- 著者
-
金 恩貞
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
- 雑誌
- アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.62, no.1, pp.9-23, 2016-01-31 (Released:2016-02-09)
- 参考文献数
- 29
This paper presents an historical analysis of the policy formation process within the Japanese government regarding the issues of claims between Japan and South Korea (below, “Korea”) for the period from February 1951, the start of the first round of Japan-Korea talks, to October 1953, when the talks were suspended. This paper aims at providing an overview of the Japan-Korea talks from a novel perspective via elucidation of the situation within the Japanese government during the early 1950s—a period mostly blank in previous research. The process of forming concrete policies for relations with Korea during this period in Japan was clarified as described below. The paper first presents its overview findings, while referencing previous research, of the Japanese government’s negotiation strategies regarding the Japan-Korea claims issue before the Japan-Korea talks officially began, specifically in regards to how these initial strategies impacted the first round of talks. It was during this period when differences in attitudes towards the claims issue surfaced between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and considerations are presented regarding the background for such. Described next is the formation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the “mutual abandonment of claims ‘plus alpha’” concept around the time that the negotiations became locked and had their first suspension. This included the concept of justifying Japan’s claims on Korea, with both sides then together abandoning their claims, and Japan agreeing to make monetary payments to Korea while avoiding the nomenclature of “claims.” Examination is made of how the processes of discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs converged on this idea, with focus on the interactions of the logic of the Asian Affairs Bureau, which viewed foreign relations with Korea as important, international circumstances at that time, and commitments Japan had to the United States. Finally, in the midst of opposition between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance regarding policy proposals for the Japan-Korea claims issue, clarification is made as to what kind of arguments were presented that led to the Japanese government’s adoption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ plan as the official policy for negotiating with Korea. The flexible attitude toward Korea by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its emphasis on international relations was taken up as part of the Japanese government’s initial Korean strategy, and made possible a conceptual framework for government policy proposals that were more suited for mutual agreement. Also, in tandem with the changing international circumstances on the Korean peninsula, Japan could not avoid improving its relations with Korea, and this served to soften the hardline policy stance that the Ministry of Finance had adopted towards Korea. When one considers the progression of the debates within the Japanese government, most worthy of notice is that Japan did not abandon its original perceptions towards Korea, but rather conceived a solution that had as its premise exclusion of the term “claims” (literally, “the right to make claims”). It is of deep interest that this concept was similar to that inclusive within the solution of the claims issue in 1965 with the adoption of the “economic cooperation” policy in the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.