- 著者
- 
             
             梅村 卓
             
          
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
- 雑誌
- アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.54, no.1, pp.3-21, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)
- 参考文献数
- 31
- 被引用文献数
- 
             
             1
             
             
             
          
        
        Studies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have not so far included much                    investigation of the Party’s media strategy. The radio broadcasts of the Chinese                    Nationalist Party have been the subject of much study, but there is little                    corresponding research about the CCP. This paper therefore examines the                    operating conditions of CCP broadcasting during the Anti-Japanese War and the                    Civil War, and defines its characteristics in comparison with the radio                    broadcasts of other countries.In 1940, when the CCP started broadcasting, radio was the latest media. Radio,                    unlike printed media, can communicate with anyone, irrespective of literacy, and                    does not need to be physically delivered. These characteristics were very                    important for China, because most of the population were illiterate, and with no                    transport infrastructure it was very difficult to reach some regions—especially                    key CCP territories in remote mountainous lands such as the Shanganning                    district. For these reasons the CCP gave a great deal of thought to radio.At this time, as in Nazi Germany, the Japanese empire and the United States,                    radio as a propaganda tool played a major role in promoting national unity. When                    information was blockaded by the Nationalist Party and the Civil War, the CCP used radio for                    intelligence and psychological warfare. The main radio programs provided                    internal party communication and external propaganda to the enemy (black                    propaganda). The CCP noticed that there had been hostilities between Jiang Jie                    Shi and various regional armies. These armies surrendered, and in addition asked                    to surrender to the CCP. Historical material suggests that these discussions                    were made based on strategic considerations. Although it cannot be claimed that                    these propaganda programs aimed at the Nationalist Party turned the tide of the                    Civil War completely, once the tide of war turned against the Nationalist Party,                    the CCP broadcasts greatly influenced the Nationalist Party’s officers and men                    as they fought their last-ditch battles. Although the Nationalist army was                    better equipped than the CCP army, the Nationalist army soon collapsed.The CCP did not consider the general public to be their audience, because radio                    receivers were not widely available and standard Chinese had not spread. Most                    importantly, however, the CCP was not at the stage of considering national unity, because it had not yet come                    into power. Ironically, most of the people who met the requirements for listening to the                    radio were the Nationalist Party’s army and the residents of                    Nationalist-controlled areas. Other countries used radio to establish a system                    of total war, but the CCP did not follow this approach. The CCP mainly used                    radio as a tool for military activity.