著者
小川 芳範
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.1, pp.1-13, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
24

In this paper, I consider a philosophical interpretation of Hilbert's program put forward by Paul Bernays. The paper consists, roughly, of two parts. In the first part, I briefly describe Bernays's polemic against "immanence philosophy" over the question concerning the epistemological status of theoretical sciences and its relation to the foundational controversy in mathematics in the 1920s. In the second part, I briefly discuss the theory of cognition contained in the transcendental philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries and his twentieth century evangelist, LeonardNelson, and consider Bernays's view against the background of this intellectual tradition. I conclude the paper by arguing for the importance of attending to Friesian influence in order to achieve a deeper understanding of Bernays's (and Hilbert's) philosophy of mathematics.
著者
原田 悦子
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.2, pp.107-118, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
18

After 100 years of experimental researches, two aspects of human memory are now treated separately in cognitive psychology; one is memory as conscious experiences, and the other is memory as information. In this paper, historical accounts are described with experimental researches on (a) implicit memory, i.e., memory without conscious recollection, (b) process dissociation procedures (PDP), i.e., a theoretical model and also a methodology to dissociate parallel cognitive processes, particularly conscious and automatic mental processes, and (c) false memory phenomena.
著者
横山 輝雄
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.17-25, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

Whether the natural classification of plants and animals is possible or not is an important problem of philosophy of biology. Because of the acceptance of the theory of evolution, "the death of essentialism" is widely held. But an extreme conventionalist's view that every classification is artificial is not correct. In this paper I propound a view that the natural classification is possible in some sense. The natural classification has its roots in "folk taxonomy" and is necessary for human beings. The natural classification is different from phylogenetic classification. We should distinguish phylogenetical study of the evolutional history from taxonomy or classification, especially the natural classification.
著者
佐藤 敬三
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.61-75, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

It is proposed that cybernetics and general system theory, founded by N. Wiener and L. von Bertalanffy respectively, may be united to form system cybernetics. The nature of system cybernetics and its post modernity as well are discussed, while modernity is characterised by a set of three features somewhat annoying. System cybernetics is expected to play a part in overcoming that modernity.
著者
和田 泰一
出版者
日本イギリス哲学会
雑誌
イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, pp.93-107, 2014-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
参考文献数
37

The aim of this article is to formulate the purely semantic structure of representation treated in Hobbesʼs Leviathan. While the political covenant developed in The Elements of Law and De Cive is characterized by several features as the consent and unity for the purpose of achieving peace and safety, the exercise of the right of nature by the sovereign, and the performance of covenant by subjects, the theory of representation in Leviathan introduces new aspects as authorization, the sovereignʼs right of representing each one of a multitude, the ownership of all the actions of the sovereign by subjects, and serves to strengthen Hobbesʼ s claim. The structure of representation is founded on semantic union of signifiant and signifié, or représentant and représenté, of which the ensemble of a chain of representations is composed.
著者
大峯 顯
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.1-19, 1985 (Released:2018-03-01)

Nichts scheint auf den ersten Blick disparater als Wahrheit und Mythologie. Wir haben uns gewöhnt, unter Mythos eine Kunde zu verstehen, die im wörtlichen Sinne nicht wahr sein kann. Aber Schelling behauptet: Der Mythologie eignet Objektivität, Notwendigkeit und Wahrheit. Mit dieser These setzt Schelling sich allen bisherigen Theorien der Mythologie entgegen, die im äußersten Fall die Mythologie als eine entstellte Wahrheit nehmen. Um diese der Mythologie eigene Wahrheit ans Licht zu bringen, sucht Schelling sich selbst zu allererst auf die Höhe der Mythologie zu erheben. Das Dunkel, das den Ursprung des Mythos umgibt, kann nicht anders überwinden, als in Folge einer gründlichen Erweiterung des menschlichen Denkhorizonts. Schelling entdeckt in allen bisherigen Erklärungsweisen der Mythologie das Prinzip der A l l e g o r i e. Die allegorische Deutung der Mythologie erklärt: zwar lilegt in der Mythologie Wahrheit, aber nicht, sofern sie Mythologie ist. Diese Deutung erklärt nicht die Mythologie, sondern sie verflüchtigt und verleugnet. Demgegenüber lautet Schellings These: Die Mythologie ist a l s s o l c h e wahr. Sie ist ihr wirklich existierendes Wesen, das nicht etwas anders i s t, etwas anders b e d e u t e t, sodern nur das bedeutet, was sie ist. Die Mythologie ist t a u t e g o r i s c h. Das Zentrum der Schellingschen Philosophie der Mythologie ist der Begriff des theogonischen Prozesses: ein Prozeß, in dem Gott selbst w i r d, in dem er sich, als der wahre Gott, s u k z e s s i v erzeugt. Es ist eine gegen das Bewußtsein r e a l e, d.h. nicht mehr in seiner Gewalt befindliche Macht, die sich seiner in der Mythologie bemächtigt hat. Die Mythologie hat also ihre wesentliche Wahrheit erlangt, indem sie als ein notwendiges Moment im Prozeß der Selbstentfaltung des Absoluten begriffen ist. Der charakteristische Vorzug und die eigentümlichen Grenzen der Schellingschen Spekulation treten an diesem Punkt deutlich hervor. Die Konzeption des theogonischen Prozesses ist es, die Mythologie von allem subjektiven Gesichtskreis befreit. Aber zugleich schließt diese Konzeption die Gefahr in sich, daß das tautegorische Wesen der Mythologie wieder aufhebt. Dieser Mangel scheint mir davon zu kommen, daß Schelling den Mythos ausschließlich in Zusammenhang mit der Vernunft behandelt und die Sprachlichkeit des Mythos immer noch übersieht.
著者
海野 敏 影浦 峡 戸田 愼一
出版者
日本図書館情報学会
雑誌
日本図書館情報学会誌 (ISSN:13448668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.4, pp.205-221, 2006-12-20
被引用文献数
1

本研究の目的は,近代における図書館の存在意義と社会的機能を明らかにすることである。そのために,主体とメディアの関係を手がかりとし,哲学,社会学,メディア研究等の先行研究を照査した。メディアが近代的主体の成立に寄与するための客観的条件を考えたところ,すべての条件を初めて満たしたのは印刷本であった。また,現在に至るまで印刷本だけが近代的主体の成立に寄与してきたことがわかった。さらに,19世紀に欧米で成立した近代図書館は,理念的には近代的主体の理想を純粋に体現していた。以上より,近代における図書館の本源的な社会的機能は,印刷本を媒介として近代的主体の成立,維持,強化に寄与するものであることを示した。
著者
成瀬 翔 NARUSE Sho
出版者
名古屋大学文学部
雑誌
名古屋大学文学部研究論集. 哲学 (ISSN:04694716)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.63, pp.61-74, 2017-03-31

John Seale claims that human society are based a special rules: constitutive rules. Constitutive rules have form of ʻX counts as Y in context Cʼ, and are characterized as constituting social facts. For example, bills in the wallet are physically only pieces of paper. However, certain type of paper counts as bills in our society. Seale asserts constitutive rules are foundation to create such a social fact. But, the problem is acts of ʻcounts asʼ. Searle is assumed this act as a primitive concept. In order to explain this act, I will compare the Kendall Walton and Searle, and try to clarify the constitutive rules. The contents of this paper are as follows. In Section 1, I will survey Searleʼs discussion and consider concepts of constitutive rules and social facts. In Section 2, I will introduce Waltonʼs theory of make-believe. In Section 3, I will compare the Searle and Walton, and point out the differences between them.
著者
高艸 賢
出版者
日本社会学会
雑誌
社会学評論 (ISSN:00215414)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, no.4, pp.468-484, 2019

アルフレート・シュッツの生世界論は,社会学の研究対象領域の1 つを提示しているだけでなく,社会科学の意味を反省するための手がかりを与えている.本稿の問いは,シュッツにおいて生世界概念は何を契機として導入され,その結果彼の論理はどのように変わったのか,という点にある.その際,シュッツの社会科学の基礎づけのプロジェクトに含まれる2 つの問題平面を区別し,社会科学者もまた生を営む人間(科学する生)だという点に注目する.<br>1920 年代から30 年代初頭にかけての著作において,シュッツは生の哲学の着想に依拠しつつ,生成としての生を一方の極とし論理と概念を用いる科学を他方の極とする「両極対立」のモデルを採用していた.しかし体験の流れとの差分において科学を規定するという方法には,科学する生を積極的には特徴づけられないという困難があった.こうした状況でシュッツは生という概念の規定を見直し,生世界概念を導入したと解釈される.<br>生世界概念の導入によって,日常を生きる人間も科学に従事する人間も,世界に内属する生として捉え直された.私を超越し一切の活動の普遍的基盤をなす世界の中で,生は間主観性・歴史性・パースペクティヴ性を伴う.この観点からシュッツは科学する生を,科学の間主観的構造,科学的状況と科学の媒体としてのシンボルの歴史的成立,レリヴァンス構造による科学的探究のパースペクティヴ性という3 点によって特徴づけた.
著者
高艸 賢
出版者
日本社会学理論学会
雑誌
現代社会学理論研究 (ISSN:18817467)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.11, pp.55-67, 2017

本稿の目的は、A. シュッツにおける学問と生の区別と連関の論理を明らかにすることである。シュッツによる理解社会学の基礎づけの議論は日常知と科学知の関係づけを模索するものとして捉えられてきたが、常識と科学の二分法の下では、シュッツの論じる生の論理的重層性が見えにくくなるという問題がある。そこで本稿は、ウィーン時代に書かれた著作および草稿を扱い、シュッツが生における体験次元と意味次元という区別を導入していることに注目する。ベルクソンに依拠したこの概念化は、人間の思惟の基盤を分析するという点で、科学知への批判的視点と日常知に埋没することへの警戒を同時に含意している。シュッツは主著『社会的世界の意味構築』において、両次元の区別に基づいて社会的世界の機制を解明している。意味次元についてシュッツは、他者理解が所与の知識に基づく意味付与として遂行されるという「自己解釈」の機制を明らかにし、他方で体験次元については、他者の体験の連続的生成を見遣るという「持続の同時性」を論じている。体験次元と意味次元は日常的行為者においては主観的意味という形で統一を形成しているが、「主観的意味連関の客観的意味連関」としての社会科学は必然的に体験次元を欠く。理解社会学の認識限界を踏まえたシュッツは、生きられる日常における体験と意味の統一に、純粋に哲学的な思惟や社会科学的分析によっては得られない社会学的反省の基盤を見いだしている。
著者
田村 均
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.61, pp.261-276_L16, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)
参考文献数
19

A self-sacrificial action is not consistent with rational decision-making. If an agent decides to take the rational course of action, that is, the best action among the options, the decision is not truly self-sacrificial. The agent has sought the best option and, therefore, nothing is really sacrificed. We need, then, a scheme other than that of rational decision making to explain self-sacrifice. I propose a theory which explains a self-sacrificial action as a kind of play-acting. In a play, an actor may take a role that is undesirable in real life. In a social situation involving self-sacrifice, the agent must accept such a course of action as undesirable but inevitable for anyone in the same situation. In a sense, the agent is coerced into playing an undesirable role. We cannot but see the agent as accepting it as an actor would. In instances of sacrifice, such as the sacrificial rite of the Ainu Bear Festival (IYOMANTE) or the legend of Iphigenia at Aulis, there is a traditional, social scenario that prescribes proper action. The self-sacrificial agent accepts such action in the same way that an actor accepts an unattractive role. The agent will intentionally perform the action; however, this is only in response to the prescription of the scenario. In other words, it is not based on an authentic decision, but on a play-acting decision. In this way, we can explain an act of self-sacrifice that implies a moral split for the agent. Contemporary theories of action, such as G. E. M. Anscombe's intellectualist theory or Donald Davidson's voluntarist-like theory, take it for granted that in any situation an agent is an integrated person with no moral split in principle. Moral splits, or dilemmas, are not, however, rare in everyday life. I put forward the play-acting theory of action as an alternative to contemporary theories.
著者
石崎 嘉彦
出版者
政治哲学研究会
雑誌
政治哲学 (ISSN:24324337)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.25, pp.26-60, 2019 (Released:2019-04-10)

本翻訳は、Leo Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws, The University of Chicago Press, 1975 (Midway reprint 1983), pp. 22-53 の日本語訳である。ジョゼフ・クロプシーの「前書き」と「第一巻」の翻訳は、『政治哲学』第20号(2016年、99-123頁)に、レオ・シュトラウス「プラトン『法律』の議論と筋書」(1)としてすでに公表されている。併せて参照いただければ幸いである。
著者
遠藤 智夫
出版者
日本英学史学会
雑誌
英学史研究 (ISSN:03869490)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1994, no.26, pp.71-83, 1993 (Released:2010-05-07)
参考文献数
28

It is well known that the English word “philosophy” was translated into Japanese astetsugakuby Amane Nishi.The writer makes clear the circumstances under which Nishi coined the termtetsugaku.However, before Nishi coined it, the wordrigakuwas the term most com-monly used to mean “philosophy.” In 1791-92, in a translation of a Dutch book on astronomy, YoshinagaMotoki translated “philosophy” into various terms, such as 儒教・智学・窮理学・性理学・性理術. This was the first recorded translation of “philosophy” into these terms. And after twenty years, in a few Dutch-Japanese or English-Japanese dictionaries compiled around 1810, we can find the wordrigaku (理学).A case can be made that Yoshinaga Motoki and Dutch interpreters played an important role in the translation of the word “philosophy” into Japanese. But why didtetsugahucome to replacerigakuas the commonly accepted translation whenrigakuhad been used for so many years.After presenting a report at the regular monthly meeting in April, 1993, the writer tried to throw new light on this question, as well as on the issues of why opinions are divided on the books in which the termtetsugakuappeared, and why “philosophy” was not translated into its exact Japanese equivalentaichigaku (愛智学).
著者
野本 和幸
出版者
北海道大学哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.1-28, 2004-07-18

Firstly I sketch Frege's personal history, his academic career and his publications briefly, and secondly I try to give a general outline of the structural and methodological characteristics of his investigations as a whole. One can divide Frege's logico-philosophical investigations into the three parts as follows: (A) The invention of contemporary logic, its axiomatic systematization and the development of the logicist philosophy of arithmetic. (B) Philosophy of logic. (C) Controversies with his contemporary distinguished scholars concerning psychologism, empiricism, physicalism, formalism, etc., though I do not take them up this time. Concerning (A), firstly I try to explain why Frege must constitute the higher order logic through formulating his formal language (Begriffsschrift) for the accomplishment of his logicist project. Secondly I take note of his theory of judgment/ assertion and inference, and point out its two distinctive features, i.e., (1) his priority thesis of judgment, and (2) his epistemological characterization of judgment and inference. For Frege, a judgment is the recognition of the truth (als wahr anerkennen) of the thought-content and assertion is the manifestation of a judgment with assertoric force,while an inference is the justification (Berechtigung) of the correctness of the conclusion based on its true premises. Thirdly, Frege's claim of the primacy of the sentence or the context principle, and the composition principle are Frege's methodological guiding principles of his syntactic and semantic considerations as a whole. Concerning (B): his philosophy of logic, (1) Frege will neither approve the justifiability of primitive logical laws nor definability of primitive logical terms within his Begriffsschrift. (2) In fact, Frege does not introduce distinctive model theoretic ideas such as variant domains or quantification along with domain fixing. However, Frege explicitly provides lots of semantical 'explanations (Erklärung/Darlegung)' in his ‘explanatory language (Darlegungssprache)' as metalanguage distinguished from his object language (Begriffsschrift as ‘Hilfssprache'). For example, in his main work: GGA, Frege tries to give the proofs of the meaningfulness of his primitive logical symbols, truthfulness of axioms, and the truth-preserving nature of inference-rules. (3) Frege gives further metalinguistic explanations as propedeutic concerning the basic ‘logical forms' such as‘fall-under (subsumption)' and his logical categories: objects versus concepts/functions, and his semantic distinction of sense (Sinn) and Meaning (Bedeutung). In such explanations there might be a certain anticipation of Wittgensteinian idea of ‘saying' and ‘showing'. Furthermore Frege provides meta-meta-linguistic elucidations or suggestions resorting to vivid metaphors concerning his fundamental categories of proper names versus function-signs/concept-words,o r objects versus functions/concepts, the distinction of Begriffsschrft from ordinary language, and the relationship of representation, sense and Meaning, etc. Really Frege is not only the most revolutionary logician since Aristotle, but also a distinguished man of metaphor.