyen est de goûter《ces charmes》que la grâce au sens étroit du terme donne à l’âme. Il est évident que ces trois moyens de se convertir sont les arché-types des《trois moyens de croire : la raison, la coutume, l’inspiration》tels qu’ils sont exprimés dans les Pensées (L. 808-Br. 245).
著者
薗田 坦
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.4, pp.1-20, 1987 (Released:2018-03-15)

Die Frage nach dem “Menschen” bei Nikolaus von Cues wird hauptsächlich in zwei verschiedenen Hinsichten in seinen theologisch-philosophischen Schriften gestellt, nämlich einmal im dritten Buch der “De docta ignorantia” (1440) und zum anderen in der Schrift “Idiota de mente” (1450). In der erstgenannten Schrift wird der Mensch grundsätzlich im metaphysischen Zusammenhang mit Gott (maximum absolutum) und der Welt (maximum contractum) betrachtet und muß selber als “maximum contractum et absolutum” in die vermittelnde Stellung zwischen diesen beiden “maxima” eingeordnet werden. Nikolaus versucht diese Möglichkeit des Menschen in der vollendeten Menschlichkeit Jesu aufzusuchen und festzumachen, indem er die Idee des Menschen(humanitas) mit der Christus-Idee als “Gott-Mensch” zur Deckung zu bringen versucht und daraus folgend Jesus Christus für den einzig “wahren Menschen” ansieht. Dies führt dazu, daß die Anthropologie letztendlich in die Christologie zurückgeführt wird. In der zweiten Schrift wird der Mensch dagegen als Geist (mens) aufgefaßt und besonders wird seine Vernünftigkeit betont. Da der Geist aber zugleich als Bild Gottes (imago Dei) angesehen und diese Ebenbildlichkeit im Sinne der Gleichheit (aequalitas) mit Gott (unitas) interpretiert wird, wird der Mensch als Geist hier wiederum zu einer Stellung erhöht, die beinahe dem Sohne Gottes in der göttlichen Trinität entspricht. Der menschliche Geist hat von daher seine Entsprechung zu dem alle Dinge aus sich ausfaltenden (schöpferischen) Gott darin, daß er auf seine Weise (nämlich auf dem Wege der Erkenntnis) Nachbilder aller Dinge ausbilden kann. In beiden geschilderten Zusammenhängen spielt der Mensch jedenfalls die entscheidende, vermittelnde Rolle zwischen Gott und der Welt (allen Dingen). Man kann diese umfangreiche Bedeutsamkeit des Menschen im Denken des Cusaners dadurch auffinden, daß man die von der Christologie bis zur Geisteslehre entwikkelten Probleme unter dem leitenden Gesichtspunkt des “Menschen” zusammenschaut.
著者
中島 秀憲
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.4, pp.55-68, 1987 (Released:2018-03-15)

Der größte Teil der Schriften Hegels vor dem Jahre 1800 ist theologisch, während die Schriften nach dem Jahre 1801 philosophisch sind. Das Jahr 1801 kann als Wendepunkt Hegels “von der Religion zur Philosophie” gesehen werden. Doch ist dieser Schritt keine Abwendung von der Religion, sondern die Vollendung der “wahrhaften Religion.” Aber diese Vollendung ist nicht der gerade Weg von der “schönen Religion Jesu in den theologischen Schriften” zur “wahrhaften Religion”. Dazwischen gibt es eine qualitative Differenz. Die “schöne Religion Jesu” kann nicht sich mit der Reflexion versöhnen. Hingegen kann die “wahrhafte Religion” durch die Bewegung der Reflexion, in der die Reflexion sich in der Antinomie vernichtet und zur Vernunft zurückkehrt, vollendet werden.
著者
中路 正恒
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.68-80, 1986 (Released:2018-03-14)

Higher Men are insufficient because they do not realize the nature of affirmation― for true affirmation is inseparable from that negation which negates those negative values which are created by the “will to nothing”. Therefore the affirmation conceived by them is merely an abstract image of true affirmation. True affirmation finds its power in the affirmability of life itself revealed in the experience lived of the “eternal return”. This affirmability of life itself is called Dionysos, and the affirmation that affirms Dionysos finds its principle in Ariadne, while the “eternal return” signifies the wedding ring between these divinities.
著者
塩野谷 祐一
出版者
The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史学会年報 (ISSN:04534786)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, no.38, pp.21-27, 2000 (Released:2010-08-05)

A mere chronological description or an exegesis of past major economists does not constitute the history of economics as a discipline of social science. Inspired by a provocative claim of Kozo Sugimura, I have been concerned with the philosophical foundations of the history of economics. Social science observes social reality and constructs theory, which, in turn, becomes an object of observation. Just as a social study, whether historical or theoretical, focuses on social reality and attempts to make a subjective construction of the reality, so a study of theories is merely a subjective construction of those theories because they are a part of social reality. An approach to the history of economics, whether an interpretation or a critique, is also either historical or theoretical, i. e., it is an historical or rational reconstruction of economic thought. In my view, just as economic theory comprises economic statics, economic dynamics, and economic sociology, so metatheory, which is a theory about theory, consists of the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the sociology of science. Thus the structures of theory and metatheory are parallel in the sense that in social science both society and the mind are analyzed at three levels: the static, the dynamic, and the social. Actually based on an examination of the work of Joseph Schumpeter, I have explored a metatheoretical perspective of social science and called this conception of social science a two-structure approach to the mind and society.
著者
西村 拓生 岡本 哲雄 吉田 敦彦 山内 清郎 井谷 信彦 辻 敦子 神戸 和佳子 山田 真由美
出版者
奈良女子大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2012-04-01

教育における宗教性は、教育という営みの根底を考える際に非常に重要な契機である。この問題を考える際に思想史的に注目すべきなのが、京都学派の哲学に源流をもつ教育哲学の系譜である。この研究では、京都学派教育哲学の諸思想を分析し、その中に、「生命性と超越」を鍵概念とする系譜、「臨床性から公共性」という志向をもつ系譜、そして「言語の限界と可能性」をめぐる系譜を見出した。さらに、その分析を基盤として、教育における宗教性・超越性に関する多様な思想史的・人間学的研究を行ない、包括的・体系的な研究への足掛かりを構築した。
著者
大橋 容一郎
出版者
上智大学哲学会
雑誌
哲学論集 (ISSN:09113509)
巻号頁・発行日
no.45, pp.17-22, 2016

上智大学哲学会第83回大会 シンポジウム
著者
松井 貴英
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.55, pp.243-255,32, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

In Plato's Phaedo 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the Republic and the comparison with the slave boy in the Meno help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the Meno, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.
著者
田村 圭一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.55, pp.206-217,30, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
10

Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.
著者
藏田 伸雄 古田 徹也 久木田 水生 近藤 智彦 村山 達也 佐藤 岳詩 森岡 正博
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2016-04-01

本年度は北海道哲学会でシンポジウム「人生の意味」(研究代表者・藏田伸雄、研究分担者・森岡正博、研究協力者・山田健二)、日本倫理学会でワークショップ「「人生の意味」の哲学的・倫理学的議論の可能性」(研究代表者及び研究分担者・村山達也、研究協力者・文武吉沢、研究協力者・長門裕介)、科学哲学会でワークショップ「分析哲学/現代形而上学で「人生の意味」や「死」について「語る」ことはできるのか」(研究代表者及び研究分担者・久木田水生、研究協力者・鈴木生郎)を実施し、本研究の研究成果の一部を公開した。また研究代表者の藏田は日本生命倫理学会で「「人生の意味」というカテゴリーを生命倫理領域で用いる場合に注意しなければならないこと」と題する発表を行い、「人生の意味」に関する議論を終末期医療に関する生命倫理問題に接続することを試みた。また研究分担者と研究協力者による研究会も開催し、研究協力者の北村直彰氏によって死の形而上学について、また杉本俊介氏によって「人生の意味」とWhy be Moral問題についての検討を行った。また本研究課題に関連する問題についていくつかの論考を発表している研究分担者の山口尚氏の一連の論文を批判的に検討することを通じて、人生の意味と「決定論」や「自然主義」との関連について明らかにすることができた。特に、今年度は青土社の雑誌『現代思想』が分析哲学に関する別冊を発行したが、その中で研究分担者の森岡、村山、研究協力者の山口がこの研究班での研究の成果や、本研究と関わる内容について論文を掲載している。また本研究班での研究内容とは異なるが、研究分担者の近藤と古田は「道徳的な運」に関する研究成果を発表している。「道徳的な運」の問題は、本研究の直接的なテーマではないが、「人生の意味」に関する問題とも深く関わる。
著者
宮原 勇 MIYAHARA Isamu
出版者
名古屋大学文学部
雑誌
名古屋大学文学部研究論集. 哲学 (ISSN:04694716)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, pp.45-73, 2015-03-31

It has been widely admitted that the main text of Husserliana Bd. X is very difficult to interpret consistently because of its compilation. The first version of the main text appeared in one of the Jahrbuch (1928) collected from various Husserl's manuscripts written in a comparatively wide period, and edited by Edith Stein and Martin Heiddeger in an arbitrary way. At last in the year 2013, the PhB version of Husserliana Bd. X was published by Rudolf Bernet with a long introduction, in which he confirms the date of each manuscript. So we investigate the textual genesis of it and the whole structure and relations of the problems concerning the time-consciousness on the basis of such a textual criticism. Especially we propose a new interpretation of the diagram of time-consciousness of §10 and its text, namely; Husserl's famous diagram originated in the diagram drawn by Franz Brentano, which we can know through the report by Carl Stumpf. We conclude that it is impossible to understand the phrase 'die stetige Reihe der Ordinaten' in the text of §10 without knowing Brentano's diagram.