- 著者
-
倉科 一希
- 出版者
- JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2003, no.134, pp.42-55,L9, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
- 参考文献数
- 67
This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters.The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956.The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter.These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration.Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.