- 著者
-
松井 貴英
- 出版者
- 日本哲学会
- 雑誌
- 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2004, no.55, pp.243-255,32, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)
In Plato's Phaedo 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the Republic and the comparison with the slave boy in the Meno help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the Meno, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.